The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare

• Putin's Sledgehammer (E112)

  Putin’s Sledgehammer: The Wagner Group and Russia’s Collapse into Mercenary Chaos, by Professor Candace Rondeaux is a must read for anyone interested learning how Russia came to rely on mercenary-like organizations in its global strategy and how it has used them. This book is not just about Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner, not even about Russia's other quasi-mercenary actors. It is an excellent summary of how Russia has come to be what it is since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The opening section alone is worth the cover price of the book. This is an extensive who is who of Russian oligarchs, generals, and mercenaries. Putin’s Sledgehammer is not what one might consider a dry academic thesis. Professor Rondeaux tells this story better than any spy-thriller, better because it is true. Like most true stories, it seems more fantastical than any political fantasy. It tells why Russia intervened in Syria, Africa, Ukraine, and elsewhere, who are the players in developing that strategy, and how they implemented it. In shining the spotlight on Russia, the United States and the West in general is not let off the hook. The West did not simply stand aside while Russia pursued a global strategy through mercenary means. Western political leaders, however, made the mistake of thinking that Russia would turn away from its disruptive approach and accept the Western rules-based order if only given the proper incentives and sanctions. The West failed and continues to fail to understand Russia just as Russian leaders continue to misinterpret and misapply ways and means employed by the U.S. and its allies. In summary, Putin’s Sledgehammer is an outstanding single source for anyone interested in Russian imperial aspirations and the unconventional means it uses in pursuit of those goals. References: Rondeaux, C. (2025). Putin’s sledgehammer: The Wagner Group and Russia’s collapse into mercenary chaos (First edition). PublicAffairs. The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare: Episode 2: “What Are Russian Private Military Companies?” (2019) Episode 4: “The Difference Between Russian Quasi-Mercenary Organizations and Western PMSCs” (2019) Episode 6: “Meeting the Challenge” (2019) Episodes 35-39: On Mercenary Warfare (2021) Episode 54: “Russian Mercenaries” (2022) Episode 63: “Why Wagner” (2023) (Which contains one guess that may have been true at the time, but was ultimately unreliable.) Episode 75: “Wagner Decapitated?” (2023)

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• Nations, States, and Countries (E111)

  I am picking up my podcast series where I left off, addressing the challenges of peace. War is an act of violence among nations or states, affecting entire countries. These terms, nations, states, and countries are not synonymous. Confusing these terms leads to misunderstanding, misinterpretation, or can be used to create misperceptions. In this episode I try to clarify the difference among nations, states, and countries. Understanding the differences and relationships among these terms is important to analyzing the actual and claimed objectives of warring parties and to identify emotion driven propaganda that obstructs the path to peace.   The information in these podcasts represents only my own thoughts, and not those of any organization I am, or have ever been associated with. (Some of what I say may be completely opposed to official position of some of the organizations.)   Music: Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain Copland, A. & United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)

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• Moving Forward with the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare (E110)

  Now that I have laid the groundwork for what I think everyone needs to know about war, I can digress and address current topics of interest, placing them in the framework of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. In this podcast I build on the topic of peace in the last episode to address current developments regarding Ukraine. Russia is the aggressor. Putin cannot be rewarded for his violations of international law, the laws and customs of war, both jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and threatening the peace and security of all of Europe. However, without a Western commitment to apply overwhelming force against Russian aggression, a cease fire is in order. The death and destruction of war without any serious prospects for victory violates Just War principles of proportionality and reasonable probability of success. Even Clausewitz would agree. As usual, the opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with. Music: Wagner, R. and US Marine Corps Band, Siegfried’s Funeral March and Finale (Götterdammerung) from “Music of Richard Wagner” (1981) (Public Domain)

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• E109: Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace

  In my closing podcast summarizing the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare I review key points from Episodes 91-96 about peace, with an application to current events. When we are trying to figure out conflict termination the take-away should be that peace after war depends on: Jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The material evils of war are only justified to correct an injustice so great that the continued harm of that injustice is worse than the harm caused by that war. The cure cannot be worse than the disease. Jus in bello limits those harms and makes the restoration of peace easier. Being feared but not hated. This goes with Jus in Bello. Deliberate actions that cause unnecessary death and destruction, particularly to the civilian population and cultural/religious works, can inflame passion and hatred among the civilian population. The result can both extend the conflict and instill long-lasting resentments which plant the seeds of future war. Jus post bellum: Establishing or re-establishing justice. Victory is not peace. It does not correct the injustices that justified the war. Victory, or the point where both sides are so exhausted that they accept a truce, is merely a necessary pre-condition for building a peace that addresses the root causes of the injustices that led to armed conflict. Sadly, these are largely ideals, rarely practiced throughout history. They are derived from the numerous examples in the history of warfare which disregarded these concepts and the far fewer examples in which they were practiced, leading to a more sustainable peace. Although this is the last episode covering the fundamentals that I think every citizen should know about war, the podcast will continue, but more on that next week.   Music: Copeland, A., and the US Marine Corps Band, Fanfare for the Common Man (2000), Library of Congress recording  

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• War is a Political Instrument

  After taking a Christmas break, I am picking up on my summaries of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. In the previous episode, I described the nature of war as violence intended to compel an opponent to submit to your will. Although this idea is described by Carl von Clausewitz in his magnum opus, On War, the Prussian philosopher of war is best known for the aphorism that war is a continuation of politics by other means. It is a catchy phrase, but that translation leaves a lot to be desired and misses key points Clausewitz wanted to make. As I see it, the key take-aways from this idea are: War must be viewed as an instrument of national policy – one among many. War is not the policy; war is inserted to the ongoing political engagement to achieve the policy objective.  Therefore, it is important to know what that policy is – the objective the policy intends to achieve. That is, to understand what a nation intends to achieve by war, before embarking upon it. It follows then, that the use of force in war must be consistent with the aims of that policy. Not all wars have the policy objective of overthrowing the enemy. A suspension of active warfare does not necessarily mean abandoning the strategic policy objective. If you want to end a war, achieve or change the policy objective.   Reference: v. Clausewitz, C., On War, (Michael Howard and Peter Paret Ed. And Tansl.) © 1976 Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA Music: Holst, G. The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War, Internet Archives, https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709 Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain(

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