The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare

Every August and September, the U.S. atomic bombing of Japan in 1945 seems to be a topic of discussion. This year, I decided to take that on and place it into the Just War framework, specifically jus in bello, or justice in the conduct of war. Just War Theory is a recurring topic in this podcast series. I believe that this framework is critical as a restraint on war and to establishing a just and lasting peace after war. (I still intend on addressing Pope Leo’s statement that Just War Theory is outdated.) This episode builds on information my guests and I presented in previous episodes, and particularly Episodes 13-16, and Episode 17 which described Just War Theory in theory and practice. As a side note, the web service that hosts these podcasts informed me that the episodes of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare now have 50,000 downloads. I know that many podcasters get this for a single episode. Since I don’t do this for the clicks, but just to share my thoughts on war, I was somewhat impressed that so many people bothered to download my thoughts. Thank you.

 

Music:

Liszt, F., and the USMC Band, Les Preludes. Public Domain

Copland, A. & United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)

The common definition of a mercenary is a soldier paid to fight in an armed conflict for a country that is not his or her own. The terrorist organization Hizballah operates in Lebanon, fighting against Israel, with financial, material and organizational support from Iran, and frequently under the direction of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Under the common definition, could Hizballah be considered mercenaries fighting for Iran? Royce de Melo, Doug Brooks, and I discuss this question in this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.

 

References:

 

Hague 1907: Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907. (definition of lawful combatant) https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/hague-conv-iv-1907

Article 47, Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions, 1977 (definition of mercenary) (The United States is not a party to this Protocol) https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977?activeTab=1949GCs-APs-and-commentaries

United Nations Mercenary Convention: International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-against-recruitment-use-financing-and&ved=2ahUKEwi47cCQ6M-VAxV4M1kFHX_OGsAQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1fCthlNI1AV0DjEGZmeTVl (As of the date of this episode, only 38 governments had ratified this treaty. Only two NATO countries are parties to the convention.)

Music:

Liszt, F., and the USMC Band, Les Preludes. Public Domain

Kiilstofte, P. Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)

Is war rational? The great philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, was a product of three schools of education: the classical tradition of Aristotle, the enlightenment philosophers such as Kant, and the practical experience of Napoleon. Each of these three challenged and opposed the other two. His work, On War expresses this tension and opposition. In his effort to develop a comprehensive theory of war, he had to deal with the many instances where the reality of war seemed to defy any coherent framework, where the things which should happen in war are contradicted by what actually happens. (This fits with his assigning the element of probability and chance to the military leg of his famous triad.) “Consequently,” he wrote, “it would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of their governments…” If it did, he concluded, then in the end, war would never need to be fought. But wars are fought. Is war itself then, irrational?

 

Music:

Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)

Copland, A. & United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)

Since at least the 1940’s, policy and strategic thinking uses the so-called rational actor model in determining what competitors and partners may do, how to respond to them, and how they may react in return. Even considering variations to that model to explain less than optimal choices by these actors, there appears to be enough irrationality by state and non-state actors to call into question whether continued use of the rational actor model is itself rational.

 

Music:

Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)

Copland, A. & United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)

I haven’t posted for a few weeks mostly because the current armed conflict with Iran poses a lot of questions that I don’t have answers for. One thing I might have an answer for is the question about wars of choice. Recently, this term is used in a way that implies that this armed conflict is illegitimate or unethical. Like many terms used by any faction with intended political impact, the term is left undefined. Without defining terms there can be no logical argument. Rather, the intent is an appeal to emotion, rather than reason. In this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare, I take on the challenge of defining that term and applying it to modern conflicts.

Music:

Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)

Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive