Let's Know Things

This week we talk about OpenAI, nudify apps, and CSAM.
We also discuss Elon Musk, SpaceX, and humanistic technology.
Recommended Book: Who’s Afraid of Gender? by Judith Butler
Transcript
xAI is an American corporation that was founded in mid-2023 by Elon Musk, ostensibly in response to several things happening in the world and in the technology industry in particular.
According to Musk, a “politically correct” artificial intelligence, especially a truly powerful, even generally intelligent one, which would be human or super-human-scale capable, would be dangerous, leading to systems like HAL 9000 from 2001: A Space Odyssey. He intended, in contrast, to create what he called a “maximally truth-seeking” AI that would be better at everything, including math and reasoning, than existing, competing models from the likes of OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic.
The development of xAI was also seemingly a response to the direction of OpenAI in particular, as OpenAI was originally founded in 2015 as a non-profit by many of the people who now run OpenAI and competing models by competing companies, and current OpenAI CEO Sam Altman and Elon Musk were the co-chairs of the non-profit.
Back then, Musk and Altman both said that their AI priorities revolved around the many safety issues associated with artificial general intelligence, including potentially existential ones. They wanted the development of AI to take a humanistic trajectory, and were keen to ensure that these systems aren’t hoarded by just a few elites and don’t make the continued development and existence of human civilization impossible.
Many of those highfalutin ambitions seemed to either be backburnered or removed from OpenAI’s guiding tenets wholesale when the company experienced surprising success from its first publicly deployed ChatGPT model back in late-2022.
That was the moment that most people first experienced large-language model-based AI tools, and it completely upended the tech industry in relatively short order. OpenAI had already started the process of shifting from a vanilla non-profit into a capped for-profit company in 2019, which limited profits to 100-times any investments it received, partly in order to attract more talent that would otherwise be unlikely to leave their comparably cushy jobs at the likes of Google and Facebook for the compensation a non-profit would be able to offer.
OpenAI began partnering with Microsoft that same year, 2019, and that seemed to set them up for the staggering growth they experienced post-ChatGPT release.
Part of Musk’s stated rationale for investing so heavily in xAI is that he provided tens of millions of dollars in seed funding to the still non-profit OpenAI between 2015 and 2018. He filed a lawsuits against the company after its transition, and when it started to become successful, post-ChatGPT, especially between 2024 and 2026, and has demanded more than $100 billion in compensation for that early investment. He also attempted to take over OpenAI in early 2025, launching a hostile bid with other investors to nab OpenAI for just under $100 billion. xAI, in other words, is meant to counter OpenAI and what it’s become.
All of which could be seen as a genuine desire to keep OpenAI functioning as a non-profit arbiter of AGI development, serving as a lab and thinktank that would develop the guardrails necessary to keep these increasingly powerful and ubiquitous tools under control and working for the benefit of humanity, rather than against it.
What’s happened since, within Musk’s own companies, would seem to call that assertion into question, though. And that’s what I’d like to talk about today: xAI, its chatbot Grok, and a tidal wave of abusive content it has created that’s led to lawsuits and bans from government entities around the world.
—
In November of 2023, an LLM-based chatbot called Grok, which is comparable in many ways to OpenAI’s LLM-based chabot, ChatGPT, was launched by Musk’s company xAI.
Similar to ChatGPT, Grok is accessible by apps on Apple and Android devices, and can also be accessed on the web. Part of what makes its distinct, though, is that it’s also built into X, the social network formerly called Twitter which Musk purchased in late-2022. On X, Grok operates similar to a normal account, but one that other users can interact with, asking Grok about the legitimacy of things posted on the service, asking it normal chat-botty questions, and asking it to produce AI-generated media.
Grok’s specific stances and biases have varied quite a lot since it was released, and in many cases it has defaulted to the data- and fact-based leanings of other chatbots: it will generally tell you what the Mayo clinic and other authorities say about vaccines and diseases, for instance, and will generally reference well-regarded news entities like the Associated Press when asked about international military conflicts.
Musk’s increasingly strong political stances, which have trended more and more far right over the past decade, have come to influence many of Grok’s responses, however, at times causing it to go full Nazi, calling itself Mechahitler and saying all the horrible and offensive things you would expect a proud Nazi to say. At other times it has clearly been programmed to celebrate Elon Musk whenever possible, and in still others it has become immensely conspiratorial or anti-liberal or anti-other group of people.
The conflicting personality types of this bot seems to be the result of Musk wanting to have a maximally truth-seeking AI, but then not liking the data- and fact-based truths that were provided, as they often conflicted with his own opinions and biases. He would then tell the programmers to force Grok to not care about antisemitism or skin color or whatever else, and it would overcorrect in the opposite direction, leading to several news cycles worth of scandal.
This changes week by week and sometimes day by day, but Grok often calls out Musk as being authoritarian, a conspiracy theorist, and even a pedophile, and that has placed the Grok chatbot in an usual space amongst other, similar chatbots—sometimes serving as a useful check on misinformation and disinformation on the X social network, but sometimes becoming the most prominent producer of the same.
Musk has also pushed for xAI to produce countervailing sources of truth from which Grok can find seeming data, the most prominent of which is Grokipedia, which Musk intended to be a less-woke version of Wikipedia, and which, perhaps expectedly, means that it’s a far-right rip off of Wikipedia that copies most articles verbatim, but then changes anything Musk doesn’t like, including anything that might support liberal political arguments, or anything that supports vaccines or trans people. In contrast, pseudoscience and scientific racism get a lot of positive coverage, as does the white genocide conspiracy theory, all of which are backed by either highly biased or completely made up sources—in both cases sources that Wikipedia editors would not accept.
Given all that, what’s happened over the past few months maybe isn’t that surprising.
In late 2025 and early 2026, it was announced that Grok had some new image-related features, including the ability for users to request that it modify images. Among other issues, this new tool allowed users to instruct Grok to place people, which for this audience especially meant women and children, in bikinis and in sexually explicit positions and scenarios.
Grok isn’t the first LLM-based app to provide this sort of functionality: so called “nudify” apps have existed for ages, even before AI tools made that functionality simpler and cheaper to apply, and there have been a wave of new entrants in this field since the dawn of the ChatGPT era a few years ago.
Grok is easily the biggest and most public example of this type of app, however, and despite the torrent of criticism and concern that rolled in following this feature’s deployment, Musk immediately came out in favor of said features, saying that his chatbot is edgier and better than others because it doesn’t have all the woke, pearl-clutching safeguards of other chatbots.
After several governments weighed in on the matter, however, Grok started responding to requests to do these sorts of image edits with a message saying: “Image generation and editing are currently limited to paying subscribers. You can subscribe to unlock these features.”
Which means users could still access these tools, but they would have to pay $8 per month and become a premium user in order to do so. That said, the AP was able to confirm that as of mid-January, free X users could still accomplish the same by using an Edit Image button that appears on all images posted to the site, instead of asking Grok directly.
When asked about this issue by the press, xAI has auto-responded with the message “Legacy Media Lies.” The company has previously said it will remove illegal content and permanently suspend users who post and ask for such content, but these efforts have apparently not been fast or complete, and more governments have said they plan to take action on the matter, themselves, since this tool became widespread.
Again, this sort of nonconsensual image manipulation has been a problem for a long, long time, made easier by the availability of digital tools like Photoshop, but not uncommon even before the personal computer and digital graphics revolution. These tools have made the production of such images a lot simpler and faster, though, and that’s put said tools in more hands, including those of teenagers, who have in worryingly large numbers taken to creating photorealistic naked and sexually explicit images of their mostly female classmates.
Allowing all X users, or even just the subset that pays for the service to do the same at the click of a button or by asking a Chatbot to do it for them has increased the number manyfold, and allowed even more people to created explicit images of neighbors, celebrities, and yes, even children. An early estimate indicates that over the course of just nine days, Grok created and posted 4.4 million images, at least 41% of which, about 1.8 million, were sexualized images of women. Another estimated using a broader analysis says that 65% of those images, or just over 3 million, contained sexualized images of men, women, and children.
CSAM is an acronym that means ‘child sexual abuse material,’ sometimes just called child porn, and the specific definition varies depending on where you are, but almost every legal jurisdiction frowns, or worse, on its production and distribution.
Multiple governments have announced that they’ll be taking legal action against the company since January of 2026, including Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Britain, France, India, Brazil, and the central governance of the European Union.
The French investigation into xAI and Grok led to a raid on the company’s local office as part of a preliminary investigation into allegations that the company is knowingly spreading child sexual abuse materials and other illegal deepfake content. Musk has been summoned for questioning in that investigation.
Some of the governments looking into xAI for these issues conditionally lifted their bans in late-January, but this issues has percolated back into the news with the release of 16 emails between Musk and the notorious sex traffic and pedophile Jeffrey Epstein, with Musk seemingly angling for an invite to one of Epstein’s island parties, which were often populated with underage girls who were offered as, let’s say companions, for attendees.
And this is all happening at a moment in which xAI, which already merged with social network X, is meant to be itself merged with another Musk-owned company, SpaceX, which is best known for its inexpensive rocket launches.
Musk says the merger is intended to allow for the creation of space-based data centers that can be used to power AI systems like Grok, but many analysts are seeing this as a means of pumping more money into an expensive, unprofitable portion of his portfolio: SpaceX, which is profitable, is likely going to have an IPO this year and will probably have a valuation of more than a trillion dollars. By folding very unprofitable xAI into profitable SpaceX, these AI-related efforts could be funded well into the future, till a moment when, possibly, many of today’s AI companies will have gone under, leaving just a few competitors for xAI’s Grok and associated offerings.
Show Notes
https://www.wired.com/story/deepfake-nudify-technology-is-getting-darker-and-more-dangerous/
https://www.theverge.com/ai-artificial-intelligence/867874/stripe-visa-mastercard-amex-csam-grok
https://www.ft.com/content/f5ed0160-7098-4e63-88e5-8b3f70499b02
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2026/jan/29/millions-creating-deepfake-nudes-telegram-ai-digital-abuse
https://apnews.com/article/france-x-investigation-seach-elon-musk-1116be84d84201011219086ecfd4e0bc
https://apnews.com/article/grok-x-musk-ai-nudification-abuse-2021bbdb508d080d46e3ae7b8f297d36
https://apnews.com/article/grok-elon-musk-deepfake-x-social-media-2bfa06805b323b1d7e5ea7bb01c9da77
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/07/technology/elon-musk-spacex-xai.html
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3ex92557jo
https://techcrunch.com/2026/02/01/indonesia-conditionally-lifts-ban-on-grok/
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgr58dlnne5o
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/22/technology/grok-x-ai-elon-musk-deepfakes.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XAI_(company)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenAI
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChatGPT
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grok_(chatbot)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grokipedia
https://www.cnbc.com/2025/02/10/musk-and-investors-offering-97point4-billion-for-control-of-openai-wsj.html


This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe

This week we talk about the European Union, India, and tariffs.
We also discuss trade barriers, free trade, and dumping.
Recommended Book: The Kill Chain by Christian Brose
Transcript
A free trade agreement, sometimes called a free trade treaty, is a law that reduces the cost and regulatory burden of trading between two or more states.
There are many theories as to the ideal way to do international trade, with some economists and politicians positing that complete free and open trade is the way to go, because it allows goods and services to cross borders completely unencumbered, which in turn allows businesses in different countries to really lean into whatever they’re good at, selling their cars to countries that are less good at making cars, while that recipient country produces soy beans or computer chips or whatever they’re good at making, and sending those in the other direction, likewise unburdened by stiff tariffs or regulatory hurdles. Each country can thus produce the best product cheapest and sell it to the market where their products are in high-demand, while they, in turn, benefit from the same when it comes to other products and services.
This theory leans on the idea that everyone is better off when everyone does what they’re best at, rather than trying to do everything—specialization. But those who oppose this conception of international trade argue that this creates and reinforces asymmetries between different nations and businesses: a country that’s really good at producing soybeans may be at a substantial disadvantage if the country that makes cars ever decides to go to war, because they won’t have the existing infrastructure to build tanks or drones or whatever else, while the country that specializes in computer chips might hold all the cards when it comes to generating economic pressure against its enemies or would-be enemies, because such chips are in everything these days, from military hardware to kitchen appliances.
This also creates potential frailties for countries that specialize in, say, buggy whips, only to have a new technology like the automobile come around and put a significant chunk of their total economy out of business.
This theory may also leave local businesses that don’t lean into a regional strength kind of in the lurch. If a country with a decent-sized automobile industry decides leaves their borders completely open to international competition, there’s a chance that could light a fire under those local producers, forcing them to become more competitive, but there’s also a chance it could collapse the market for local offerings—their cars might no longer be desirable, because the international stuff flooding across the borders from a nation that has heavily prioritized making cars are just so much better and cheaper, whether naturally or artificially, because of subsidies by that foreign government meant to help them take out international competition.
This is why most nations have all sorts of tariffs, regulations, and other trade barriers erected between them and their trading partners, and why those trade barriers are ultra-specific, different for every single possible trade partner. The goal is to make international options less appealing by making them more expensive, or making it trickier for foreign competition to smoothly and quickly get their products on your shelves, while still making those things available in a volume that aligns with local consumer demands. And then ideally making it easier and cheaper for your stuff to get on their shelves.
The negotiation of all this is massively complicated because Country A might want to favor their soybean farmers, who are an important voting bloc, and Country B might want to do the same for their car industry, because tax income from that industry is vital, and these two governments will thus do what they can to ensure their favored local industries and businesses have the biggest leg-up possible in as many foreign markets as possible, without giving away so much to their trade partners that they create worse situations for other industries and businesses (and the people who run them) on the home-front, as a consequence.
What I’d like to talk about today is a recent, massive and potentially quite vital trade deal that was struck in early 2026, and what it might mean for global trade.
—
At the tail-end of January 2026, the European Commission announced that they had struck what they called “the mother of all deals” with India, this deal the culmination of two decades worth of negotiation, its tenets impacting about 2 billion people and around a quarter of the world’s total GDP.
The agreement, as is the case with most such agreements, is fairly complex. But in essence it reduces or eliminates tariffs on 96.6% of all EU goods exported to India, which means about 4 billion euros of annual duties that would have otherwise been paid on European products in India will disappear—a savings for Indian consumers, and a boon for European producers whose products will now be cheaper in India.
This is expected to be especially beneficial for European automakers like Volkswagen, Renault, and BMW, which have long been weighed down by a 110% tariff in India; that tariff will be reduced to as little as 10% on the first 250,000 vehicles sold, following this agreement. Lower priced vehicles will still face higher tariffs, to help protect India’s local carmakers, but electric vehicles will benefit from a five-year grace period, as India has been focusing on allowing as many cheap, renewable energy assets and infrastructure into the country as possible, regardless of where they come from.
Tariffs on machinery, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals coming from the EU will be almost entirely eliminated, down from tariff rates of 44, 22, and 11%, respectively. Wine, which has long been tariffed at a rate of 150%, will be cut to between 20-30% for many varieties, and spirits from the EU coming into India will see 150% tariffs cut to 40%.
On the other side of this deal, the EU will also open its market to Indian goods, reducing tariffs on about 99.5% of all such goods, including seafood, textiles, gems and jewelry, leather goods, plastic products, and toys. Several of these categories, like Indian seafood, textile-making, and other labor-intensive industries, have had a rough time of late, because of high US tariffs enforced by President Trump’s second administration, so this is being seen as a significant win for them in particular.
Interestingly, while the reduction in trade barriers is substantial here, and the number of people and industries, and amount of money that’s involved is massive, this deal doesn’t include, and in some cases explicitly excludes, any agreements related to labor rights, climate commitment, or environmental standards.
This means that while the European Union has thus far been pretty strict in terms of ensuring incoming products align with their policies and values regarding things like carbon emissions and ensuring goods aren’t produced by people laboring in slave-like conditions, this deal falls short of such enforcements, allowing India to operate with relative impunity, with regards to those issues, at least, and still sell with dramatically reduced barriers, on the European market. That’s a big deal, and is perhaps the biggest indicator of just how badly the EU wanted to make this deal work.
The EU was also able to keep significant protections in place for important local sectors like beef and chicken, dairy, rice, and sugar—all industries in which India would have liked to compete in the EU, but which, because of those maintained barriers, they practically can’t. That would likely have been a feverishly negotiated topic, and it’s likely an indicator of how much India wanted this to work, too.
On that note, both India and the EU were apparently especially interested in making this multi-decade deal work, now, because of increasing pressure from China on one side and the US on the other.
China has been rerouting many of its cheap products that would have previously gone to the US market, elsewhere, engaging in what’s often called ‘dumping’ which slowly but surely puts businesses that produce comparable products at a profit in those local target markets out of business, at which point these Chinese companies can then ratchet up their prices and profits, operating without real competition.
The EU and India have both been targeted by Chinese companies taking this approach, because they’re still producing at a feverish pace and because of US tariffs and the general unpredictability and irregularity of US policy overall under the second Trump administration, they’ve been firing that cheap product cannon more intensely at other large markets, instead—and India and the EU are the next two big markets in line right now, after the US and China.
On the US side of things, those same tariffs have been hurting companies in both the EU and India that would otherwise been shipping their goods to the rich and spendy US market, and in many cases these tariffs have been fine-tuned to hurt important local industries as much as possible, because that’s one of Trump’s main negotiating tactics: lead with pain and then negotiate to take some of the pain away.
This deal, then, serves multiple purposes in that it creates a valuable, newly polished trade relationship between a rich and powerful existing bloc and the newly most-populous country on the planet, which is also rapidly expanding economically and geopolitically.
One last point to note, here, though, is that the European Union has been trying to create these sorts of mutually beneficial deals with non-US partners for a while, now, and the two most recent wins, trade deals with a South American trade bloc and with Indonesia, in early January 2026 and in September of 2025, respectively, have borne mixed results.
The deal with Indonesia seems to be moving forward apace, and while it’s a heck of a lot smaller than the India deal, only worth about 27 billion euros, that’s still important, as Indonesia is increasingly important, both economically and geopolitically, especially in a Southeast Asia that’s slowly reinforcing itself against China’s economically and potentially militarily expansionist tendencies.
The deal with that South American bloc, however, was referred to the EU Court of Justice in mid-January for legal review due to its lack of alignment with other EU treaties, and that could delay or prevent its ratification.
This new mother of all deals with India could likewise face holdups, or could fizzle before being implemented—though most analysts who are keeping eyes on this are seeing it not just as an economic agreement, but a gesture of solidarity at a moment in which China and the US are signaling their intent to carve up the world into hemispheric hegemonies, when those who might otherwise be forced into subordinate positions are scrambling to figure out who they can team up with and create counter-balancing forces capable of standing up against current and future aggression and coercion.
There’s a chance that even if politics and propriety threaten to get in the way, then, India and the EU will figure out a way to work together, on this and potentially other matters of global import, as well.
Show Notes
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/jan/27/eu-and-india-sign-free-trade-agreement
https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/eu-india-trade-deal-leaves-blocs-carbon-border-tariff-intact-2026-01-27/
https://archive.is/20260127162349/https://www.ft.com/content/b03b1344-7e92-4d0d-b85e-5ed92fc8f550
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_trade_agreement
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trade_barrier
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_184
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_26_184/IP_26_184_EN.pdf
https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/how-indias-mother-of-all-deals-with-eu-wipes-out-pakistans-trade-advantage-10921011
https://theconversation.com/what-the-mother-of-all-deals-between-india-and-the-eu-means-for-global-trade-274515
https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/economic-impact-us-tariff-hikes-significance-trade-diversion-effects
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20260116IPR32450/eu-mercosur-meps-demand-a-legal-opinion-on-its-conformity-with-the-eu-treaties
https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/1/27/mother-of-all-deals-how-india-eu-trade-deal-creates-27-trillion-market
https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/27/trump-reaction-eu-india-trade-deal-fta.html
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/the-mother-of-all-trade-deals-in-the-time-of-trump/
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/with-mother-of-all-deals-in-bag-minister-piyush-goyal-says-mother-will-be-compassionate-fair-to-all-28-children/articleshow/127821015.cms
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%E2%80%93European_Union_Free_Trade_Agreement
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%E2%80%93European_Union_relations


This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe

This week we talk about social networks, propaganda, and Oracle.
We also discuss foreign adversaries, ByteDance, and X.
Recommended Book: Rewiring Democracy by Bruce Schneier and Nathan E. Sanders
Transcript
In 2021, TikTok, a short-form video platform that’s ostensibly also a social network, though which leans heavily toward consuming content over socializing, was ranked the most popular website by internet services company Cloudflare, beating out all the other big tech players, including search engine juggernaut, Google.
It was a neck and neck sort of thing, with Google taking the lead some days that year, but 2021 was definitely TikTok’s time to shine, as it was already popular with young people and was starting to become popular with the general public, of all ages and across a huge swathe of the planet. It even beat Facebook as the most popular social media website that year, despite, again, being mostly about consuming content rather than interacting—that was actually a prime motivator for Meta, which owns Facebook and Instagram, to redirect its own apps in a similar direction, shifting its focus from communication and interaction between users toward the creation of binge-able content, and feeding users more of that content in a feed optimized for time-losing levels of consumption.
2021 was also the first full year that TikTok was coming under scrutiny from the US government. In the preceding year, 2020, then first-term president Donald Trump said he was considering banning the app because it was becoming so popular, with young people in particular, and because it was owned by a Chinese company, ByteDance it represented a potential national security threat.
So the idea was that because Chinese companies are forced, by their very nature, to do what the Chinese government tells them—that’s just how things work over there—and to do so on the down-low if that’s what the governments demands, and to lie about having to do what the government tells them to do, if the government tells them to thus lie, it doesn’t matter that ByteDance’s leadership swore up and down to the world that the company will never use its popularity, and the data it soaks up from all its users as a result of that popularity, to help the Chinese government, the Chinese military, or Chinese intelligence services.
It of course will have to do that, and if it doesn’t, its leaders could be black-bagged and disappeared in the night—because again, that’s just how things work over there. So the Trump administration decided to make TikTok a sort of bogeyman, representing Chinese companies in general, and to some degree the presence of China in the US and throughout the Western world, and said, nope, we’re not gonna let this thing continue to operate over here.
It’s worth remembering, too, that by 2021 the world was enmeshed in the COVID-19 pandemic, which originated in China, and which Trump and his administration were ardently attempting to tie to the Chinese government—calling Covid the Chinese Flu, and even worse things, as part of that effort.
So this move against TikTok and its parent company, while based on genuine concerns about the ownership of the company and how and where the data being collected by said company is handled, it should also be seen as a political maneuver, allowing Trump, during the 2020 election run-up, to look like he was taking a big stand against a big foreign threat, China.
What I’d like to talk about today is a deal that was proposed way back then by the Trump administration, as a potential way out for TikTok and ByteDance, allowing it to continue operating in the US despite threats to shut it down, now that said deal, or a version of it, seems to have finally come to fruition—and what we know about the shape of the resulting new, US-based version of TikTok.
—
On January 18, 2025, TikTok stopped worked in the US. It voluntarily suspended all services in the country in the lead-up to the implementation of the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, which was passed by the US congress and signed into law by then-president Joe Biden in April of 2024. This law gave social networking services controlled by ‘foreign adversaries’ 270 days, with the possibility of a 90-day extension, to divest themselves so that they’re no longer considered foreign adversary-owned.
This law was almost exclusively aimed at TikTok, and the idea was that TikTok, in the US, would no longer be able to legally function following that deadline if it was still owned by China, which for the purposes of this law has been labeled a foreign adversary.
ByteDance could keep TikTok in the US going if it sold a majority, controlling stake of its US-based assets to non-adversary owners, but otherwise it would have to shut down.
Interestingly, though Trump was the original source of concerns about TikTok and its Chinese ownership during his first administration, when he stepped back into office in January 2025, he signed a new executive order that delayed the enforcement of this Biden-signed law, and then delayed it still-further, three more times after that, saying that he wanted to give American investors the time to negotiate controlling interest of US TikTok, rather than banning it.
Those efforts eventually bore fruit in the shape of a new controlling entity called TikTok USDS Joint Venture LLC, which is made up of a bunch of non-Chinese investment entities, including US software behemoth Oracle, an Emirati investment firm called MGX, a US investment firm called Silver Lake, and a personal investment company owned by Michael Dell, the founder of Dell Technologies. There are other, smaller investors also involved, but the red thread that runs through almost all of them is that they’re big Trump supporters and funders, funneling a lot of money into Trump’s campaigns, and his family businesses.
So six years after the initial legal salvo was fired at TikTok in the US, the local assets are now controlled by non-Chinese investors, though the original Chinese owner, ByteDance, still owns just under 20%, compared to about 15% apiece for Oracle, MGX, and Silver Lake.
The new company’s board is majority-run by those investors, too, which means it’s majority-run by ardent Trump supporters. We don’t yet know what effect this will have on content within the app, but under full Chinese ownership, topics related to democracy, Tianamen Square, and the LGBTQ community, among others, were significantly downgraded in the algorithm, ensuring they were seldom shown to anyone, which in turn disincentivized content that those owners didn’t like while incentivizing content that was pro-China, and pro-Chinese government priorities.
It’s considered to be likely, by analysts who watch these sorts of maneuverings, that the same will be true of this new entity, but for and against subject matter that the Trump administration is for and against. Which raises the possibility that the new US TikTok, while superficially the same as the previous US TikTok, will slowly go the way X, formerly Twitter, has gone under Elon Musk, which was dramatically pushed in a new direction under its own owner, focusing on his political and ideological priorities and punishing users who spoke against those priorities.
TikTok could become more or less an extension of the Trump-verse, in other words, and could thus become something more akin to Trump’s own network, Truth Social, or other right-leaning and far-right social networks, like conservative YouTube-clone, Rumble, rather than something less ideological, or maybe I should say less overtly politically ideological, like Meta’s Facebook, Threads, and Instagram.
Users have already noticed some changes to US TikTok after the change in ownership, though, including what sorts of data are collected.
TikTok’s new privacy policy, which all users have to agree to before using the app, now that the platform has changed hands, says that TikTok will be using precise location tracking, keeping tabs on exactly where users are located via their device’s GPS. That’s compared to the app’s previous approximate location-tracking effort, which used SIM card and IP address data to understand general proximity—it still uses that data, too, but now, rather than knowing what neighborhood you’re probably in, it may also know what room in your house you’re scrolling from.
The new US TikTok also tracks users’ interactions with AI tools, including their prompts, outputs, and metadata attached to said interactions, which includes details about where users are when they’re using such tools, and what time they used them.
They also collect gobs of marketing data from outside sources, and based on the users’ activity within the app. So things you buy, websites and other apps you visit and use, and conversations you have will all be sucked up and agglomerated into a profile that’s then used to show you targeted advertising. This isn’t unique to US TikTok, but the company does seem to intend to make use of more such data, and to combine it with that other stuff it’s now collecting, to increase the price it can charge for ads, because they’ll be a lot more specifically targeted than before.
Some users are beginning to comb through the new user agreement with a fine-toothed comb, noticing, in addition to those aforementioned major changes, that the company also reserves the right to collect information about your physical and mental health, to use identifying information in the videos and images you might share, and information gleaned from people and their identifying characteristics in images and videos, and to collect biometric data, which usually means eyes and faces and walking gate and things like that, to differentiate and track people across such content. They can keep tabs on your sex life, sexual orientation and gender, your drug usage, your ethnic and racial origins, your citizenship and immigration status, your financial situation and information—all sorts of stuff is collected, and they say in the privacy policy and user agreement that they intend to do gather and store and cross-reference this kind of information whenever possible.
Again, much of this isn’t novel, as social platforms are gobbling up all sorts of stuff about their users all the time, mostly to refine their ad placements because that allows them to charge advertisers more for better-targeted placements, over time.
That said, because of the nature of the group that now owns US TikTok and which is making executive decisions about it, including, potentially, how this data is shared, including with the US government and its many agencies, there’s a chance we might see an exodus of sorts from the still younger-than-average user base of this network, because there is a nonzero chance it could become a tool in the Trump administration’s utility belt for tracking down people they don’t like and spreading messages that are favorable to them and their ideological aims; so basically what was happening under the previous ownership, but for the current US administration’s priorities, rather than those of the Chinese government.
Show Notes
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/tiktok-surpasses-google-popular-website-year-new-data-suggests-rcna9648
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/22/technology/tiktok-deal-oracle-bytedance-china-us.html
https://www.wired.com/story/tiktok-new-privacy-policy/
https://archive.is/20260123005655/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-23/tiktok-seals-deal-to-create-us-venture-with-oracle-silver-lake
https://www.axios.com/2026/01/23/tiktok-deal-trump-app-ban
https://www.theverge.com/tech/866868/tiktok-usds-new-owners-algorithm-explained
https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/22/5-things-to-know-about-the-tiktok-deal-00743316
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/23/business/media/tiktok-us-terms-conditions.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TikTok
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Trump%E2%80%93TikTok_controversy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Efforts_to_ban_TikTok_in_the_United_States
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protecting_Americans_from_Foreign_Adversary_Controlled_Applications_Act


This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe

This week we talk about war, inflation, and currency devaluation.
We also discuss tyrants, police violence, and social media threats.
Recommended Book: Post-Growth Living by Kate Soper
Transcript
Back in mid-June of 2025, a shooting war erupted between Iran and Israel, with Israeli military forces launching attacks against multiple Iranian military sites, alongside sites associated with its nuclear program and against individual Iranian military leaders.
Iran responded to these strikes, which left a lot of infrastructural damage and several military leaders assassinated, with large waves of missiles and drones against both Israeli and allied military targets, and soon after, later the same month, both sides agreed on a ceasefire and that was that.
Following that blip of a war, though, Iran’s economy suffered greatly. It already wasn’t doing well, in part due to the crippling sanctions enforced by the US government for years, but also because of persistent mismanagement by Iran’s ruling regime, and the resultant deterioration of local infrastructure, both physical and bureaucratic.
Millions of people fled Iranian urban centers during the war with Israel, and while most of them returned when the ceasefire was brokered, the pace of life and other fundaments of these cities never got back up to where they were, before, as there have been fairly consistent blackouts that have kept people from being able to function as normal, and these outages have also kept businesses from getting back on their feet. That, in turn, has resulted in closures and firings and an overall reduction in economic activity.
The general hamhandedness of the government has amplified these issues, and the countless other issues of trying to exist within a country that is being so persistently targeted—both in the sense of those crushing sanctions from the US, but also in the sense of being periodically struck by Israel—has dramatically increased uncertainty throughout Iran these past several years.
