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Supreme Court Decision Syllabus (SCOTUS Podcast)

Jake Leahy
Supreme Court Decision Syllabus (SCOTUS Podcast)
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  • Goldey v. Field (Bivens / Excessive Force)
    Send us a textGoldey v. FieldsPER CURIAM. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), this Court recognized an implied cause of action for damages against federal officers for certain alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment. The Court subsequently recognized two additional contexts where implied Bivens causes of action were permitted, neither of which was an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim. After 1980, we have declined more than 10 times to extend Bivens to cover other constitutional violations. Those many post1980 Bivens “cases have made clear that, in all but the most unusual circumstances, prescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the courts.” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482, 486 (2022). Despite those precedents, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit permitted the plaintiff here to maintain an Eighth Amendment excessive-force Bivens claim for damages against federal prison officials. ...This Court has repeatedly emphasized that “recognizing a cause of action under Bivens is ‘a disfavored judicial activity.’” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 491. To determine whether a Bivens claim may proceed, the Court has applied a two-step test. First, the Court asks whether the case presents “a new Bivens context”—that is, whether the case “is different in a meaningful way” from the cases in which this Court has recognized a Bivens remedy. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. 120, 139 (2017); see Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979); Bivens, 403 U. S. 388. Second, if so, we then ask whether there are “special factors” indicating that “the Judiciary is at least arguably less  equipped than Congress to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.’” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 492. That analysis is anchored in “separation-of-powers principles.” Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 135. This case arises in a new context, and “special factors” counsel against recognizing an implied Bivens cause of action for Eighth Amendment excessive-force violations. To begin with, Congress has actively legislated in the area of prisoner litigation but has not enacted a statutory cause of action for money damages. See Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 148– 149. In addition, extending Bivens to allow an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force could have negative systemic consequences for prison officials and the “inordinately difficult undertaking” of running a prison. Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 84–85 (1987). Moreover, “an alternative remedial structure” already exists for aggrieved federal prisoners. Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 137; see Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 74 (2001). The existence of such alternative remedial procedures counsels against allowing Bivens suits even if such “procedures are ‘not as effective as an individual damages remedy.’” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 498. For the past 45 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts. See Egbert, 596 U. S., at 490–491. We do the same here. The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 
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  • Trump v. CASA, Inc. (Universal Injunction / Birthright Citizenship)
    Send us a text Trump v. CASA, Inc. Held: Universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has given to federal courts. The Court grants the Government’s applications for a partial stay of the injunctions entered below, but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue. Pp. 4– 26. 
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  • Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc. (Appointments Clause)
    Send us a textKennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc.In 1984, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) created the U. S. Preventive Services Task Force, a body that formulates evidence-based recommendations regarding preventive healthcare services. Congress codified the Task Force’s role in 1999, establishing it as an entity within the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) in HHS’s Public Health Service. The Task Force currently consists of 16 volunteer members appointed by the Secretary of HHS to staggered 4-year terms. Before 2010, Task Force recommendations were purely advisory. The Affordable Care Act of 2010 changed this by requiring most health insurers and group health plans to cover without cost sharing those preventive services that receive “A” or “B” ratings from the Task Force. The Act also amended the governing statute to describe the Task Force as “independent” and to provide that members and their recommendations “shall be independent and, to the extent practicable, not subject to political pressure.” 42 U. S. C. §§299b–4(a)(1), (6). Plaintiffs, individuals and small businesses who object to the Affordable Care Act’s preventive-services coverage requirements, sued in federal court. Lead plaintiff Braidwood Management runs a health and wellness center offering insurance coverage to its approximately 70 employees through a self-insured plan. Plaintiffs argued that Task Force members are principal officers under the Appointments Clause who must be appointed by the President “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,” Art. II, §2, cl. 2, not by the Secretary. The District Court agreed, recognizing that Task Force members are removable at will by the Secretary but concluding they are principal officers because they “have no superior” who supervises and directs them. 627 F. Supp. 3d 624, 646. While the Government’s appeal was pending, the Secretary in June 2023 ratified existing appointments made by the AHRQ Director and began personally appointing Task Force members. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court, holding that while Task Force members are removable at will, they are not inferior officers because they cannot be “ ‘independent’ ” and “free from ‘political pressure’ ” while simultaneously being supervised by a political appointee.  Held: Task Force members are inferior officers whose appointment by the Secretary of HHS is consistent with the Appointments Clause. Read by RJ Dieken. 
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  • FCC v. Consumer Research (Nondelegation Doctrine)
    Send us a textFCC v. Consumers’ Research The Communications Act of 1934 established the FCC and instructed it to make available to “all the people of the United States,” reliable communications services “at reasonable charges.” 47 U. S. C. §151. That objective is today known as “universal service.” The universal-service project arose from the concern that pure market mechanisms would leave some population segments—such as the poor and those in rural areas—without access to needed communications services. Under the 1934 Act, the FCC pursued universal service primarily through implicit subsidies, using its rate-regulation authority to lower costs for some consumers at the expense of others. Congress created a new framework of this Act in 1996. Section 254 now requires every carrier to "contribute" to the Universal Service Fund. The FCC then uses this money to pay for universal service programs. The statutory scheme designates certain beneficiaries of these subsidies--such as low-income consumers, rural areas and hospitals, schools, and libraries. It also provides details for how to determine what services should be accessible. To determine what to subsize, the FCC “shall consider the extent to which” a service is “essential to education, public health, or public safety” and has “been subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers.” §§254(c)(1)(A)–(B). It also must determine if a service can be provided at an affordable rate.  §254(b)(1). There are also certain principles the FCC is told to base its policies, including Section 254 also sets forth “principles” on which the FCC “shall base” its universal-service policies. §254(b). Among other things, those principles direct that all consumers, “including low-income consumers” and those in “rural” areas, should have access to quality services at affordable prices. See ibid. The FCC also may add “other principles” found both “consistent with” the Act and “necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” §254(b)(7). To calculate how much carriers must contribute to the Fund, the FCC has devised a formula, known as the “contribution factor.” That factor is a fraction, expressed as a percentage, whose numerator is the Fund’s projected quarterly expenses (the subsidy payments it will make plus overhead) and whose denominator is contributing carriers’ total projected quarterly revenue. A carrier must pay into the Fund an amount equal to its own projected revenue multiplied by the contribution factor. §54.709(a)(3). The FCC has appointed the Universal Service Administrative Company, a private, not-for-profit corporation, as the Fund’s “permanent Administrator.” §54.701(a). The Administrator manages the Fund’s day-to-day operations and also plays a role in producing the financial projections that end up determining the contribution factor. See §§54.702, 54.709(a)(2)–(3). Each quarter, the Administrator projects the Fund’s expenses, adds up revenue estimates it receives from carriers, and submits those figures to the Commission for approval and eventual use in calculating the contribution factor. See §§54.709(a)(2)–(3). The FCC has appointed the Universal Service Administrative Company, a private, not-for-profit corporation, as the Fund’s “permanent Administrator.” §54.701(a). The Administrator manages the Fund’s day-to-day operations and also plays a role in producing the financial projections that end up determining the contribution factor. See §§54.702, 54.709(a)(2)–(3). In the full Fifth Circuit’s view, the combination of Congress’s delegation to the FCC and the FCC’s “subdelegation” to the Administrator violated the Constitution, even if neither delegation did so independently. Held: The universal-service contribution
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  • Mahmoud v. Taylor (LGBTQ+ Books / Parental Opt-Out)
    Send us a textHeld: Parents challenging the Board’s introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks, along with its decision to withhold opt outs, are entitled to a preliminary injunction. Read by Jeff  Barnum. 
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About Supreme Court Decision Syllabus (SCOTUS Podcast)

Following what the Supreme Court is actually doing can be daunting. Reporting on the subject is often only done within the context of political narratives of the day -- and following the Court's decisions and reading every new case can be a non-starter. The purpose of this Podcast is to make it as easy as possible for members of the public to source information about what is happening at the Supreme Court. For that reason, we read every Opinion Syllabus without any commentary whatsoever. Further, there are no advertisements or sponsors. We call it "information sourcing," and we hope that the podcast is a useful resource for members of the public who want to understand the legal issues of the day, prospective law students who want to get to know legal language and understand good legal writing, and attorneys who can use the podcast to be better advocates for their clients. *Note this podcast is for informational and educational purposes only.
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