Let's Know Things

This week we talk about industrialization, antibiotics, and child mortality rates.
We also discuss corruption, instability, and progress.
Recommended Book: Empire of Silence by Christopher Ruocchio
Transcript
Demographic transition is a social sciences theory that posits, based on all sorts of modern historical data, that societies tend to change, demographically, as they transition from a largely agrarian, low-industrial society, to that of a less-agrarian, high-industrial society.
Most modern, post-hunter-gatherer societies have started out plowing the vast majority of their labor into bare subsistence, human beings spending their days, throughout their whole lives, working the land in order to produce enough food to live. All sorts of social and economic systems arose around this base-level fact, including those that tied laborers to the land, allowing for the rise of a leadership or ruling class, regional militaries, and other sorts of specialists. But until relatively recent history, the majority of people in a given society labored to produce raw essentials, and that was just the shape of things.
This began to change with the dawn of the industrial revolution, and in some areas a bit before that, as precursor technologies allowed societies to produce more food and other essentials with less manual labor and using fewer foundational resources, like land. These technologies, as they became more widely distributed, more effective and efficient, and cheaper to deploy and operate, allowed more people to do more sorts of things, leading to a ballooning of industry and commerce in industrializing regions, and that allowed said regions to invest in other things, including medical knowledge, education, and so on.
Life wasn’t exactly a cakewalk in these industrializing areas, and all sorts of new abuses and issues, including long hours at factories and problems related to pollution, arose and became common. But because these sorts of societies required professionals with new types of knowledge and know-how, and because they were able to sustain an increasing number of specialities beyond working the land to generate food and other bare necessities, keeping people alive, longer, and ensuring more people had the specialized knowledge required to do all those things, became more of a priority, and one that could actually be addressed because of the concomitant ability to feed and clothe and house and address more of the needs of more people.
There were gobs of other spiraling forces in the mix, of course, including religion, politics, and so on, but that general tendency to shift away from raw subsistence into more complex and diverse economic systems was a driving factor behind a lot of what happened from around 1800 until, well, now.
What I’d like to talk about today is a specific data point, or collection of data points, that arguably, more than any other such data points, show the benefits of the industrialized, modern society we’re living in, today, despite all the accompanying downsides.
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So most societies, at this point, have undergone significant changes as a result of our widespread application of technologies that allow human beings to get more done with the same amount of effort.
We’re able to generate more value, of all kinds, than our ancestors, and though it’s possible to criticize the change in priorities and focus on all the negative knock-on effects of these changes—and there are many such negative knock-on effects, like large-scale military conflicts and rampant pollution and climate change—it would be difficult to argue that there haven’t been some fairly significant upsides for humanity, as well.
One key upside is related to that demographic transition I mentioned. As societies shift and it becomes better for everyone if more people know how to do more things, and it thus becomes a priority for more people to live long enough to use the knowledge and know-how they acquire, it has increasingly made more sense for governments to invest in our overall longevity and survivability.
We can’t just say, I’d like everyone to live longer, and then snap our fingers and make that happen. But we can, and have, invested in technologies and systems that make longer lives more likely, and from 1800 onward that’s generally been the trend, with a huge upswing arriving in the mid-20th century, when a bunch of new tools and technologies, including things like modern antiseptics and early antibiotics, first arrived on the scene, dramatically reducing the mortality rate associated with all kinds of medical procedures.
Arguably the most significant social gain during this period, though, has been the bogglingly large reduction in child mortality rates.
Child mortality refers to the death of children under the age of five, and this figure is, today, usually expressed as the likelihood of a child under five dying, per 1000 children in an area. So you might say in India, the child death rate is 92 in 1000, which means 92 of every 1000 children resulting from live births in India die before they reach the age of five. And that was actually the real child mortality rate in India back in the year 2000.
And the story of overall global child mortality rates is actually pretty well exemplified in India’s rates, as the country has seen a dramatic drop in all-cause child deaths in recent decades.
In the year 2000, as I mentioned, it was expected that 92 out of every 1000 children would die before the age of 5 in India. As of 2024, though, that number has dropped to just 32 out of every 1000; a 68% drop. If you go back as far as 1990, the progress is even more impressive, those 2024 numbers representing a 76% drop in child mortality.
This progress has largely been the consequence of intentional, targeted health interventions by the Indian government, including institutionalized child delivery services and widespread, well-funded immunization efforts that ensured more children got vaccines and other sorts of care that was previously lacking, or which was not widely disseminated beyond wealthy families. They’ve also invested in newborn care and neonatal units at hospitals, which has increased child survival outcomes in a large radius around these facilities.
Southeast Asian nations still account for about 25% of all under-five deaths, globally, but improvements in India mirror those in China, which made rapid and sustained progress on this issue beginning in the 1950s, but really hitting their stride in the 1970s, when their child mortality rate was 143 per 1000 children; that rate dropped to just 12 per 1000 by 2020.
Globally, right now, the average child mortality rate is just under 40 per 1000, which is down from 93 per 1000 in 1990.
That’s a staggering amount of progress, but it does mean that nearly 5 million children still die each year before their 5th birthday, which adds up to something like 15,000 of such deaths per day.
At the moment, the vast majority of these deaths, about 80% of them, occur in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. The cause of these deaths varies a bit based on location, and there’s a time component to this, too, as some areas have seen much higher rates due to epidemics, but most of the causes of child death before the age of 5 are consistent, with premature birth and pneumonia, birth asphyxia or trauma, malaria, diarrhea, congenital abnormalities, and sepsis representing about 60-70% of such deaths, globally.
Almost all of these issues are preventable, and the major barrier to reducing these numbers further is access to resources and expertise that are more widely available and accessible in the wealthier world; there are huge disparities in child mortality between rich countries and poor countries, in other words, and while the number of child deaths has decreased everywhere, including in the world’s poorest countries, over the past 100 years, countries like Finland see about 2 in every 1000 children die before they reach the age of five, while countries like Niger see nearly 115 in every 1000 children die before the age of five.
This figure was previously around 500 in every 1000, globally, so about half of all children would die before the age of five, even in relatively recent history, even in the wealthiest regions, just a few hundred years ago—so again, stunning progress in this area; and looking back, in addition to families needing more hands to work the fields, before everyone started industrializing, families would tend to have as many kids as they could because it was generally just assumed that about half of them would die within the first couple of years; some cultures still have traditions of not naming their children until they’ve lived for a few years because of that earlier child mortality trend.
There’s still plenty to be done in this space, though, and the changes necessary to dramatically drop this mortality rate even further, regionally and globally, are not revolutionary in nature, it’s just a matter of more widely and equitably disseminating tools and technologies and cultural and economic infrastructure that already exists across much of the world, to the places where it doesn’t exist yet.
That’s a tall order in some locations, though, as part of why some high child mortality rate regions still have those high rates is that they’ve also had persistent government instability, which has in turn led to persistent internal conflicts and government overthrows and long histories of grift and corruption at the top-most levels of society.
In other words, it’s extremely difficult to improve these sorts of numbers when those who are in charge of a high-mortality-rate region are seemingly incapable of keeping things stable, and always seem to be enriching themselves at the expense the the country they’re meant to be governing.
That’s a much larger systemic issue, of course, made up of numerous fractal issues that each have their own distinct causes and potential solutions.
But the main takeaway here is that child mortality is already an immense success story of modernity, and even more progress is possible, but in order to achieve that kind of progress, a bunch of other problems will probably need to be solved in these still-highly-afflicted areas, first. And solving these problems will likely be a truly heavy lift, for anyone who tries to tackle them, until and unless something fundamental changes about governing norms and corruption, and the many forces that enable that kind of high-level corruption, globally.
Show Notes
https://data.unicef.org/resources/levels-and-trends-in-child-mortality-2025/
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/un-report-highlights-indias-79-decline-in-child-mortality-rates-a-major-contributor-to-global-child-health-advancements/articleshow/129660557.cms
https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality-in-the-past
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Child_mortality
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1041851/china-all-time-child-mortality-rate/
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7138028/
https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/topic-details/GHO/child-mortality-and-causes-of-death
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_infant_and_under-five_mortality_rates


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This week we talk about the Strait of Hormuz, oil, and Russia.
We also discuss Patriot missiles, expensive weapons, and peer rivals.
Recommended Book: Tiny Experiments by Anne-Laure Le Cunff
Transcript
During 2025 and early 2026, about 20 million barrels of crude oil and other petroleum products was shipped through the Strait of Hormuz every day. That’s about a quarter of the world’s total seaborne oil, and essentially all of that oil, and gas, and those other energy products that pass through this strait are from Middle Eastern suppliers like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, and Iran.
Beginning at the tail-end of February 2026, however, the Iranian military has shut down the Strait by threatening to take out or capture any vessels that attempt to pass through it. This has had the practical effect of initially reducing tanker traffic through the Strait by about 70%, but in recent weeks traffic has dropped to nearly zero. As of April 2026, about 2,000 ships are stranded in the area as a result of this closure.
As a result of this shutdown, though, other energy product suppliers have seen demand for their oil and gas and the like increase, and that’s led to higher prices for these products.
Russia, for instance, which doesn’t rely on the Strait to get its oil and gas out to its customers, has seen its oil tax revenue double in April, and the price of one grade of oil that it sells increased by 73% from February, alone.
That’s a big windfall for Russia, which has had trouble selling its oil and gas at a significant profit, due in part to heavy sanctions that have resulted from its invasion of Ukraine. It’s continued to sell to countries like China and India, but those customers have been able to pay lower prices due to the lessened demand for what Russia is selling.
This increased demand has thus goosed profits for Russia at a moment in which it could really use those sorts of profits—its economy is not doing terribly well, again because of its invasion of Ukraine, which has also not been going terribly well—so while inflation caused by this gas price-spike has been near-universally not great for much of the world, because energy cost increases tend to increase the price of just about everything, Russia’s government, at least, has been pretty happy with the shutdown of the Strait, and would probably love to see it continue.
Another moderate benefactor of this shutdown has been the United States government. The US is the number one exporter of liquified natural gas, and one of the top exporters of oil and petroleum products. US export numbers are poised to hit new records with the closure of the Strait, too, because, just like with Russia, fewer products of this kind available on the global market means those who have such products to sell can charge higher prices for them.
There’s a good chance this disruption, even if it ended today, for good, will have permanently rewired at least some of the global petroleum industry, as companies and countries that have been left in the lurch have adjusted their risks analyses and determined that it makes more sense to buy from different suppliers, to sell to different customers, or, in some cases, to use fewer of these products and invest more enthusiastically in renewables, like solar and wind—so while the US and Russia and a few other players are somewhat pleased with how things are going, oil and gas price-wise at least, long term this could actually harm them, the most, as more of their customers decide to stop paying irregular prices for what they’re selling and to opt for less turbulent solar and wind power, instead.
What I’d like to talk about today is another knock-on effect of the war in Iran that could have significant international, possibly even military implications.
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Since Trump first stepped into office, winning the US presidency back in 2016, allies have openly wondered whether the US could be relied upon as a military ally, should push come to shove.
Trump has repeated said that he thinks NATO is a rip-off for the US, as the US has long provided the vast majority of funding and weapons for the alliance, and he’s pushed European NATO members to step up their own investment, lest he decide to just led Russia or whomever else attack them; he’s openly speculated that he might do exactly that.
As a result of the US’s pivot away from happily playing the role of world police and invasion deterrent, European governments have been hastily putting together contingency plans that don’t include the US: if Russia turns its attention away from Ukraine and starts attacking the Baltics or Poland, they want to be ready, and they don’t want to have to rely on the unreliable Trump administration for their survival.
Other governments that have long assumed they would be protected, at least in part, by the overwhelming force of the US military, have also been rethinking things, based on Trump’s stated, if not always practiced, isolationism.
Taiwan, for instance, which is persistently menaced by China, which considers Taiwan to be a rebel asset that it will someday reclaim, has also been investing in its own defenses, no longer certain that the US will step up and help them out at their moment of greatest need, despite historical assumptions.
Adding to that uncertainty, though, is the increasingly depleted state of the US military following its attack on Iran, which began in earnest in late February of this year.
Since February, the US has expended around 1,100 long-range stealth cruise missiles, more than a thousand Tomahawk cruise missiles, more than 1,200 Patriot interceptor missiles, and more than a thousand Precision Strike and ATACMS ground-base missiles.
For context, those Patriot missiles cost $4 million apiece, and again, 1,200 of them have been used since February, and the US military only buys about 100 Tomahawks a year, so the military has spent 10-years worth of them already during this new conflict in Iran. And those 1,100 stealth cruise missiles were built for a potential war with China, but now they’re gone.
This rapid depletion of armaments, weapons that take a long time to make and which are very expensive to procure, has required that stockpiles from elsewhere around the world be quickly packed up and shipped to the Middle East; and while the majority of what’s been fired so far by the US have been missiles, these shipments include all sorts of bombs, vehicles, and personnel equipment like guns and bullets, too, because they have to be ready for anything.
The military has also redirected assets, like missile systems and carrier strike groups, from other theaters, like the Pacific Ocean, to the Middle East, which leaves allies, like Taiwan and South Korea, less well-defended against potential incursions.
The US has refused to release any estimates as to the cost of the attack on Iran so far, but a pair of independent groups have estimated that price tag to be somewhere between $28 and $35 billion, which is about a billion dollars a day.
What’s more, it’s estimated that it will take about six years just to get armament stores back up to where they were in February, before this attack; it’s not just costly, it also takes a long time to produce that many missiles and rockets. And notably, a lot of these weapons were already considered to be in short supply before this conflict, at levels not suitable for a full-on shootout with an enemy like China, according to military experts. So six years plus whatever would be necessary to get up to more suitable levels.
This shortfall is partly the result of how the US military deals with defense contractors, and there are efforts by new military startups to remedy this sort of situation, making manufacturing a lot more nimble, while also shifting to cheaper weapons, like drones and inexpensive interceptors, to replace the pricy, conventional ones that the country has long relied on.
This expanded production hasn’t begun in earnest, though, and conventional military hardware suppliers have been slow to spin up new production because new funding hasn’t yet been confirmed by the Pentagon.
So the US military is currently low on the weapons it would need to defend its allies in Europe or the South China Sea against attacks by rival, near-peer nations, at a moment in which such nations are making big moves, like China’s persistent expansion into the South China Sea, and Russia’s adventurism in Ukraine.
What’s more, these stockpiles are unlikely to be resupplied any time soon, the capacity to produce what’s needed simply doesn’t exist, not in the US, anyway, and next-step options, like mass-scale drone production, also haven’t kicked off in earnest, yet, and might not arrive for another 5 or 10 years.
This already precarious moment has been made all the more precarious by the US government’s decision to attack Iran, then, and that decision still hasn’t been fully explained, the actual end-goal unknown. Consequently, there also doesn’t seem to be a clear end-point to aim and plan for.
Show Notes
https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/iran-war-complicates-contingency-plans-to-defend-taiwan-some-u-s-officials-say-4384f7c1
http://nytimes.com/2026/04/16/world/middleeast/iran-war-cost-congress.html
https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/epic-fury-costs-as-of-the-april-8-cease-fire/
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/23/us/politics/iran-war-cost-military.html
https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/is-the-iran-war-depleting-us-weapons-too-fast-1.500517800
https://www.moneycontrol.com/world/iran-war-drains-us-munitions-raises-taiwan-defence-concerns-report-article-13898019.html
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-rearms-iran-ceasefire-advanced-munitions-supplies/
https://www.ft.com/content/1a5a2502-a45a-40c1-af6f-b30ecc34bacb
https://archive.is/20260424042150/https://www.ft.com/content/1a5a2502-a45a-40c1-af6f-b30ecc34bacb
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/24/world/europe/europe-defense-nato-trump-eu.html
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/04/23/aircraft-carrier-bush-iran/
https://archive.md/T9tD1
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2026-03-31/trump-s-iran-war-is-accelerating-the-global-energy-transition
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/apr/18/fossil-fuel-trump-green-revolution-us-iran-renewable-energy
https://www.axios.com/2026/04/24/trump-oil-export-ceiling-iran-strait-hormuz


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This week we talk about Orbán, Hungary, and reformers.
We also discuss Fidesz, Tisza, and illiberalism.
Recommended Book: I’m Starting to Worry About This Black Box of Doom by Jason Pargin
Transcript
Hungary is a Central European country that was formed in the aftermath of WWI as part of the Treaty of Trianon, which—due to it having fought on the losing side of that conflict—resulted in the loss of more than 70% of its former territory, most of its economy, nearly 60% of its population, and about 32% of ethnic Hungarians who were left scattered across land that was given to neighboring countries when what was then Austria-Hungary was broken apart, initially by Hungary declaring independence from Austria, and then by those neighbors carving it up, grabbing land at the end of and just after the war, all of them pretty pissed at Hungary for being part of the Central Powers, quadruple alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and the Kingdom of Bulgaria.
Today, Hungary is surrounded on all sides by other nations, including those who gobbled up some of their territory, back in the day. They’ve got Slovakia to their north, Ukraine to their northeast, Romania is to the east, and Serbia is to the south. Croatia and Slovenia are to their southwest, and Austria, which used to be part of the same nation as Hungary, is to their west.
In 2026, Hungary has a population of a little over 9.5 million people, and the vast majority of those people, around 97.7%, are ethnic Hungarians, the next-largest ethnic group is Romani, weighing in at just 2.4%.
During WWII, Hungary was on the Axis side of the conflict, once again ending up on the losing side of a world war, and was eventually occupied by the Soviet Union, which converted the nation into a satellite state called the Hungarian People’s Republic. Hungarians tried to revolt their way out of the Soviet Union’s grip in 1956, but it didn’t work. In 1989, though, during the wave of other regional revolutions that tore the Soviet Union apart, Hungary peacefully transitioned into a parliamentary democracy, and it joined the EU in 2004.
What I’d like to talk about today is post-Soviet, Third Republic Hungary, the country’s conversion into an ultra-conservative, ultra-corrupt state, and how a decade and a half of democratic backsliding might be eased, at least somewhat, by new leadership that just won an overwhelming majority in Hungary’s recent elections.
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In the 1990s, Hungary began its transition from state-run authoritarianism under the Soviets into the type of capitalism-centered democracy that was being spread by the US and its allies during the Cold War.
In Hungary, like many other post-Soviet nations, this transition wasn’t smooth, and the country experienced a severe economic recession that sparked all manner of social upsets, as well.
Hungary’s Socialist Party did really well in elections for a while, in large part because of how badly capitalism seemed to doing, and all the downsides locals now associated with it, but the Socialists went back and forth with other governments, especially the liberal conservative Fidesz (FEE-dez) party, each government taking the reins for four years before being voted out, replaced by the opposition, which was then voted out four years later and replaced by their opposition.
In 2006, there was a big to-do about a report that the then-Prime Minister, in charge of the Socialist Party, had admitted behind closed doors to having lied to win the last election. “We lied in the morning, we lied in the evening, and we lied at night,” he said during that closed-doors speech, and the divulgence of this led to nationwide protests and a period, which continues today, in which no left-wing party could attain power, only conservative governments standing a chance of running things in Hungary.
In 2010, the Fidesz party, led by Viktor Orbán, won a supermajority in parliament, and the following year, parliament approved a new constitution that brought a huge number of significant changes to the government and the nation’s laws. This adoption was criticized for basically being a nation-defining document that enshrines the party’s Conservative Christian ideology into law, permanently, despite that ideology not reflecting the views of the country at large; just over 40% of Hungary identifies as Christian. This new constitution also significantly cut or curtailed the rights of formerly independent institutions, removing basically all checks on the government’s power, and making it nearly impossible to push back against anything they might want to do, moving forward.
Under Orbán, Hungary saw significant democratic backsliding, meaning the country was converted from a functioning democracy into something that looked like a democracy from the outside, with elections and a press and such, but with actual functionality closer to that of Russia, which also holds elections, but those elections are tightly controlled by the government, the outcomes preordained by locking up those who challenge the existing power structure and falsifying votes when necessary. The press, too, in Russia and Hungary, is severely limited in what it can report, those who fail to toe the party line locked up or otherwise punished, and most of these formerly and supposedly journalistic entities owned by close friends of the country’s leader.
This sort of setup is often called a kleptocracy or mafia-state, that hides behind the veil of democracy, because the people up top basically just do whatever they want, perpetually enriching themselves at the expense of their countrymen, and they get away with it because all the forces of government and opposition that might stand in their way are systematically removed, all while they continue to pretend that this is what the people want.
Both Hungary and Russia also publicly embrace illiberal governance, at least to some degree, meaning they loudly promote top-down systems of governance, and both of their top-down systems are vehemently anti-immigrant, anti-LGBT rights, anti-women’s rights, and pro-fellow illiberal states—which in this case means Hungary and Orbán tend to be close buddies with other oppressive nations, like Russia, like Iran, and like China.
Orbán has thus overseen the transition of Hungary from a liberalizing, open, post-Soviet nation into a different sort of totalitarian state, his version wearing the guise of western democracy instead of Stalinesque communism, but actually functioning as a private kingdom of sorts for Orbán and his friends, all of whom became wealthy by carving up state assets and making deals that favor them, just that group of oligarchs, and all of this happening at the expense of the Hungarian people and its institutions and resources.
That context established, let’s talk about what happened recently, during the 2026 Hungarian parliamentary elections.
On April 12, 2026, Hungary held elections to fill all 199 seats in the country’s parliament. 100 seats are necessary to achieve a majority, and thus to form a government and run things.
Orbán’s party, Fidesz, was seeking a fifth consecutive term, partnering with the Christian Democratic People’s Party in the hopes of elbowing out a newer competitor, the conservative, center-right Tisza (TEE-sah) party.
This election had been promoted as the most important in EU history, as while he was in control of Hungary, Orbán had been pushing the nation further and further into Russia’s orbit, allegedly even sharing classified information from private EU meetings with Russia’s government. He consistently also stood in the way of EU efforts to help support Ukraine, blocking billions of dollars of funding for Ukraine’s defensive efforts against Russia’s continuing invasion of its neighbor; if one EU member country says no, some bloc-wide efforts can be shut-down in perpetuity. And Orbán was a consistent ‘no’ for anything that was bad for Russia, or anything that was good for the EU, in the liberal democracy sense of good. He also regularly demanded what amounted to bribes to get his vote for just about anything, and was thus a consistent obstructionist for even normal government business within the bloc.
This new Tisza party, which is a Hungarian abbreviation for what translates as the Respect and Freedom Party, was established in 2020, then rose to prominence when a former Orbán ally and Fidesz member, Péter Magyar left Fidesz and joined with Tisza.
Tisza ran on populist principles and the overthrow of Orbán, who has been increasingly unpopular as he’s continued to heavy-handedly reinforce his own hold on power, rigging election maps so that nothing but the most overwhelming imbalance in votes against him would ever lead to a loss.
Unfortunately for him, that’s exactly what happened in this 2026 election: nearly 80% of potential voters turned out to vote, which is the highest since 1989, when communism originally collapsed throughout Europe. And Tisza, the new opposition party led by a former Orbán loyalist, who left Fidesz during a scandal during which the government oversaw the pardoning of people responsible for covering up child sexual abuse, Tisza took 141 of 199 seats, giving them the supermajority they need to not just form a government, but to change the constitution.
This is being seen as a massive victory for the EU, and a serious defeat for Russian President Putin, who will likely be losing a lot of influence in the region, but also his proxy within the EU, which allowed him to forestall and halt all sorts of anti-Russian and pro-Ukrainian efforts.
It’s also being seen as a possible shot across the bow of illiberal and illiberalizing governments around the world, including others within Europe, but also that of the United States, which has seem similar democratic backsliding under two non-consecutive Trump administrations. The same forces that led to Orbán’s loss, like a successful anti-corruption message communicated by his opposition, collapsing on-the-ground economic realities for the majority of Hungarian citizens, and a wave of support for the opposition, especially amongst young people, could lead to more toppled governments and strongman leaders in the coming years.
There are still quite a few unknowns and potential pitfalls here, though.
Magyar, though now the leader of a different party, was formerly in Orbán’s camp; this could represent a changing of the guard up top, someone else holding the reins and enriching himself and a different group of friends, rather than a wholesale change that serves those at the bottom. It wouldn’t be the first time we’ve seen an authoritarian replaced by a seeming freedom-fighter who then became an authoritarian, because all those former incentives remained in place when they stepped into office.
It’s also been posited that Putin might lean more heavily on Bulgaria as Hungary steps out of his sphere of influence; one pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian, anti-EU European Union nation replaced by another, the obstructionism continuing, but with different people on the Russian payroll.
As I’m recording this, polls from elections in Bulgaria that happened this past weekend seem to favor Bulgaria’s former president, who is pro-Russian and anti-Ukraine, though his administration seems to be filled with pro-EU representatives. It could be that he plays nice with the West while still opposing support for Ukraine, or it could be he waits to see which way the large-scale winds blow before deciding how to lean; he’s been pretty vague about how he’ll govern, and the people of Bulgaria seem like they’ll be happy just to have a functioning government after a long period without. So this guy could represent a foot in the door for Putin, but he could also be a reformer; he could also be a bit of both.
It’s also possible Orbán, who admitted defeat in the face of his opponent’s overwhelming parliamentary victory, will try some kind of last minute maneuver to stay in power, claiming that the vote was rigged against in him some way, for instance—a classic authoritarian move that has been repeated by these sorts governments over and over, including in modern history, and at times, unfortunately, successfully.
Show Notes
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/15/hungarys-magyar-urges-president-to-quit-vows-to-overhaul-state-media
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g40npz37lo
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/04/18/bulgaria-election-radev-russia-orban/
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-18/hungary-s-tisza-party-widens-election-majority-in-fresh-tally
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/18/opinion/hungary-election-orban-loses-trump-maga.html
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/18/hungary-peter-magyar-donald-tusk-poland-europe
https://apnews.com/article/hungary-eu-unlock-funds-orban-5a208f4094d4d66a47de9fc10b9d194f
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/hungary-putin-orban-russia-ukraine-b2959920.html
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/04/hungary-orban-loss/686832/
https://www.npr.org/2026/04/16/nx-s1-5784063/hungarian-americans-orban-defeat-trump-authoritarianism-democrats-republicans
https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2026/04/hungarys-election-significance-and-implications/
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/17/eu-officials-hungary-talks-peter-magyar-government
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-hungarys-vote-to-oust-viktor-orban-could-have-global-implications
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/hungary-just-voted-out-viktor-orban-heres-what-to-expect-in-europe-and-beyond/
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/hungarys-landmark-election/
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/could-bulgaria-replace-hungary-as-putins-proxy-inside-the-eu/
https://ecfr.eu/article/four-principles-for-an-eu-hungary-reset/
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/13/world/europe/hungary-election-results-orban-magyar.html
https://apnews.com/article/hungary-election-orban-magyar-trump-1a4eb0ba6b94e0c80c3cd18bd36254ab
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Trianon
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungarian_diaspora
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungary
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fundamental_Law_of_Hungary
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/19/world/europe/bulgaria-elections-what-to-know.html


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This week we talk about Project Glasswing, Anthropic, and Q Day.
We also discuss exploit markets, vulnerabilities, and zero days.
Recommended Book: The Culture Map by Erin Meyer
Transcript
In the world of computer security, a zero-day vulnerability is an issue that exists within a system at launch—hence, zero-day, it’s there at day zero of the system being available—that is also unknown to those who developed said system.
Thus, if Microsoft released a new version of Windows that had a security hole that they didn’t know about, but someone else, a hacking group maybe, discovered before it was released, they might use that vulnerability in Windows or Word or whatever else to hack the end-users of that software.
While large companies like Microsoft do a pretty good job, considering the scope and scale of their product library, of identifying and fixing the worst of the security holes that might leave their customers prone to such attacks, that same scope and scale also means it’s nearly impossible to fill every single possible gap: a truism within the cybersecurity world is that defenders need to get it right every single time, and attackers only need to get it right once, and the same is true here. There’s never been a perfect piece of software, and as these things expand in capability and complexity, the opportunity to miss something also increases, and thus, so does the range of possible errors and exploitable imperfections.
Because of how damaging zero-days can be for both users of software and the companies that make that software, there are thriving marketplaces, similar to those that deal in other illicit goods, where those who discover such vulnerabilities can sell them, usually for cryptocurrencies or funds derived from stolen credit cards.
Software companies have countered the increasing sophistication of these exploit black markets with white and grey market efforts, the former being direct payouts to hackers, basically saying hey, thanks for finding this bug, here’s a lump-sum of money, a bug bounty, rather than punishing all hacking of their systems, which is how they would have previously responded, which had the knock-on effect of sending all hackers, even those who weren’t looking to cause trouble, either underground, or actively hunting for bugs for the black market.
The grey market is more complicated and diverse, and also the largest of marketplaces for those shopping around for these types of exploits. And it’s populated by the same sorts of neverdowells who might frequent the exploit black markets, but also includes all sorts of governments and intelligence agencies, who scoop up these sorts of vulnerabilities to use against their opponents, or to deny them to others who might use them instead, against them.
All sorts of governments, from the US to Russia to North Korea to Iran are regular shoppers on these computer system exploit grey markets, and that has created a complicated, entangled system of incentives, as is some cases, it’s better for the US government, or Iranian government, or whomever, if the company making these systems doesn’t know about a bug or other vulnerability, because they just spent several million dollars to buy a map to said bug or gap, which could, at some point in the future, allow them to tunnel into an enemy’s computers and cause damage or steal information.
What I’d like to talk about today is a new AI system that is apparently very, very good at identifying these sorts of exploits, and why this is being seen as a milestone moment for some people operating in the zero day, and overall computer security space.
—
On April 7, 2026, US-based AI company Anthropic announced Project Glasswing—a new initiative that is currently only available to 11 companies that’s meant to help those companies shore-up their cyber defenses before more AI systems like the one that underpins Project Glasswing, which is called Mythos Preview, hit the market.
So these companies, Amazon Web Services, Anthropic, Apple, Broadcom, Cisco, CrowdStrike, Google, JPMorganChase, the Linux Foundation, Microsoft, NVIDIA, and Palo Alto Networks, make a lot of stuff, and in particular make and maintain a lot of vital online and device-based software infrastructure, like operating systems and all the stuff that keeps things in our apps and on the web secure.
Mythos Preview is a new model created by Anthropic, similar to their existing Claude models, but apparently vastly more powerful. There are tests that AI companies use to compare the potency of their models at a variety of task types, but those are generally considered to be flawed or game-able in all sorts of ways, so the main thing to know here is that Mythos did way better at most of those tests, especially the coding, the programming-related ones, than the other, currently most capable models, the ones that professional programmers, most of them anyway, are using these days. It was also able to do impressive and worrying things like break out of the sandbox that contained it, accessing the internet when it wasn’t supposed to be able to do so.
And because of that leap forward in programming capability, Mythos Preview was tasked by Anthropic with finding vulnerabilities in all sorts of software systems, including operating systems—Windows, macOS, iOS—and browsers, like Chrome and Firefox.
Most AI systems, and most human coders, if they focus enough and look really hard for long enough, will tend to find some kind of vulnerability in just about anything, because this software is just that big and complex. But within a relatively short period of time, Mythos Preview found thousands of vulnerabilities in these systems, indicating that it’s a lot better at this kind of task than the other AI available these days, and so Anthropic created this project, Project Glasswing, to give these entities a head-start, helping them fill these gaps and bolster their defenses, before everyone else on the planet, including foreign governments, hacker and terrorist groups, but also just everyday people, suddenly have the ability to identify and possibly exploit these vulnerabilities, on scale.
This news hasn’t been super widely reported in the non-tech press quite yet, but within the tech world, it landed like a hand grenade in a crowded room.
And there are already quite a few perspectives on what this all means, including a fair bit of skepticism.
On the skeptic side, many analysts have noted that it’s a common tactic amongst AI companies to doomsay, to basically suggest that their models might end the world, might kill all of humanity, might dramatically change everything, put everyone out of work, maybe, not necessarily because the founders and employees at those companies believe that would be the case, but because the implication is that if these products are that powerful, well, investors should probably give them gobs of money, because a tool that could end the world or cause that much disruption might be the last tool available, or might become the next electricity or internet or whatever else. Claiming philosophical, humanistic concern for the super-weapon you just built, in other words, is one way for AI company leaders to say their product is superior to every other product ever while also seeming to suggest that they are the thoughtful, careful leaders that we need holding the reins of that sort of capacity.
Other skeptics have said that while this might be a step-up in terms of the speed at which such vulnerabilities can be identified in these sorts of systems, other AI systems, existing ones, even open source, free ones, have been able to do the same for a while now. So while Mythos Preview might be even better at it, and might be capable of running constantly, finding more and more of these things for a government that wants to save money they might otherwise spend on the grey market, scooping these things up for use against their enemies, or for defensive purposes, sharing some of them with their homegrown tech companies, perhaps, smaller, less-moneyed groups can already do the same, if they’re smart about how they apply existing, even free, lower-end AI systems.
Others have responded to this announcement similarly to how some have responded to the concept of Q Day, short for Quantum Day, which refers to the hypothetical moment at which quantum computers finally become powerful enough to break the encryption that allows the internet, and banking, and government privacy systems to function. If these encryption keys can be broken—and quantum computers should theoretically be able to do this a lot better than conventional computers, because of their very nature—if and when that happens, if these systems aren’t suitably prepared with new encryption that’s hardened against quantum systems, the entire banking sector could collapse, everything hackable, all the money stealable, none of it trustworthy anymore. The same with the whole of the web, with apps, with government systems that keep things hidden away and classified, with energy grids. It could be chaos.
The theory here, then, is that this type of AI, maybe Mythos Preview, maybe the other systems that it portends—because this whole industry seems to leapfrog itself every three or four months at this point, someone coming out with a big, cool, most powerful new thing, then their competitors coming out with something even more powerful within weeks or months—maybe these vulnerability-identifying and exploiting AI will result in something similar, all the world’s software and encryption a lot more vulnerable, all at once, essentially tomorrow.
It’s more of what we’ve already seen with AI, basically, these tools providing anyone who uses them more leverage to do all sorts of things. Not necessarily creating anything new—exploits and vulnerabilities have always existed—but giving a skilled hacker the ability to find and exploit thousands of them in the same time it would have previously taken them to find and exploit just one. And it could also give unskilled, non-hackery people and entities similar capabilities.
That creates a dramatically new cybersecurity landscape essentially overnight, and that’s why, at least according to their press releases on the matter, Anthropic is not releasing Mythos Preview to the public, and instead is taking the Project Glasswing approach: they don’t think other AI companies, like OpenAI or xAI, can be trusted not to just lob that grenade into the crowded room, so since they got there first, they’re going to try to help everyone protect themselves from that grenade when it inevitably lands.
This could, then, be quite the PR coup, giving Anthropic the opportunity to tout their superior products, while also allowing them to portray themselves as sort of the white knight in the AI world, helping everyone protect themselves, even though they probably could have made far more money by either selling the exploits and creating their own new market for them, or by somehow leveraging those exploits themselves.
At the same time, it could be that they are overselling the capabilities of this new model, painting a rosy picture with them as the heroes, while in turn makes their products seem more powerful than they are in order to bolster their public perception and future economic potential.
It could also be a bit of both; even those who are skeptical about this specific announcement and the implications of it do tend to agree it’s likely we’ll see more disruption from these sorts of models soon. Even if Mythos Preview isn’t the grenade everyone’s worried about, in other words, it’s likely we’ll face such a threat in the near-future, and even if Project Glasswing isn’t the defense we need against such a threat, it’s probably prudent that we be thinking about whatever it is we do need, and ideally building it, too, so it’s ready to go, already in place, when that new threat lands.
Show Notes
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/10/briefing/claude-mythos-preview.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/07/technology/anthropic-claims-its-new-ai-model-mythos-is-a-cybersecurity-reckoning.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claude_(language_model)#Claude_Mythos_Preview
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2026/04/13/sam-altman-may-control-our-future-can-he-be-trusted
https://www.anthropic.com/glasswing
https://www.wired.com/story/anthropic-mythos-preview-project-glasswing/
https://stratechery.com/2026/myth-and-mythos/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-day_vulnerability
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_for_zero-day_exploits


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This week we talk about modems, WiFi, and kinda sorta bribes.
We also discuss Huawei, government subsidies, and the FCC.
Recommended Book: Replaceable You by Mary Roach
Transcript
Many homes, those with WiFi connections to the internet, have two different devices they use to make that connectivity happen.
The first is a modem, which is what connects directly to your internet service provider, often via an ethernet jack in the wall that connects to a series of cables webbed throughout your city.
The second is a router, which plugs into the modem and then spreads that signal, derived from that network of city-wide cables around your home, either by splitting that single ethernet jack into multiple ethernet jacks, allowing multiple devices to plug into that network, or by creating a wireless signal, WiFi, that multiple devices can connect to wirelessly in the same way. Many routers will have both options, though in most homes and for most modern devices, WiFi tends to be the more common access point because of its convenience, these days.
That WiFi signal, and the connection provided via those additional ethernet ports on the router, create what’s called a Local Area Network of devices, or LAN. This local area network allow these devices—your phone and your laptop, for instance—to connect to each other directly, but its primary role for most people is using that connection to the modem to grant these devices access the wider internet.
In addition to providing that internet access and creating the Local Area Network, connecting devices on that network to each other, routers also usually provide a layer of security to those devices. This can be done via firewalls and with encryption, which is important as unprotected networks can leave the devices plugged into them vulnerable to outside attack. That means if the router is breached or in some other way exploited, a whole company’s worth of computers, or all your local devices at home, could be made part of a botnet, could be held hostage by ransomware, or could be keylogged until you provide login information for your banks or other seemingly secure accounts to whomever broke into that insufficiently protected LAN.
What I’d like to talk about today is a recently announced ban on some types of routers in the US, the reasoning behind this ban, and what might happen next.
—
On March 23, 2026, the US Federal Communications Commission announced a ban on the import of all new consumer-grade routers not made in the United States.
This ban does not impact routers that are already on the market and in homes, so if you have one already, you’re fine. And if you’re buying an existing model, that should be fine, too.
It will apply to new routers, though, and the rationale provided by the FCC with the announcement is that imported routers are a “severe cybersecurity risk that could be leveraged to immediately and severely disrupt US critical infrastructure.”
They also cited recent, major hacks like Salt Typhoon, saying that routers brought into the US provided a means of entry for some components of those attacks.
This stated concern is similar to the one that was at the center of the Trump administration’s 2019 ban of products made by Chinese tech company Huawei in the United States. Huawei made, and still makes, all kinds of products, including consumer-grade smartphones, and high-end 5G equipment sold to telecommunications companies around the world for use in their infrastructure.
The concern was that a company like Huawei might leverage its far better prices, which were partly possible because of backing from the Chinese government, to put foreign competitors out of business. From there, they could dominate these industries, while also getting their equipment deep in the telecommunications infrastructure of the US and US allies. Then, it would be relatively easy to insert spy equipment and eavesdrop on phone calls and data transmissions from phones, or to incorporate kill-switches into these grids, so if China ever needed to, for instance, distract the US and its allies while they invaded Taiwan, they could just push a button, kill the US telecommunications grid, and that would buy them some time and fog of war to do what they wanted to do without immediate repercussions; and undoing a successful invasion would be a million times more difficult than stepping in while it’s happening to prevent it.
As of 2024, Huawei still controlled about a third of the global 5G market. It controlled about 27.5% back in 2019, the year it was banned in the US and in many US allied nations, so while it’s possible they could have grown even bigger than that had the ban not been implemented, they still grew following its implementation.
Chinese companies currently control about 60% of the US router market, and it’s likely the local, US market will shift, reorienting toward US makers over the next decade or so. But it’s possible these Chinese companies will grow their global footprint even further, as previous US bans have pushed them into different, less exploited markets, and that’s resulted in a wider footprint for such companies, even if their profits may drop a little after leaving the spendier US market.
There’s also a pretty good chance we’ll see deals to move more manufacturing to the US, which could allow some of these companies to make relatively small changes to their operations in order to bypass the ban entirely.
This seems extremely likely, at least in the short term, as all major players in the US router market fall under the FCC’s definition of not being entirely US owned and operated, and making consumer-grade routers that are designed or manufactured outside the US. Even the ostensibly more US companies, based and founded here, make their stuff primarily in Southeast Asia; so even those companies would seem to fall afoul of this new rule.
The FCC has also given these companies the opportunity to apply for what’s called Conditional Approval from the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security, which would require they give a bunch of details about their company and products to these entities, along with plans to manufacture more stuff in the US, and these departments can then give them permission to keep selling in the meantime.
It’s worth mentioning here that this kind of set up has previously given foreign entities a chance to funnel money into President Trump’s properties and businesses, before then speaking with him or one of his representatives and coming to some kind of agreement, the President then instructing the relevant agencies or departments to let those companies through, the ban not applying to them or not applying in the same way.
There are concerns that such bans basically operate as requests for bribes, in other words, and those who don’t pay up see their customer base dwindle in the US market, while those who do get away with a slap on the wrist so long as they promise to make more stuff in the US at some point—though they’re not really held to that promise in any concrete way, and often that’s where their efforts stop, at the announcement of such changes.
Also worth mentioning is that it’s not clear why this applies only to consumer-grade routers, as it would seem like the industrial- and military-grade ones would be of even greater concern, at least based on the claims made by the FCC when announcing this ban.
We also don’t know why it’s being applied to new models, but not models currently being sold, and not those already in our homes; all of which would seem to be just as vulnerable as newer models that haven’t made it to the market yet.
There’s a chance those details will follow, and there’s also a chance, again, that this is more about the administration maybe accumulating promises from foreign companies to move manufacturing to the US, because that looks good in an election year, and it’s maybe another means of accumulating bribes from companies that would find it far cheaper to make contributions to organizations the President either controls or favors, than to build new manufacturing capacity in the US, or leave the market entirely.
Show Notes
https://www.theverge.com/tech/899906/fcc-router-ban-march-2026-explainer
https://archive.is/20260326232922/https://www.theverge.com/tech/899906/fcc-router-ban-march-2026-explainer
https://www.cnet.com/home/internet/i-review-routers-for-a-living-dont-buy-a-router-right-now/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Router_(computing)
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-updates-covered-list-include-foreign-made-consumer-routers
https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/fcc-banning-imports-new-chinese-made-routers-citing-security-concerns-2026-03-23/
https://www.wired.com/story/us-government-foreign-made-router-ban-explained/
https://itif.org/publications/2025/10/27/backfire-export-controls-helped-huawei-and-hurt-us-firms/


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