Even before that brief war, Iran was already on the backfoot, having suffered the loss of their local proxies, including the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas in the Gaza Strip—all of which have been either severely weakened by Israel in recent years, or functionally wiped out—and that in turn has more directly exposed them to meddling and attacks from their key opposition, which includes the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.
That new vulnerability has put the Iranian government on high-alert, and the compounding effects of all that infrastructural damage, mismanagement, and the need to reallocate more resources to defense has left the country suffering very high levels of inflation, a severely devalued currency, regular blackouts, mass unemployment, a water shortage, and long-time repression from a government that is in many ways more paranoid and flailing than in any time in recent memory.
What I’d like to talk about today is a recent wave of protests across Iran and why the US government is apparently considering taking action to support protestors against the Iranian government.
—
Iran has long suffered all sorts of issues, including regular efforts by ethnic secessionists to pull it apart into pieces they periodically occupy and want to govern, themselves, and concerns from citizens that the government spends a whole lot of their time and the nation’s resources enriching themselves, oppressing the citizenry, funding what seems to be a pointless nuclear program, and prioritizing their offensive efforts against Israel and their other regional enemies, often by arming and funding those aforementioned, now somewhat defunct proxy militias and militaries.
On top of all that, as of October 2025, inflation in Iran had surged to 48.6% and the Iranian currency, the rial, dropped in value to 1.45 million per dollar. The government tried to artificially boost the value of the rial to 1.38 million per dollar in early January of 2026, but it dropped further, to 1.5 million per dollar a few days later, hitting a record low. This combined with that wild inflation rate, made the basic fundamentals of life, food, electricity, and so on, unaffordable, even for those who still had jobs, which was an ever-shrinking portion of the population.
For context, the drop of the rial to a value of 1.38 million per dollar, the boosted value, represented a loss of about 40% of the rial’s value since June of 2025, just before that war with Israel, which is a staggering loss, as that means folk’s life savings lost that much in about half a year.
When currency values and inflation hit that level of volatility, doing business becomes difficult. It often makes more sense to close up shop than to try to keep the doors open, because you don’t know if the price you charge for your product or service will make you a profit or not: there’s a chance you’ll sell things at a loss, because the value of the money you receive and the cost of goods you require, both to survive and to keep your business functioning, will change before the day ends, or before the sale can be completed.
Iran’s economic crisis has further exploded in the past few weeks, then, because all those issues have compounded and spiraled to the point that simply selling things and buying things have become too risky for many people and entities, and that means folks are having even more trouble getting food and keeping the lights on than before; which becomes a real survival issue, on top of the regular crackdowns and abuses by the government that they’ve suffered in various ways for decades.
In 2022, those abuses and limits on personal rights led to large protests that were catalyzed by the death of a 22-year-old woman named Mahsa Amini, who was in police custody for allegedly wearing her hijab improperly. Those 2022 protests were historically large—the biggest in the country, by some estimates at least, since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
On December 28 2025, a group of shopkeepers in Iran’s capital city, Tehran, went on strike, closing their shops in protest against what’s been happening with Iran’s economy; again, it’s basically impossible to safely do business in a country with that much inflation and currency devaluation happening.
Other shopkeepers followed suit, and large protests formed around these closed shops. Those protests flooded social media platforms in short order, protestors shouting slogans that indicated they were pissed off about all the economic mismanagement in the country, and then eventually that led to anti-government slogans being shouted, as well.
Things remained peaceful at these protests, at first, and they expanded across the country within the next few days, shops closing and people filling the streets.
By the fourth day, police had started to use live ammunition and tear gas against protestors, some of the protestors were killed, and things spiraled from there.
By December 31, the government ordered a total, nationwide business shutdown, to try to get ahead of these protests, which again tended to revolve around the shutdown of businesses in protest—the government said they were making this call because of cold weather, but the writing was kind of on the wall at this point that they were scrambling to make it look like businesses were shutting down because they said so, not in protest of the government.
The government also announced that they would start cracking down on protestors, hard, and on the first day of 2026, things escalated further, police using even more force against those who gathered, which of course led to more protests in more places, more angry slogans being shouted, and more protestor deaths at the hands of government forces.
Protests had spread to all 31 Iranian provinces by early January of 2026, and at this point there were only 17 confirmed deaths.
US President Donald Trump got involved around this time, maybe feeling confident following the successful nighttime grab of Venezuelan President Maduro; whatever the case, he warned the Iranian government not to shoot protestors, or the US government might have to get involved, coming to the protestors’ rescue.
Iran’s government responded by saying the rioters must be put in their place, suppressing the funerals of protestors, and muffling local internet service, slowing down access speeds and increasing the number of outages by about a third. They threatened to execute hundreds of protestors by hanging, then said they wouldn’t. Trump declared this to be a personal victory, though the Iranian government has used his insinuation of himself into the matter to position the fight as Iran against the US, the protestors backed by their great enemy, which has shown itself to be responsible for these protests.
The government then started forcing captured protestors to make confessions on video, which only seemed to further anger the non-arrested protestors, and some protestors began to fight back, in one case setting a police officer on fire, and in other cases local militia groups defended protestors against police, leading to several deaths.
Iran’s government shut down more communication services in an attempt to regain control, in some cities taking down the internet completely, though some information, photos and videos of police abuses of protestors still made it out into the wider world using satellite services like Starlink, and by the 9th of January, protests reached a scale that rivaled and maybe surpassed those seen during the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and protestors began to set fire to buildings associated with the Islamic Republic, the government, and directly clashing with security forces in some cases.
Hundreds of people were reportedly killed per day from that point forward, and thousands were rushed to hospitals, overwhelming local doctors.
Thousands of people were also violently killed by police, under cover of the now complete internet blackout, and on January 10th, it was estimated that around 2,000 protestors had been killed in the past two days, alone, while other estimates from inside and outside Iran range from 12,000 to 20,000 protestors killed by the government. The most reliable source I could find, as of last weekend, indicated that the true number of dead is something like 3,300 people, at minimum.
In the past week or so, the Iranian government has apparently figured out how to jam Starlink internet signals, making it even more difficult for protestors to share what’s happening in the country, and President Trump posted on his social network, Truth Social, telling Iranian citizens that they should overthrow the government and that help is on the way.
The Iranian government has arrested tens of thousands of people, has tanks patrolling their towns and cities, and seems to have successfully quashed protests for the time being; no protests at all were reported across the country as of mid-January, and so many people were killed and injured that hospitals and other institutions are still overwhelmed, trying to work through their backlog; much of the country is in mourning.
Government forces are reportedly going door to door to arrest people who were spotted in CCTV and social media footage participating in protests, and they’ve set up checkpoints to stop people, look through their phones, and arrest them if any photos or videos are found that indicate they were at protests, deleting that digital evidence in the process.
This remains a fast-moving story and there’s a chance something significant, like the US striking Iranian government targets, or renewed, more focused protests will arise in the coming days and weeks.
Some analysts have argued that it’s kind of a no-brainer for the Trump administration to hit the Iranian government while it’s strained in this way, because it’s a long-time enemy of the US and its allies that’s currently weak, and doing so would reinforce the narrative, sparked with the capture of Maduro, that Trump’s administration is anti-tyrant; which is questionable by most measures, but again, this is a narrative, not necessarily reality. And narratives are powerful, especially going into an election year.
It’s also possible that, because economic conditions in Iran haven’t changed, that this is just the beginning of something bigger; protestors and militias taking a moment to regain their footing and consider what they might do to have more of an impact when they start back up again.
Show Notes
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601130145
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/31/we-want-the-mullahs-gone-economic-crisis-sparks-biggest-protests-in-iran-since-2022
https://www.nytimes.com/article/iran-protests-inflation-currency.html
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/06/25/mapping-the-protests-in-iran-2/
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/10/us/politics/trump-iran-strikes.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/10/world/middleeast/iran-protests-death-toll.html
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/iranian-mp-warns-greater-unrest-urging-government-address-grievances-2026-01-13/
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-is-hunting-down-starlink-users-to-stop-protest-videos-from-going-global-d8b49602
https://archive.is/20260114175227/https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/bank-collapse-iran-protests-83f6b681
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-protest-death-toll-over-12000-feared-higher-video-bodies-at-morgue/
https://sundayguardianlive.com/world/did-irans-currency-collapse-rial-plummets-to-000-against-euro-while-inflation-protests-escalate-across-the-country-164403/
https://archive.is/20260116034429/https://www.ft.com/content/5d848323-84a9-4512-abd2-dd09e0a786a3
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cm2jek15m8no
https://theconversation.com/the-use-of-military-force-in-iran-could-backfire-for-washington-273264
https://archive.is/20260114182636/https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/01/14/iran-regime-protest-trump-strike/
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/16/world/middleeast/iran-protests-deadly-crackdown.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/17/world/middleeast/iran-ayatollah-khamenei.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%932026_Iranian_protests
https://www.en-hrana.org/day-thirteen-of-the-protests-nighttime-demonstrations-continue-amid-internet-shutdown/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Iran_internal_crisis
https://apnews.com/article/iran-protests-trump-khamenei-fc11b1082fb75fca02205f668c822751


This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe

This week we talk about Venezuela, Maduro, and international law.
We also discuss sour crude, extrajudicial killings, and Greenland.
Recommended Book: The Keep by F. Paul Wilson
Transcript
Back in mid-November of 2025, I did an episode on extrajudicial killings, focusing on the targeting of speedboats, mostly from Venezuela headed toward the United States, by the US military. These boats were allegedly carrying drugs meant for the US market, and the US government justified these strikes by saying, basically, we have a right to protect ourselves, protect our citizens from the harm caused by these illegal substances, and if we have to keep taking out these boats and killing these people to do that, we will.
There’s been a lot of back-and-forthing about the legitimacy of this approach, both in the sense that not all of these boats have been shown to be carrying drugs, some just seemed to be fishing boats in the wrong place at the wrong time, and in the sense that launching strikes without the go-ahead of Congress in the US is a legally dubious business. There was also the matter of some alleged follow-up strikes, which seemed to be intended to kill people who survived the initial taking-out of the boats, which is a big international human rights no no, to the point of potentially being a war crime.
All of this happened within the context of a war of words between US President Trump’s second administration and the increasingly authoritarian regime of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, who followed the previous president Hugo Chávez as his hand-picked successor, and has more or less completed the authoritarian process of dissolving, coopting, or diminishing all aspects of the Venezuelan government that might ever check his power, which allowed him, in 2024, to bar the very popular, now Nobel Peace Prize winning candidate María Corina Machado from running, and her sub-in candidate, like previous Maduro opponent Juan Guaido, seems to have won the election by a fair bit, and in an internationally provable way, but Maduro’s government faked results that made it look like he won, and his single-party rule has since continued unabated.
Or rather, it continued unabated until the early morning of January 3, 2026, around 2am, when US Operation Absolute Resolve kicked into action, leading to the—depending on who you ask—justified captured or illegal kidnapping—of Maduro and his wife from a stronghold in his country.
And that’s what I’d like to talk about today: the operation itself, but also the consequences and potential meaning of it within the context of other important things happening in the world right now.
—
Maduro is immensely popular with about a fifth of the Venezuelan population, but essentially everyone else is strongly opposes him and his iron-fisted rule.
It’s estimated that between 2017 and 2025, just shy of 8 million people, which is more than 20% of Venezuela’s 2017 population, has fled the country in order to escape a tyrannical government and its failed policies, which have collapsed the economy, made getting working and feeding oneself and one’s family difficult, and made crime, conflict, and the state-sanctioned oppression of anyone who doesn’t kowtow to the ruling party a commonplace thing.
Trump speculated about the possibility of invading Venezuela even in his first administration, and part of the overt rationale was that it’s run by a failed government that most of the locals hate, so it would be an easy win. That justification shifted to orient around immigration and drugs by his second administration, and then more recently, Trump has said publicly that the real issue here is that Venezuela stole a bunch of US company-owned oil assets when it nationalized the industry back in the day, and those assets should be recaptured, given back to the US.
Operation Absolute Resolve took months to plan and only about two and a half hours to complete. By most objective measures it was a spectacular military and intelligence success, especially considering all the moving parts and thus, all the things that could have gone wrong.
The operation apparently involved at least 150 aircraft of various sorts, a spy within Maduro’s government, and months of surveillance, which helped them establish Maduro’s habits and routines, and that allowed them to map out where he would be, when, and what to expect going in to get him. All of these patterns changed in September of 2025 when US warships started massing in Caribbean, as Maduro started to get a little paranoid—justifiably, as it turns out—and he started moving between eight different locations, seldom sleeping in the same place more than one night in a row.
He was eventually grabbed from a military base in Caracas, Venezuela’s capitol, and to make that happen the US military assets in the area had to take out local aviation and air defenses so that US Delta Force troops could be carried in by helicopter. Several air bases and communications centers were taken out by missiles, and fighter jets were bombed on air base tarmacs. Trump alluded that a cyberattack of some kind might have also been used to take out power in the area, though satellite imagery suggests bombs might have been used against a power station to make that happen.
The operation apparently went almost exactly as planned, though a helicopter was damaged and the Delta Force team killed a large part of Maduro’s security team when he refused to surrender. A few US soldiers were wounded, but none were killed, and Venezuelan officials said, in the aftermath, that lat least 40 Venezuelans were killed throughout the country during the operation. Maduro and his wife were swept from the base before they could lock themselves in their safe room, and they were tucked into the helicopters which headed out to sea, landing them on the USS Iwo Jima, which is an assault ship.
All of this took a matter of hours and, again, is generally considered to be an objective success, in terms of precision, outcome, and other such metrics. Morally, legally, and politically, however, the operation is receiving a far more mixed response, and that response is continuing to play out as Maduro works his way through a bizarre version of the US justice system where he’s being sent to court for drug dealing.
In the US, Trump supporters have generally said all of this was a good, smart move, though some maintain that US involvement in any kind of international conflict is a waste of time, effort, and resources, and they worry about getting bogged down in another Iraq or Afghanistan-style conflict.
Everyone else is generally against the effort, even those who admit that Maduro was a tyrant who needed to go—it’s good that he’s gone, but the way in which it was done is not just questionable, but worrying because of what it says about Trump’s capacity to unilaterally launch kidnapping missions against the leaders of other countries. Not a good look, but also kind of scary.
Internationally the response is generally aligned with the latter opinion, especially in other countries that Trump has at some point threatened, which is most of them.
Governments in South and Central America have been especially concerned, however, because one of Trump’s newer messaging efforts has revolved around the concept of a Western Hemisphere basically owned and protected by the US. Do whatever you want in the rest of the world, basically, but everything over here is ours. This has raised the possibility that an emboldened Trump might attempt similar maneuvers soon, including possibly claiming the Panama Canal for the US again, or grabbing the leaders of other Latin American countries he doesn’t think are kowtowing enthusiastically enough; toeing the new international line that he’s drawing, basically.
He’s also renewed messaging around the possible purchase or capture of Greenland, which has been raising alarm bells across Europe in particular. Greenland is considered to be a vital strategic base for US security, and it would grant potential access to an abundance of also strategically and economically important minerals, both on land and underwater, but Greenland is an autonomous territory of Denmark, and most European leaders have said something along the lines of “if the US takes action to militarily claim Greenland, that’ll be the end of NATO,” an organization that was originally founded to help protect the world, and Europe especially, from military conquest from the Soviet Union, but which, at that point, might be recalibrated to protect against incursions from the US, as well.
NATO has been mostly funded and perpetuated by the US until recently, however, so there’s a chance that something else would need to replace it, if the US is no longer providing nuclear deterrence as the ultimate whammy against a potential Russian invasion of its European neighbors.
The UN has also indicated that they consider this operation to be a violation of international law, and have called it a dangerous precedent—because one nation capturing the leader of another nation, unilaterally, kind of negates the purpose of negotiations and the whole concept of international law. That kind of use of force is meant to be granted by the UN, not attempted secretively and outside the bounds of international processes for such things.
All that said, the Trump administration seems to be leaning into the victory, gleefully talking about next-step potential targets, the most likely of which seem to be in Iran, a long-time US opponent, and a target of this administration last year, when the US attacked Iranian nuclear facilities alongside Israel.
There are ongoing, very large and seemingly significant protests happening across Iran right now, so the US could see this as another opportunity to topple another unpopular authoritarian regime while also getting the chance to flex its military and intelligence capabilities at a moment in which another big-name player in that space, Russia, is generally flailing; it’s failed to protect several of its allies, including Venezuela, over the past few years, and its intended few-day invasion of Ukraine has now stretched into years.
That contrast is considered to be meaningful by most analysts, and though a lot of the PR about the capture of Maduro has focused on the oil, most US-based oil executives have said it’s a red herring—the hundreds of billions of dollars required to get more of Venezuela’s thick, dirty, expensive to process oil pumping and back on the market wouldn’t be worth it—and it’s more likely that this is partly a means of keeping the press and US public focused on something other than the Epstein files, which is a major scandal for Trump and his administration, while also allowing Trump to test the boundaries of his power; what the public and government will let him get away with currently, and what he can do to expand the range of what he can do without any outside buy-in or significant personal consequences, in the future.
Show Notes
https://theconversation.com/how-maduros-capture-went-down-a-military-strategist-explains-what-goes-into-a-successful-special-op-272671
https://archive.is/20260105035543/https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/01/trump-nicolas-maduro-venezuela/685493/
https://www.wsj.com/business/energy-oil/chevron-charts-a-new-path-in-venezuela-to-unlock-vast-oil-reserves-0369ce1b
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/04/tactical-surprise-and-air-dominance-how-the-us-snatched-maduro-in-two-and-a-half-hours
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/10/us/politics/trump-iran-strikes.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/10/nyregion/nicolas-maduro-lawyers.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/10/business/dealbook/oil-executives-trump-venezuela.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/10/world/americas/venezuela-oil-tanker-us.html
https://www.axios.com/2026/01/11/trump-iran-protest-options-death-toll
https://www.axios.com/2026/01/03/maduro-capture-trump-venezuela-operation
https://www.axios.com/2025/05/11/trump-maga-western-civilization
https://www.axios.com/2026/01/08/venezuela-war-powers-senate-aumf-time-kaine
https://www.axios.com/2026/01/07/trump-russia-oil-tanker-seize-bella-venzuela
https://www.axios.com/2026/01/08/trumps-donroe-doctrine-sets-us-on-great-power-collision-course
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/05/un-security-council-trump-attack-venezuela
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/08/us/politics/trump-interview-power-morality.html


This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe