Irregular Warfare Podcast

Description

Episode 156 examines what the U.S.-Iran War and Russia-Ukraine War reveal about how weaker states and irregular actors contest navies, maritime commerce, and global energy flows.

Summary

This conversation examines naval irregular warfare in an era of drones, shadow fleets, contested chokepoints, and attacks on commercial shipping. The guests explore why the maritime domain is attractive to weaker states and irregular actors, comparing Iran’s approach in the Strait of Hormuz, Ukraine’s campaign in the Black Sea, and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. They also discuss ghost fleets, sanctions enforcement, and the risks of mixing warfighting, law enforcement, and freedom of navigation. Throughout, they emphasize that technology matters most when paired with ingenuity, strategy, and a clear end state.

Takeaways

Naval irregular warfare is not new; mines, small boats, commerce raiding, deception, and coastal attacks have long been part of maritime competition.

Unmanned systems, cheap sensors, long-range fires, spoofing, and commercial data add new layers to older maritime threats.

The maritime domain is attractive to irregular actors because trade, energy, food, communications, ports, and undersea infrastructure are difficult to defend and easy to disrupt.

Commercial shipping can be as strategically important as naval forces because disrupting trade can create economic and political effects far beyond the immediate battlefield.

Chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal allow relatively small actions to generate disproportionate global consequences.

Ukraine’s Black Sea campaign shows that a state without a conventional surface fleet can still contest the sea by integrating drones, missiles, intelligence, targeting, and adaptation.

Iran’s maritime strategy relies on asymmetric tools such as small boats, mines, drones, dark shipping, proxy-enabled experimentation, and the threat of disruption in confined waters.

Ghost fleets, spoofed vessel tracking, reflagging, sanctions evasion, and maritime interdiction create hard legal and operational problems for the United States and its allies.

Boarding suspect vessels is not enough; policymakers need a clear legal basis, a clear “then what,” and a strategy that does not undermine freedom of navigation.

U.S. and allied navies need to focus on threat tactics as much as threat technologies, especially the combined use of drones, missiles, mines, small boats, and commercial vessels.

Platform flexibility, modularity, amphibious capacity, and agile force design may matter as much as any single new technology or class of unmanned system.

Tactical success does not equal strategic success. Shooting down drones or destroying vessels matters only if it helps keep seas open and achieves the larger political objective.

Dr. Ben Connable is the Executive Director of the Battle Research Group, an Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, and an on-call principal research scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses. A retired Marine Corps intelligence and Middle East foreign area officer, he previously served as a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and is the author of Ground Combat: Puncturing the Myths of Modern War.

Dr. Ian M. Ralby is president of Auxilium Worldwide and founder and CEO of I.R. Consilium. He is a leading expert on maritime law, maritime security, ocean governance, maritime domain awareness, hybrid aggression, lawfare, and the protection of critical maritime infrastructure. His work supports governments and international organizations confronting piracy, trafficking, smuggling, sanctions evasion, and other maritime security challenges.

Kyle Atwell and Alisa Laufer are the hosts for episode 156. Please reach out to them with any questions about the episode or IWI. 

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. 

Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa

Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa

Photo: AI-generated photo illustration created for the Irregular Warfare Podcast. The image is illustrative and does not depict an actual event, vessel, or operation.

This week’s episode of the Irregular Warfare Podcast examines how Taiwan could deter—or potentially defeat—a Chinese invasion by transforming the Taiwan Strait into an “unmanned hellscape.” Anchored in the recent CNAS report Hellscape for Taiwan: Rethinking Asymmetric Defense, the conversation explores how drones, autonomous systems, and mobile defenses are reshaping warfare in the Indo-Pacific. Drawing from lessons in Ukraine, the guests argue that cheap, expendable drones offer Taiwan a way to strengthen its longstanding “porcupine strategy” by imposing massive costs on a PLA invasion force during the dangerous amphibious crossing of the Taiwan Strait.

The episode also explores how Taiwan’s geography favors the defender if leveraged correctly. Narrow beaches, mountainous terrain, dense urban areas, and the roughly 100-mile Strait create opportunities for a layered defense built around mines, kamikaze drones, mobile air defenses, and uncrewed maritime systems. At the same time, the guests assess the political and organizational barriers Taiwan faces in implementing a truly asymmetric strategy, arguing that the island’s security may depend less on high-end prestige platforms and more on building a resilient and scalable ecosystem of autonomous systems capable of making invasion prohibitively costly.

Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he directs work on cyber, emerging technologies, and Indo-Pacific security. A former PACOM J3 and carrier strike group commander, RADM Montgomery has extensive experience working on Taiwan defense issues and regularly conducts engagements with Taiwanese military officials.

Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn is a senior fellow and director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). A leading expert on defense strategy, drones, and emerging technologies, she is the co-author of Hellscape for Taiwan: Rethinking Asymmetric Defense, which serves as the foundation for today’s discussion.

Ben Jebb is the host for this episode. Please reach out to Ben with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

Episode 154 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast examines a core puzzle in intrastate conflict: how a small number of foreign fighters can exert outsized influence on insurgencies. Anchored in Professor Tricia Bacon’s The Counterinsurgency Dilemma, this episode explores when foreign fighters strengthen insurgent groups—and when they undermine them. 

While foreign fighters are often associated with higher levels of violence, they typically make up only a small share of insurgent forces. As Bacon argues, this reveals a key insight: local insurgents—not foreign fighters—drive outcomes. They control strategy, resources, and relationships with the population, making them the decisive actors in any insurgency.

Foreign fighters can still provide meaningful advantages. They bring combat experience, specialized skills, and sometimes external funding. Their high risk tolerance and ideological commitment can make groups more aggressive and tactically capable. In fragmented insurgencies, they can even shift the balance of power among rival factions.

However, these benefits come with serious costs. Foreign fighters often lack cultural understanding and local legitimacy, and their preference for extreme violence can alienate civilian populations. Over time, this can strain relationships within insurgent movements, reduce local recruitment, and erode long-term effectiveness.

Drawing on his experience as U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, Steven Schwartz highlights how groups like al-Shabaab evolved from foreign-influenced networks into locally driven organizations. Their durability, he notes, stems less from popular support than from their ability to impose predictable order—often outperforming weak governance alternatives.

Ultimately, the episode reframes foreign fighters as a diagnostic tool rather than the central problem. High levels of foreign fighter influence often signal a weak insurgent group, while limited influence suggests a stronger, locally embedded movement. For practitioners, this distinction matters: effective counterinsurgency must focus on the local dynamics that sustain insurgencies—not just the foreign fighters who draw attention.

Description

Episode 153 examines the role of unconventional warfare and special operations forces in conventional major war.

Summary

This conversation explores how unconventional warfare can support, shape, and sometimes substitute for conventional military operations in large-scale combat. Our guests examine what unconventional warfare is, why it matters beyond the special operations community, and how support to resistance forces can create strategic and operational effects for joint force commanders. The discussion draws heavily on the 2003 invasion of Iraq, where U.S. Special Forces partnered with Kurdish Peshmerga forces to create a northern front, tie down Iraqi forces, generate intelligence, and support the broader conventional campaign. The episode also examines the limits and risks of unconventional warfare, including partner alignment, feasibility assessments, political constraints, and the need for policymakers and commanders to understand both the value and the limitations of this tool. 

Takeaways

Unconventional warfare is best understood in simple terms as support to resistance movements or insurgencies.

Unconventional warfare is not just a SOF issue; conventional joint force commanders and civilian policymakers need to understand how it can support broader campaigns.

UW can supplement conventional forces by shaping the battlefield, imposing costs, generating intelligence, and creating dilemmas for the enemy.

UW can also substitute for conventional forces when geography, politics, or access prevent a conventional formation from operating in a particular area.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq provides a powerful example of UW supporting a conventional campaign, as a small number of U.S. SOF personnel helped mobilize Kurdish Peshmerga forces to create pressure in the north.

Working with local forces is not the same as replacing U.S. infantry with indigenous infantry; resistance forces have their own strengths, limits, interests, and operating areas.

Successful UW depends on feasibility: competent local leadership, survivable terrain, contested space, political conditions, and at least some alignment of objectives.

Interest alignment is rarely perfect, but major divergence between U.S. objectives and partner objectives can create serious strategic risk.

Relationships matter. Long-term credibility, prior engagement, and trust can make UW options more viable when crises emerge.

Policymakers should not assume UW can be created instantly in a crisis; the best options often require years of preparation, relationships, infrastructure, and understanding.

SOF practitioners need to explain UW in terms conventional commanders care about: operational effects, risk, timing, authorities, and contribution to the broader campaign.

Special Forces must remain excellent at working by, with, and through partners—not just at unilateral tactical tasks.

Lieutenant General (Retired) Ken Tovo served as the commanding general of U.S. Army Special Operations Command. A career Special Forces officer, he commanded at multiple levels and has extensive experience in special operations, unconventional warfare, and irregular warfare. He is currently the president and CEO of DOL Enterprises, Chairman of the Green Beret Foundation, and a senior partner at National Security Capital Partners.

Mark Grdovic is the author of Those Who Face Death: The Untold Story of Special Forces and the Iraqi Kurdish Resistance. He served as a battalion operations officer during the 2003 invasion of Iraq while working alongside Kurdish resistance forces in northern Iraq. After retiring from the Army, he has continued to support the special operations community, including work with SOCCENT and USSOCOM.

Kyle Atwell and Alexandra Chinchilla are the hosts for episode 153. Please reach out to them with any questions about the episode or IWI. 

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. 

Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa

Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa

Photo: Cover image is a personal photo provided by one of the podcast guests.

Episode 152 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast grapples with the many definitions of irregular warfare used across the community of interest.

In this episode, our guests discuss why the concept of irregular warfare has resisted a stable definition across decades of changing doctrine, and what that persistent confusion has cost operationally and strategically. We walk through three competing definitional approaches— the maximal, the traditional, and the competition-disruption model — weighing the strengths and weaknesses of each. We close by asking what irregular warfare actually is at its core, and why getting that answer right matters, not just for writers of doctrine, but for practitioners.

The article is here: Fragmented Frontiers: Three Approaches to Understanding Irregular Warfare

 

Dr. Chris Tripodi is Reader in Irregular Warfare at the Defence Studies Department, King's College London. His research focuses on the forms of knowledge Western militaries use to understand their operational environments, and the complex relationship between counterinsurgency theory and practice.

 

Eric Robinson is an Associate Director of the Data Science and Technology Group at the RAND Corporation, where his research focuses on special operations, irregular warfare, and gray zone challenges. He is the lead author of RAND's 2023 report Strategic Disruption by Special Operations Forces, which we touch on in today’s episode.

 

Lieutenant General (ret.) Mike Nagata served for 38 years in the US Army, with 34 years in special operations. Among his many positions of leadership, he served as Commander of US Special Operations Command-Central from 2013 to 2015, and was heavily involved in the first two years of combat operations against the Islamic State.

 

Alisa Laufer hosts this episode. Please reach out to the Irregular Warfare Podcast team with any questions about the episode or the broader mission of the show.

 

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

 

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

 

All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. 

 

Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa

Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa