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Russian World
At around the same time the video headlining this article was recorded, President Putin was hosting Russian Language, or Pushkin Day. This precedes Russia Day which is celebrated on 12 June. Putin spoke virtually from Novo Ogaryovo, his favoured residence on the outskirts of Moscow which boasts a heated, indoor, Olympic-sized swimming pool. Russian was one of the most expressive languages in the world, he extolled, 'reflecting our spiritual and moral traditions, culture, and unique identity.' The Russian president often blathers about Russia as a great 'civilisational-state'. It is even written into the country's national security doctrine: 'Russian World'(Russkiy mir) as counterpoint to the wicked 'Collective West'. A reader glancing at the image would likely imagine it shows two Ukrainian soldiers at the bottom of a sand pit. Not so. The two unfortunates are Russian soldiers - refuseniks. Not visible in the footage is another Russian firing live rounds into the sand around them and taunting them. This 'Russian World' - a reality far removed from the scented, polished corridors of presidential villas in Moscow - is the subject of this article. 'On the Russian Peasant' In 1922, the Russian writer Maxim Gorky wrote a later much-quoted essay 'On the Russian Peasant'. Why, Gorky mused, were Russians capable of apparently bottomless cruelty? 'I experienced and saw many atrocities. I could never find a justification for their existence …Where does this human cruelty come from?' His view of the Muscovite (Russian) national character was low and deserves to be quoted in full: 'It seems to me that the most striking feature of the Moscow national character is actual cruelty, just like English humour. This is a special cruelty, and at the same time a cold-bloodedly invented measure of the degree of endurance and resistance in patience that man can attain… The most interesting feature of Moscow brutality is its devilish finesse, its, I would say, aesthetic refinement. I do not think that these features can be explained by such words as "psychosis", "sadism" or similar. Because in essence, they do not explain anything. A consequence of alcoholism? - But I do not think that the people of Moscow were more poisoned by alcohol than other European nations. However, it must be admitted that the influence of alcohol on the psyche of a Muscovite is particularly fatal because our nation is worse off than others. I am not talking here about cruelty, which appears sporadically, like an explosion of a sick or perverted soul. These are exceptions that will chill a psychiatrist: here I am talking about mass psychology, about the nation's soul, about collective cruelty.' In Russia, he concluded, almost everyone enjoys beating someone. On the 'Special Military Operation' Putin's 'Special Military Operation' will be remembered for its barbarism. The Russian president arrogantly presumed to take Kyiv in three days and the rest of eastern and southern Ukraine in two weeks. Instead he has mired Russia in a disaster and revealed to the world the true nature of 'Russian World'. The Donbas, which he presumed to 'liberate', has been turned into a ravaged, depopulated wasteland, a region drained of children, jobs, hope or a future. Scores of settlements and towns have been erased from the map. The 'Russian way of warfare' has proved to be naked banditry. 'This is not the 'second army' of the world,' as one Ukrainian expressed following the invasion, 'this is a bunch of marauders, degenerates, executioners and rapists.' From Kherson to Kharkiv, daily and nightly drone attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure have not stopped for over three years. Russian contempt for the Laws of Armed Conflict and International Red Cross (IRC) has been breath-taking. Ukrainian PoWs are currently dispersed in around 300 prisons across Russia (Ukraine maintains five transit centres and five permanent prisons). Moscow will not allow the IRC anywhere near Ukrainian PoWs and...
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Creating internal dilemmas: The Gendering of Grey-Zone Warfare
"Russia's hybrid attacks against NATO look like war", writes Deborah Haynes for Sky News. She is referring to grey-zone warfare, attacks that sit under the threshold of conventional war and include sabotage, cyber hacks, and assassination plots. Significantly, this is not the first caution published in the recent media of Russia's employment of this type of warfare and the risks of a failed NATO response. As Edward Lucas warns in The Times, Russia's war in the grey zone is actually chipping away at the heart of NATO. When I read these warnings, my gendered military experiences are at the forefront of my mind. I am a female, current serving RAF Reservist and former RAF Regular. I am also a PhD student, with my research centres around gender and RAF organisational culture. Whilst connecting diversity, inclusion and sub-threshold warfare may seem a stretch to some and arguably to others, a further distraction from the more immediate threat of war, I am well aware that the impact of grey-zone warfare has far reaching consequences. Grey-zone warfare conducted in 'peacetime' using information, money, or even physical force is powerful. Not only does it have a physical impact on UK and NATO defence through the seemingly endless impact of drones, hired thugs, and now "seabed sabotage" damaging infrastructure, energy, computer networks or transport systems; but most significantly, the cohesive nature in which we fight together, reducing the ability to defend against threats. By "posing dilemmas and stoking divisions" the MoD is being pulled in ways which undermine the foundations of the organisations purpose. The real target, as Edward Lucas writes, is decision making. The act of distracting and undermining decision making equates to sub-threshold warfare, reducing the ability to effectively operate. So where does gender and diversity link in? In the real world? In November 2024, the HMNZS Manawanui, a New Zealand Naval ship, crashed and subsequently sank under the command of Yvonne Gray, whose Naval career notably spanned over 30-years in both the New Zealand and Royal Navy. Despite this, her gender and sexuality were directly attributed to the incident. As a "diversity hire", she has faced a barrage of hostile and toxic abuse in the street. Quoted directly in The Times, John Mclean, author of A Mission of Honour: The Royal Navy in The Pacific, clearly outlines the problem. "The Navy is over-promoting women beyond their capacity in order to meet gender and sexual orientation goals". In New Zealand, other women in uniform received similar abuse in the wake of the incident. March this year saw one of the worst weeks for aviation history in the US, as a commercial jet and military helicopter collided in Washington DC. In immediate response, President Trump blamed D&I initiatives and so called 'diversity hires' as the reason for the accidents and a Transgender pilot was wrongly blamed and vilified for the crash. When only 2 days later a small medical transport plane crashed in Philadelphia, it was unsurprising that the mourning family of one of the pilots refuses to release their name, out of concerns for gendered attacks and abuse. Pervasive and closer to home, these type of gendered attacks are gaining momentum and increasing in prevalence. When a group of Palestine Action protestors recently broke into RAF Brize Norton and vandalise a Voyager aircraft, the Station Commander of RAF Brize Norton, a female Group Captain, was outwardly mocked as a 'woke wing commander' and forced to deactivate her social media due to gendered trolling attacks. The attacks against her cite her gender as the reason for her position, and it is because of this that the airfield security failed. In a paradoxical twist, the effort to resolve such issues of gendered discrimination is far reaching in its risk of being a mere rhetoric of inclusion. Within the same week of the sinking of the HMNZA Manawanui, Kevin Maher states in The Times, "I couldn't interview ...
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The UK's F-35 Procurement Strategy: A Balancing Act
The United Kingdom's procurement of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, encompassing both the F-35B and F-35A variants, reflects a complex interplay of strategic, operational, political, and industrial considerations spanning decades. The 1998 decision to select the F-35B, driven by industrial pressures and inter-service rivalries, laid the foundation for the UK's Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) capability via the Royal Navy's Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers. The recent announcement to procure 12 F-35A jets, as part of the planned 138 F-35s, introduces a tactical nuclear role for the Royal Air Force (RAF) within NATO's nuclear-sharing framework. This paper examines the 1998 F-35B selection, the rationale for excluding the F-35A and F-35C, the motivations for the 2025 F-35A acquisition, and the multifaceted challenges, including impacts on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), infrastructure, training, sovereignty, and CEPP. It argues that while the F-35A's assignment to 207 Squadron (OCU) and short-term cost savings address immediate needs, the legacy of 1998 decisions, combined with current policy shifts, risks undermining GCAP, increasing long-term costs, and enables Lockheed Martin to exploit tensions with GCAP partners Italy and Japan, jeopardising the our strategic autonomy and future air combat capabilities. The 1998 Decision to Select the F-35B and Inter-Service Pressures The UK's commitment to the F-35B originated in the late 1990s, formalised in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), which prioritised restoring a credible carrier strike capability lost with the retirement of the Invincible-class carriers and Sea Harrier FA2 by 2006. As a Tier 1 partner in the US-led Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme, the UK evaluated three F-35 variants: the F-35A (conventional take-off and landing), F-35B (Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing, STOVL), and F-35C (carrier-based, catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery, CATOBAR). The Royal Navy initially favoured the F-35C, which offered greater range (1,200 nautical miles versus 900 for the F-35B), higher payload, and compatibility with CATOBAR systems, aligning with ambitions for a more capable Queen Elizabeth-class carrier design. However, political and industrial pressures tipped the scales toward the F-35B. Rolls-Royce exerted significant influence, advocating for the F-35B due to its role in developing the LiftSystem for STOVL operations, securing substantial workshare and economic benefits for British industry. Other UK firms, including BAE Systems, supported the F-35B, as it ensured integration with the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers' STOVL configuration, avoiding costly CATOBAR retrofits estimated at £2 billion per carrier. The Labour government, under Tony Blair, prioritised industrial jobs and domestic manufacturing, aligning with the SDR's emphasis on economic dividends from defence spending. The F-35B's selection promised thousands of jobs in Rolls-Royce's Bristol facilities and BAE's supply chain, outweighing the Royal Navy's operational arguments for the F-35C. Inter-service rivalries further shaped the decision. The RAF, keen to consolidate its dominance in fixed-wing aviation, supported the F-35B's joint RAF-RN operation, arguing it could serve both carrier and land-based roles, simplifying logistics and training. This contrasted with the F-35C, which would have entrenched the Royal Navy-centric carrier operations. To fund the F-35B programme and the carriers' development, the MoD faced intense inter-service pressures, leading to the controversial early retirement of the Harrier fleet. The RAF lobbied to retire the Royal Navy's FA2 (Sea Harrier) by 2006, citing its limited air-to-air capabilities compared to the F-35B's multi-role potential. Subsequently, the 2010 SDSR accelerated the retirement of the RAF's Harrier GR9 fleet, completed by 2011, despite its proven effectiveness in Afghanistan and Libya. RAF leaders argued that resou...
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#WavellReviews War in the Smartphone Age by Matthew Ford
War in the Smartphone Age explores how modern technologies, particularly smartphones, are transforming the character of conflict. Dr Matthew Ford, an Associate Professor in War Studies, makes a compelling case that "peeling back the layers of technology makes it possible to use the smartphone for the purposes of war." The smartphone is no longer just a communications tool; it is rapidly becoming both a weapon and a battlefield. Military readers may think we already know this. We argue that you don't, and that War in the Smartphone Age will add to any readers understanding. But this is not a book solely about phones. Rather, War in the Smartphone Age is a study of the wider technological infrastructure, physical and data, that underpins modern warfare. Ford examines the evolving relationships between governments and tech companies, the weaponisation of information, and the role digital platforms play in shaping conflict. Through case studies from the Middle East, Ukraine, and the Israeli Defence Force, using both conventional militaries and other groups, he demonstrates how these technologies are being deployed in powerful and transformative ways. Things we can now see and do on a smartphone have already changed how wars are conducted . This is not the future, the smart phone age is now. One of the book's core concepts is the "stack": a layered model that connects physical systems with abstract decision-making. At the top is data storage; at the bottom, the human decision-maker. Ford argues persuasively that to navigate or fight effectively in this new battlespace, we must understand every layer in between. Through the case studies, Ford shows how different actors have weaponised the smartphone environment. The Israeli Defence Force's tight control of data and infrastructure is one such example, albeit dependent on physical infrastructure. The limits and dependencies of the strategy are explored and Ford shows that a whole society approach is needed to fight effectively in the smartphone age. From the selection of the future fighters to how the power of data is used by the most simple soldier, War in the Smartphone Age left us feeling that we probably should have had a better understanding of it all before we did. But Ford doesn't stop at strategy. He also explores the moral and legal questions these technologies raise. Should facial recognition be permitted as a tool of war? When civilians use their phones to collect targeting data, do they become combatants? These questions strike at the heart of international humanitarian law in an era of participative warfare. This idea, participative warfare, is a central theme. Ford highlights, for instance, Ukrainian civilians uploading images to military apps, directly contributing to the targeting process. Civilians have always reported enemy activity, but smartphones make this instantaneous, radically increasing the speed and precision of strikes. War in the Smartphone Age also adds insights to legal and operational debates. For example, how can evidence gathered from open-source intelligence meet legal thresholds for prosecution? Ford notes that states, corporations, and individuals apply different ethical standards, and he questions whether big data companies should play a greater role in regulating wartime data flows. There are areas you could find to disagree. The prevalence of data networks, which seem easily targetable in a 'real' war, or the resource required, and surely not all war will be this way in the future, we'll run out of energy before it can happen? Futurists have been wrong before, after all. And then the books title will bring you back to earth as you pick up your smart phone. Smartphones are everywhere, as Ford notes they are the last things we lose and have a global dependency on them far deeper and more engrained than most imagine. Ford doesn't offer easy answers, but he certainly raises the right questions. Perhaps the most sobering chapter is the last, titl...
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Making NATO More Agile and Lethal: A Digital Insurgency is Underway
"Nothing After Two O'clock" or "No Action, Talk Only" are well-worn jabs at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that once resonated with a certain truth. They conjured images of bureaucratic inertia and a disconnect between lofty pronouncements and concrete action. This has changed. NATO's Allied Command Operations is shifting its culture to rapidly adopt new technologies and capabilities at record breaking speed. A prime example is the recent acquisition of Palantir's Maven Smart System in under six months - a process that previously took up to two decades. A surging movement of digital insurgents within NATO is redefining what is achievable. The time for talk has ended; it is now an era of relentless execution and swift delivery of crucial capabilities to the warfighter. A landscape rewritten While the Alliance's core mission of collective defence enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty remains sacrosanct, the strategic environment has undergone a seismic shift, demanding a fundamental reassessment of NATO's capabilities and operational posture. This is not your father's NATO. The comfortable certainties of the Cold War era, with its clearly defined adversary and predictable battlefields, have given way to a complex and fluid landscape characterised by resurgent great power competition, the weaponisation of information, the blurring lines between peace and war, and the rapid advance of technology transforming how wars are fought and won. As underscored by the 2022 Strategic Concept and the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area strategy, NATO faces a multitude of evolving threats, from state-sponsored aggression and terrorism to cyberattacks, hybrid warfare, and the disruptive potential of emerging technologies. These all converge to challenge the international rules-based order that underpins the security of NATO's nearly one billion citizens. This necessitates a renewed focus on deterrence and defence across all domains, including the increasingly critical digital sphere. The rise of artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing, and other advanced technologies is not merely a technological evolution; it represents a revolution in military affairs, fundamentally altering the character of contemporary warfare. The analytic horsepower backing these technologies creates an unmatched acceleration within a decision cycle. This reality has spurred a top-down and bottom-up movement for change within Allied Command Operations, the Alliance's military instrument of power. Led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Allied Command Operations is driving a transformation aligned with NATO's evolving strategy and plans, ushering in a renaissance in Allied operations. From within the ranks At the forefront of this effort is a nascent but increasingly influential bottom-up group of "digital insurgents," a cross-generational, multinational cohort of tech-savvy individuals. These insurgents are working to drive NATO's transition towards rapid and effective technology adoption, focused on warfighting and warfighters. This is not a nostalgic yearning for a romanticized past or empty slogans; it's about recognising the imperative for NATO to be more agile and lethal, leveraging the most powerful technologies available to maintain its strategic edge. The world's most powerful Alliance in history needs the most powerful tools to plan, operate, and fight. We, the authors, are active participants in this digital insurgency - we are Task Force Maven. On March 25, 2025, the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) and Palantir Technologies Inc. (Palantir) finalised the acquisition of the Maven Smart System for employment within the Alliance. Our task now is implementation and fostering an environment of speed, agility, and adaptability. Yet, this is not a story about a specific technology but one about NATO's people, culture, and the fight to keep pace with an accelerating future. Task Force Maven was for...
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