Wavell Room Audio Reads

Wavell Room

An improved audio format version of our written content. Get your defence and security perspectives now through this podcast.

Government News News Commentary

Available Episodes

5 of 37

Pride and Fall
Pride and Fall tells the story of the British Army and Royal Marines (and more broadly Defence) campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan 2001-2014. It mixes high-level discussions with strategy with tactical vignettes. It offers a highly readable, highly credible history of the period. This book is bloody brilliant. We highly recommend it. From people who served in Afghanistan to warfare experts to those with a casual interest, Pride and Fall will help anyone understand. Miller's clarity coupled with a deep understanding of what happened during the campaign make this highly readable. He does it with an engaging style and sense of wit that few can match. Blow by blow account? In many ways Pride and Fall is a blow by blow account of the land campaign in Afghanistan. Its chapters are chronological, dealing with the campaign as it happened. It offers tactical details with a clear narrative of events. But you would be mistaken if you thought this was a narrative history. Miller brings out the personalities of the commanders and their preparations to show how they impacted the conduct of the war. For example, 'mowing the lawn' of early campaigns and 'clear hold build'. It also charts how the campaign developed - or didn't - and questions why. This analysis alone makes it a useful reference for future study. Miller identifies and explores named individuals to the level of critical analysis that he does, which is something few others have done as effectively. A veteran British reader will recognise many (now senior generals) in their formative years. The title of the book gives away the general argument about the conduct of the war. Miller's text charts the good and the bad of British strategy. Pride and Fall considers that the war lacked a strategy. But he is not entirely dismissive of Britain's efforts. The rise and increasing effectiveness of intelligence is a key success. The conduct of Op HERRICK 13 is a high point of success, one let down by a lack of resources to exploit it before the drawdown. Just because some things were bad, not all of it was. His ability to assess the relative merits and offer a nuanced view of the campaign sets it apart from more traditional 'good or bad' narrative history. Reading it from a doctrine perspective, Pride and Fall adds historical context from which to judge the effectiveness of Britain's new counter-insurgency doctrine. We might conclude, crudely, that Britain had 'all the ideas none of the gear'. But Miller wouldn't quite put it like that. Miller's wider points about how to be better should be grasped by a modern Army facing similar challenges in the future. Strategy and tactics Another theme is the interaction between strategy and tactics. The pressure on resources balanced against the reliance on the US is key throughout. London, Miller shows, struggled to stay relevant despite the commitment of British blood and treasure. Multiple Defence Secretaries, changing generals, the home front. How these big hand themes played out on the ground, and notably the C2 challenges it created, offers new angles to consider. But Pride and Fall doesn't only deal with the science of war. There are long sections detailing the ground reality. These moments offer a glimpse into the human struggles. For example, the role of Company Sergeant Major 'Billy' Roy who straps antlers to his quad bike to deliver Christmas dinners, or the more human details about living outside the wire (or more crudely, taking a **** whilst freezing on a mountain). Not to mention more relevant examples of long insertion tabs, coalition tensions, human relationships that actually win campaigns. Pride and Fall combined these tactical and human moments with a sense of how they contributed to the wider mission. It brilliantly demonstrates the British soldier (and Marines) sense of humour. Who is the author? Sergio Miller is a former Intelligence Corps officer and a regular Wavell Room contributor. His analysis of the war in Ukraine ...
--------
5:13
The Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force
BLUF: This paper proposes the creation of the structures and conditions required to train, lead and deploy a cost-effective Citizen Tri-service Reserve Force at scale during periods of stretch, tension, crisis or war. The Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force would be available for use. (1) as a third echelon front line fighting force, (2) providing rear area and lines of communication security and (3) in homeland defence, protecting critical national infrastructure.This will be achieved by establishing cadres of experienced ex Regulars and Volunteer Reservists capable of initially training and subsequently leading the Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force. Against a changing threat the UK is likely to require more people in uniform than we have now. The Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force concept utilises those who have already served, putting them in place to prepare thoroughly as training and leadership cadres while saving in the short to medium term the cost of recruiting, remunerating and equipping the bulk of the rank and file (90% of the workforce). It then sets the conditions to expand when required by having experienced leadership in place to build around. Strategic background The threats facing NATO in general and the UK in particular have escalated dramatically following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Furthermore, Eastern Europe is only one of several areas of the world where tensions have risen substantially over recent months and years; any of the others of which (eg Taiwan, Middle East) could erupt so as to distract key allies at a critical moment, potentially reducing their ability to support their NATO commitments in Europe. Additionally, depending on the attitude of individual NATO members, including a possible future US President, Article 5 of the NATO Treaty may not be quite as binding as is widely assumed. All of this needs to be set against a context in which the UK has the smallest standing army since Waterloo. Our navy and air force are similarly diminutive. Our Defence remains configured primarily for discretionary campaigning (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) and has not yet fully switched to prepare for non-discretionary conflict against a peer adversary. The current SDR provides an opportunity to address this necessary change in orientation, which is likely to require the provision of mass in uniform. Why we need the ability to generate mass As demonstrated clearly in Ukraine, in a war of any duration, units become worn out and need replacing in the line to rest and recuperate. The UK has no provision for this. Secondly, if the UK is operating in Eastern Europe in support of its NATO allies, it will have extremely long lines of communication along which its ammunition, equipment, workforce and rations will need to travel. Protecting such lines of communication needs "teeth" units, including infantry, light armour and air defence, especially against drones. Thirdly, substantial additional resources are needed to support the defence of the UK's critical national infrastructure. The outgoing Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Patrick Sanders, publicly raised the importance of the UK's ability to create military mass if required in a time of crisis in January 2024. He was referring to a citizen army (the "third echelon") which history shows is needed to win our wars; under this concept, as in both World Wars, a small core of Regulars (the "first echelon") fight to buy time; the Volunteer Reserves (the "second echelon") then reinforce and help to hold the line; and the citizen army (the "third echelon") concludes the conflict. Access to large numbers of cost-effective teams and a trained workforce from all three services would be essential in such circumstances. Warfighting assumptions always expect a war to be over within weeks rather than months or years (the size of our armed forces is indeed currently based on this assumption); history, and current events in Ukraine, shows this to be over-o...
--------
23:45
Will Traditions Hold us Back?
Tradition can be defined as an inherited, established and customary pattern of thought or action that can be transmitted from generation to generation due to their commonly accepted authority. In a military sense, Army traditions encompass customs and beliefs that unite different sets of soldiers. These traditions take form to us as behaviours, doctrine and actions. The British Army's website states that 'The British Army is a professional and disciplined team, with a long tradition of service to the country'.1Readers can infer that this means the Army does the nation's bidding, whether at war or peacetime, without delay or question. This endures (and has done since 1689) always; we know this from the long standing function of Parliament to authorise taxes for war and defence. It can be safely assumed then that the 'tradition' of the British Army being ever-present and ready to provide defence for the British people is a good one. Does tradition hold us back? But do Army traditions hold us back in other areas of defence? As the Army evolves and responds to current and emerging threats can it respond sufficiently? Valerii Zaluzhnyi wrote recently that technology 'boasts an undoubted superiority over tradition'.2 Arguably he was cornered into this analysis through the rigours of a war he oversaw as the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army, until February 24. However, Zaluzhnyi's dismissal does not make it a poor analysis; Zaluzhnyi's Army went to war with Russia and faced some of the most extreme fighting in Europe since WW2. They have had to adapt and survive whilst holding off Russian military superiority and they learned quickly that holding on to tradition and current thinking was costly. Adapting to the threat and remaining fluid is one thing; changing your approach entirely is quite another, but quite necessary according to Zaluzhnyi. When Zaluzhnyi mentioned 'traditions' (doctrine & processes), he was talking about improving the situation on the battlefield. He went so far as to state that a wholesale redesign of battlefield operations was needed to distance themselves from outdated, stereotypical thought processes that were harming his troops and country's war effort through simply being not up to task. This redesign, he concluded, would reshape Ukrainian military doctrine on a fundamental level for the better and help Ukrainian soldiers compete with and defeat Russian troops. This would however require substantial buy-in to be successfully integrated. No small task but surely too risky to ignore; the war with Russia was handing out lessons in evolutionary warfare and Zaluzhnyi was paying attention. Relevance of experience The British Army has had no such recent exposure or conflict with a peer adversary. The COIN environment in Iraq and Afghanistan taught us valuable lessons in insurgency warfare, counter-IED, ISTAR and medical support which 'had a profound impact on the Army's equipment, training and doctrine',3 but arguably did not find shortcomings in it. Consequently we have no experience of what should be retained and what should be dismissed or updated regarding our approach to warfare and warfighting. How are we to know if our doctrine will hold up in a large-scale peer to peer engagement? We have banked heavily on the Land Operating Concept (LOpC): 18 months in the making, full of NATO partner consultation input and interrogated by RUSI, ISS and DTsL; it is the doctrine that dictates how we will win future wars. General Sir Patrick Sanders said it is 'the most robustly evidenced and inclusive piece of conceptual thinking that the Army has produced in over three decades. This places the British Army at the intellectual edge of land warfare, able to lead in NATO and support our sister services across all domains'. 4 The LOpC clearly shows then that as an organisation we are attuned to the need to evolve and adapt to the changing threats around the globe. It highlights the need for need for technological sup...
--------
19:40
The Utility of Reserve: The Royal Navy and the Maritime Reserve.
"The Reservist is twice the citizen" - Winston Churchill Genesis The Royal Navy (RN) has the Maritime Reserve (MR), a 1* led Fighting Arm1 (FA), however, it could be argued that it is not taken seriously as a capability and is therefore not value for money. If the RN were to take the Maritime Reserve seriously, the MR would require a directed operational output, a 'head mark', a thought-out function, in conjunction with regular cadre of personnel who are taught the necessary knowledge and experience on how to employ it to enhance naval power. This article offers options for the output the MR should have in supporting the RN operationally. Its time to move on from the 'fantasy fleets'. Instead, lets discuss NATO-level, UK Defence-wide, and RN-specific strategy statements to derive function and in turn, elicit discussions of form. It will not - unlike a recent RUSI2 paper - look to use the Royal Naval3 Reserve (RNR) in addressing potential capability gaps in UK Defence. Though, its potential scope is MR wide, its focus is the RNR, as the largest MR element and the one facing the hardest questions about its future operational utility. Additionally, this paper is written in the spirit of the Chief of the Defence Staff's recent direction4 on embracing debate from juniors in challenging the status quo. "A good Navy is not a provocation to war; it is the surest guaranty of Peace" - Theodore Roosevelt Function The RNR/Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) were formed in 1859 and 1903 respectively, to supply sailors in times of war for the RN; the MR now is approximately 3500 people spread across the RNR & Royal Marines Reserve (RMR) and is the only standalone reserve organisation in UK Defence. The war in Ukraine and recent events in Israel5show that Reserves are still vital for delivering national security; internationally their use also mimics how our own Naval Reserves were used during both world wars. In WW2, 68%6 of Naval personnel were Reservists of various kinds7, who jokingly referred to their regular counterparts as the "caretakers"8. Such past precedents beg contemporary questions: could today's RN triple its personnel numbers swiftly in a time of major conflict, and would it need to? Today, the Maritime Reserve is a mere 10%9 of total RN personnel - but if the RN embraced use of reservists as Australia does (30%), could this alleviate personnel gaps too, while being better value for money? The UK is not currently under an immediate existential threat (barring a catastrophic escalation of the war in Ukraine or entanglement in a US-China conflict). However, the function of the RNR and wider reserves should be designed around a framework that recognises the possibility of direct interstate conflict - not just the precursory stages such as competition and crisis to ensure our continued national security, as articulated in the most recent Defence Command Paper (the 2023 'Refresh'). The utility of the RNR to the RN is primarily to supply Surge in war while being affordable and Niche in peacetime. Yet the recent cancelling of training on financial grounds (the infamous "In-Year Measures"), effects from COVID, and Maritime Reserve "Transformation" (a euphemistic label for various top-down reorganisations) has lowered morale, seeing an exodus10 from the trained strength. In NATO, there are four11 recognised types of reservists. Niche(specialist) capabilities that do not exist, at all or in sufficient strength, in the regular forces. Complementary. This is a capability - at the lower end of the operational spectrum - for which the full suite of military competencies is not needed, freeing regular forces. Supplementary. This is a capability at the higher end of operations to rotate or reinforce the regular forces. Surge. This is an expansion base for mobilisation in a large-scale defence emergency, the traditional Reserve role. In the Future Reserves 3012 paper, the role of reservists is articulated as. The Reinforcement Reserve - r...
--------
26:20
Iran's Strategic Impasse
Introduction Since the Gaza war began nearly a year ago, Israel has conducted dozens of airstrikes against Iranian-linked targets across the Middle East. There is a widespread concern that the ongoing low-level conflict may escalate into an all-out war between the two nations. Nevertheless, Tehran, for its part, does not seem inclined to escalate into a full-scale war. There are six pivotal reasons for Iran's strategic impasse. Fear of a Regime Change The first reason relates to Tehran's prioritisation of regime preservation. Iran knows that the Islamic regime itself may become the primary target for removal in a conflict. Iran's economy is strained due to long-standing sanctions and domestic economic challenges. A direct conflict with Israel would worsen Iran's economic troubles. Moreover, ethnic minority groups within Iran, such as the Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, and Baluchis, have long been exasperated with the Iranian regime and there is a genuine risk that Israel may engage with these groups. Potential US Involvement A second factor is that a war between Iran and Israel would likely draw the United States, Israel's historic ally, into the war. The power asymmetry between the US and Iran is striking. The US stands unmatched in its capabilities. Conversely, Tehran's efforts to modernise its conventional forces have yielded limited success due to the country's defence economics problems. Regional Interests Tehran's direct war with Israel would certainly jeopardise its regional interests. Iran strongly emphasises advancing its sectarian geopolitical ambitions within regions traditionally considered part of the Iranian/Shia sphere of influence. A direct conflict with Israel could potentially provide opportunities for Saudi Arabia, a key antagonist seeking to counter Iran's growing influence in the Middle East, and its allies to exploit the situation to their advantage. Strategic Culture The Iranian army has not faced a large-scale war since the Iran-Iraq war. The bitter experience of the war with Iraq led Iran to move away from conventional warfare tactics. Iran has opted for asymmetric strategies instead of engaging in a direct war with its adversaries. Iran supports Hezbollah, Houthis, and Hamas due to their shared objective of opposing Israel. This allows Tehran to pursue its objectives while minimising the risk of direct and large-scale retaliation from Israel. The relative success of these methods has reinforced Tehran's commitment to an indirect approach. Nuclear Program The fifth reason influencing Tehran's unwillingness to confront Israel is its progressive advancement in its own nuclear program. Iran has been enriching uranium to higher levels, developing more sophisticated centrifuges, and enhancing the range and payload capacities of its ballistic missiles. Initiating a full-fledged war against Israel would risk undermining this progress, given that it could provoke strikes on Iranian nuclear personnel and facilities. Winning Strategic Battle of Perception The last point worth mentioning is Tehran's belief that engaging in a direct confrontation with Israel would eventually benefit Israel at a time when global opinion is turning against it due to the significant civilian casualties and suffering in Gaza. In contemporary wars, military victory is no longer solely defined by battlefield success, as in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict. It is possible that Israel could face a similar destiny in Gaza. Therefore, Iran is very likely leveraging Israel's aggressive response against Hamas to undermine Israel's and, by extension, the United State's credibility. What Might Come Next? Iran is confronted with a challenging situation: it must find a way to respond that upholds its reputation while mitigating the risk of escalating to full-scale war with Israel, a scenario in which Tehran stands to lose more than it stands to gain. Choosing inaction or a feeble response could erode the domestic unity of the Iranian regime. Iran's d...
--------
6:56