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  • #Wavell Reviews A Risk Too Far: A Psychological Autopsy of the Planning for Arnhem by Gary Buck
    You may have thought that another book on Arnhem was not necessary or that it could not possibly tell you anything you did not already know about this iconic battle from World War Two. However, Gary Buck's new book, A Risk Too Far, takes a new and novel approach to the subject that has you reappraising the commonly held views and your own long-held conceptions. Whilst past commentators have been quick to apportion blame for the planning and execution of Operation Market Garden, Buck seeks to ask why and how errors might have been made. A Risk Too Far blends historical research with psychological models and theories to examine the different cognitive influences and biases that individuals face when making decisions under stressful conditions. It focuses on three of the prominent commanders of Operation Market Garden: Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, the commander of 21st Army Group who first conceived of the operation; Lieutenant-General 'Boy' Browning, the deputy commander of the First Allied Airborne Army and overall tactical commander for the operation; and Major-General Roy Urquhart, commander of the British 1st Airborne Division. It draws on both primary and secondary sources including memoirs, personal letters and reflections of both the subjects and their superiors and subordinates. Whilst referencing important psychological theories and models, the book is structured around the OODA (Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act) loop which will be familiar to military readers. In so doing, Buck deftly brings out the human element of conflict, putting one in the shoes of those commanders, seeking to understand the decisions taken against the context and pressure they were under. Studying Montgomery and the strategic level, Buck asks why he choose to embark on such a high-risk operation when he was usually so deliberate, meticulous, and careful? He examines the problems of supply and an acute manpower shortage faced by 21st Army Group that were becoming critical in the face of stiffening German resistance. Monty's options are considered in light of the political impetus to prevent further V2 launches against London and his growing frustration with Eisenhower's insistence on a broad front strategy. Analysing his character, Buck finds that Montgomery was facing acute pressures and had succumbed to what is known as a grip reaction in which he abandoned his normal analytical logical approach. Operation Market Garden was a gamble, but he had decided that it was worth it. For that to be true it needed some likelihood of success. For that, Buck turns to the operational level and Lieutenant General 'Boy' Browning. Examining 'Boy' Browning we find that he was pushing for use of the First Allied Airborne Army, accepted risks in planning, and inexplicably opted to deploy his own Corps HQ in the first lift. A colourful character driven by pride and ambition, he was concerned with the diminishing possibilities for field command and to prove the continued utility of airborne forces. Faced with similar pressures to Montgomery, he was too optimistic and failed to raise concerns about a plan that could only really be successful under the best circumstances and with a significant amount of luck. At the tactical level, Buck asks why Urquhart's plan was so rigid and lacking in focus to the extent that only one battalion ever made it to the bridge in Arnhem? He examines how his lack of airborne experience led him to fall back on inadequate experience, to make illogical decisions under time pressure and to not question clear failings in the plan over a fear that his division might be broken up to solve Monty's manpower shortage. A Risk Too Far presents a thorough investigation of the span of strategic, operational and tactical aspects of the operation. It provides considerable food for thought with regards to how other fateful operations may have been planned and executed under similar circumstances. Usefully, Buck also articulates the ways in which c...
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  • Ancient Arts, Modern Ethics, and the New Battlefield
    The recent Defence Committee report, Defence in the Grey Zone, brings renewed focus to the challenge of hostile activity below the threshold of conventional war. The term 'Grey Zone' suggests a novel ambiguity, a modern strategic dilemma born of new technologies; this ambiguous environment challenges not only our strategic doctrines but also our classical ethical frameworks for conflict. However, while the character of this struggle is undeniably new, its foundational principles are not. The Grey Zone is the modern evolution of ancient principles of statecraft, supercharged by technology and the unique vulnerabilities of a hyperconnected world. To navigate this strategic evolution requires both re-understanding the classical strategists, from Sun Tzu and Kautilya to Clausewitz and Liddell Hart, while simultaneously grappling with profound ethical questions they could never have envisioned. The Timeless Why The strategic intent underpinning Grey Zone activity, to "coerce governments or simply erode their ability to function", is as old as statecraft itself. It is the practical application of "the acme of skill" according to Sun Tzu's Art of War: "to subdue the enemy without fighting". This ideal, which finds echoes in the "silent war" of Kautilya's Arthashastra, offers an intellectual foundation for modern Grey Zone Operations. From a Consequentialist perspective - where morality is based on outcomes alone - this is a grim yet vital calculus aimed at avoiding the greater evil of devastating state-on-state conflict. The report is replete with modern manifestations of ancient approaches. The use of propaganda and disinformation, "driving a wedge between social groups", is a direct heir to the classical strategy of attacking an adversary's societal cohesion. Sun Tzu notes that "all warfare is based on deception", while Kautilya takes this further, highlighting Bheda (sowing dissent) as one of the four primary tools of statecraft. The employment of "proxies, including sub-state actors such as rebel groups, mercenaries, criminal gangs, or cyber 'hacktivists'", offers the same plausible deniability sought by ancient spymasters. Sun Tzu dedicates an entire chapter to the use of spies for gaining intelligence and manipulating the enemy, while Kautilya describes vast and intricate spy networks as the primary tool for both internal control and external influence. The report's observation that "attribution of grey zone activity is often challenging" is equally neither a new nor unforeseen problem but the intended outcome of a strategy designed to achieve political effect while adhering to the Jus Ad Bellum ('justice to war', the principles governing righteous initiation of war) principle of Right Intention (from the aggressor's perspective at least) by avoiding an overt act of war. The goal, now as then, is to weaken the adversary from within, making them politically, economically, and socially unable to resist. The Transformative What While the strategic why is timeless, the what - the nature of modern warfare and in particular that of the Grey Zone challenge - has fundamentally transformed. Technology has not merely supplied new tools for the strategist's arsenal, but created entirely new domains of conflict and systemic vulnerabilities that are without historical precedent. The report correctly states that "technology has magnified the impact and global reach of grey zone attacks, and identified new areas for prosecuting operations that did not exist a generation ago, particularly regarding cyberattacks". This has created a geographically boundless cyber domain where adversaries may conduct countless operations on a scale, and at a rate, previously unimaginable - such as the "over 90,000 sub-threshold attacks" launched against the MoD's networks over just two years. This digital dependency has birthed a new critical national vulnerability: the physical infrastructure of the internet. The report highlights the "approximately 60 under...
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  • Integrated strategy and Human Security outcomes: The British Army's engineering surveys in Albania
    Aligned to His Majesty's Government (HMG) priorities of curtailing irregular migration and associated connections to human trafficking from Albania, efforts to address the drivers of migration and organised crime at source are underway. The British Army's ongoing specialist survey work in Albania's Kukës Subterranean Complex (KSC) may lead to livelihood creation, mitigating some of the risk factors of human trafficking. This demonstrates the military instrument's contribution to Human Security. UK Strategy on Irregular Migration from Albania Enabled in large part by online messaging applications such as TikTok Albanians made up a quarter of all arrivals to the UK by small boats at a reported peak in 2022. The UK's Home Affairs Committee June 2023 report details the legal, social and political context of migration to the UK from Albania. Three key drivers identified are: 1. Economic migration because of Albania's comparative poverty 2. Refugees (particularly women) who have been trafficked or made modern slaves; and 3. Organised crime In 2023 and 2024, the UK returned more Albanians (2624) by nationality than any other, but irregular detections from Albania continued throughout 2024 (825). Time should be taken to understand migration terms and figures (see here), but the key takeaway is that the UK's intent is to reduce migration and where possible, minimise push factors at source To achieve this effect, cross-government strategy in partnership with international state and non-state partners has been pursued, complimented by a plethora of UK-Albania bilaterals, culminating in a Bilateral Cooperation Plan signed in December 2022 which centred around 'security and home affairs' with a focus on 'organised crime and illegal immigration'. Development of Kukës city - a vulnerable area prone to criminality and trafficking 'from which a substantial proportion of Albanian emigration to the UK occurs' - has been recognised as means to combat emigration. The UK has already worked with local NGOs, UNICEF and conducted fact finding missions in Kukës on perceptions and drivers of emigration. Defence Integrating into UK Strategy On 17 July 2023, the then Secretary for Defence Ben Wallace received Albanian Defence Minister Niko Peleshi in London, with former Minister of State Baroness Goldie later signing a Statement of Intent (SoI) between the two MoDs with Peleshi. The SoI is wide ranging, and leaves plenty of scope for 'any new potential areas of cooperation'. Likely by design, the SoI does not detail expected outcomes, but does list some specific outputs, one of which includes 'infrastructural development'. While the military instrument is not positioned as the lead actor in counter-trafficking efforts, those drafting the SoI seem aware that military activity could contribute meaningfully to the conditions which reduce trafficking risk. The Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) form completed for bilateral activity reinforces this interpretation. The military engagement is framed in terms of defence engagement, recognising 'representatives of other [Albanian] government and academic institutions also attend activity delivered by the UK Defence Section in support of UK Partners Across Government'. The effect is subtle but significant: rather than overstate Defence's role, the SoI and OSJA position military activity as a potential discreet net contributor to broader foreign policy and Human Security outcomes - reduction of emigration and associated trafficking through targeted development programmes at source. In this context, the absence of outcome language should be read not as an oversight, but as policy discipline. It reflects a conscious decision to align with HMG objectives without mischaracterising the military's role or inadvertently committing Defence to outcomes it alone cannot deliver. The Plan 'Exploring the potentials of the tunnels' was agreed as an output in the Defence and Security Bilateral Cooperation planned o...
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  • Identification/Mission First in the Digital Age
    This brief presents a strategic imperative. The development of the IMF is consistently bound by a very complex set of messaging - not just within the MoD but also across its supplier base - whereby interlinking technology, organisational and institutional change is hindering scalability across 'The Stack'. Increasingly, the three components of technology, people, and change need to be brought together using simple themes of design, build, secure and deliver to create the required capability positioning both within the MoD and its acquisition processes. This will demand a unifying plan/approach by the MoD to manage and exploit fully the IMF approach - consolidating a range of individual components such as cloud, security, et, under a cohesive plan/framework to support operational outcomes.[/note] to embed an Identification/Mission First (IMF) framework at the core of UK Defence. In the face of rising digital threats and rapid technological evolution, the UK must shift from legacy force structures to an agile, information-led defence model where identification, not just firepower, drives operational advantage. IMF is defined as the ability to collect, process, and exploit information faster and more effectively than adversaries, seamlessly connecting Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Logistics (including Medical), Command and Control (C2), and FIRES. This is both a technological and behavioural shift, aligning with modern warfare doctrines such as UK Fusion Doctrine, NATO's Comprehensive Approach and the Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act (OODA) loop.1 In an increasingly congested, contested, and connected battlespace, information superiority - not platform superiority - is the decisive edge, with speed of identification and mission alignment emerging as critical differentiators. As such, data must be treated as a strategic asset, akin to oil in the 20th century, requiring ethical prioritisation, protection, and operationalisation. Furthermore, civilian digital infrastructure, including social media and undersea cables, forms a crucial part of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) ecosystem, and must be lawfully integrated into defence strategies.2 To operationalise these imperatives, several core recommendations are identified and proposed. Under Leadership and Governance, Defence should appoint a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for Identification/Mission First (IMF) and establish a Digital Identification Task Force under Military Strategic Headquarters (MSHQ) to oversee strategy, ethics, and innovation. In terms of Workforce and Skills, it is essential to build a pipeline of data-literate, ethics-conscious strategists, and to incentivise digital fluency across all services through tailored career pathways. Regarding Investment and Architecture, Defence must prioritise sovereign, interoperable digital systems with low latency and secure data exchange, while embedding real-time, multi-domain identification layers into command, control (C2), and ISR platforms. For Operational Integration, IMF capabilities should be embedded into Joint Action doctrine and field exercises, and open-source intelligence should be harnessed through structured, policy-governed approaches. Finally, under Strategic Communication and Ethics, a Defence-wide Digital Ethics and Law Compliance Framework must be established, alongside clearly defined red lines for the use of private and civilian digital systems in targeting and surveillance. These measures collectively aim to ensure that Defence maintains its competitive edge through agile, ethical, and integrated information dominance Introduction Digital connectivity and rapid technological change have redefined modern warfare, where information superiority increasingly determines success. While kinetic force retains importance, digital tempo - the speed and effectiveness of information-action cycles - has become decisive.3 The MoD remains constrained by legacy structures ...
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  • NATO's Early Cold War Lessons Show What US, Japan, and South Korea Must Do Now
    In the not-so-distant future, a U.S. military commander in the Indo-Pacific could be forced to fight two major wars at once - one against a Chinese assault on Taiwan, the other against a North Korean attack on the Korean Peninsula. This dual-front crisis scenario, long considered unlikely, is now routinely modeled in wargames and quietly debated in high-level policy circles. Yet the United States and its East Asian allies remain unprepared - not in terms of firepower, but in coordination, planning, and execution. Today's alliance architecture is not designed to handle a simultaneous conflict in Taiwan and Korea. The existing command structures are fragmented, force designs are nationally siloed, and procurement choices are often politically misaligned. In short, there is no unified playbook for fighting two wars in East Asia - let alone winning them. But the United States has faced a similar problem before. From NATO's founding in 1949 through West Germany's integration in 1955, Washington confronted a world where it had to deter simultaneous threats in Europe and Asia. It responded by building institutions - not just capabilities. The first phase of NATO's evolution offers enduring lessons in how to organize allies, align procurement, and prepare for multi-theater war. Today, the U.S.-Japan-South Korea triangle urgently needs to draw from that experience before the next crisis begins. Learning from NATO's Blueprint At the 1952 Lisbon Conference, NATO members committed to fielding 50 divisions - an ambitious goal that drove significant increases in defense spending across Europe. Washington played a central role in catalyzing this shift through economic leverage, strategic vision, and the shared threat of Soviet aggression. But what mattered more than raw spending was the coordinated structure that emerged: NATO didn't just build forces; it built a cohesive force. A parallel dynamic is unfolding in East Asia. Japan has pledged to double its defense budget by 2027, investing heavily in standoff missiles, ISR, and munition stockpiles. South Korea already spends over 2.7% of GDP on defense and is expanding long-range strike capabilities, naval power, and missile defenses. But unlike the early NATO experience, these efforts remain nationally fragmented. Without integration, the investments of today may become the inefficiencies of tomorrow. NATO's lesson is clear: deterrence is not created by defense spending alone. It depends on force structure coherence, shared priorities, and a division of labor among allies. If Japan fields Tomahawk cruise missiles and South Korea invests in submarine-launched cruise missiles and explores the development of a light aircraft carrier, who integrates and sustains these systems when crises erupt? Which ally reinforces which theater, and how quickly? Without institutional answers to these questions, military planning becomes guesswork. The lack of a trilateral command mechanism is one of the most pressing gaps. In 1951, NATO established SHAPE - the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe - as a centralized node for operational planning, logistics, and interoperability. Nothing like SHAPE exists in the Indo-Pacific today. The U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and U.S.-Japan coordination under USFJ and INDOPACOM remain bilateral and compartmentalized. The result is a strategic blind spot. In a Taiwan conflict, U.S. naval assets might be redeployed from Korean waters. Simultaneously, while Japan's 2015 security legislation enables expanded support for U.S. operations, political and legal constraints could still delay or limit Japan's full-spectrum support in a Korean contingency - particularly absent a trilateral planning framework. Rather than creating an "Asian NATO," the immediate solution could be the establishment of a trilateral planning cell within INDOPACOM - drawing staff from South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff and Japan's Self-Defense Forces. With access to real-time intelligence and s...
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