Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Maxwell v. Dinis

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Nov 2, 2026.

Petitioner: William Maxwell.
Respondent: Sandra Dinis, Acting Warden.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

William Maxwell is a federal prisoner housed at FCI Beaumont Low in Texas. In 2020, Maxwell asked prison officials to transfer him to a halfway house or home confinement, invoking several laws including the First Step Act's earned time credit provisions, which require the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to apply credits prisoners earn through participation in rehabilitation programs toward earlier placement in prerelease custody. The BOP responded only to Maxwell's request under the separate CARES Act and denied it, ignoring his First Step Act arguments entirely. After Maxwell pushed through the BOP's administrative grievance process — a process he contends the BOP actively obstructed by losing filings, failing to respond, and submitting a false declaration claiming he never raised First Step Act claims — he filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking transfer to a halfway house or home confinement based on his earned First Step Act time credits.

The district court dismissed Maxwell's petition, ruling he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on his First Step Act claims. Maxwell appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which sua sponte affirmed dismissal on a different ground — holding under its own bright-line rule that because a favorable ruling would not automatically accelerate Maxwell's release from prison, a civil rights lawsuit, not a habeas petition, was the only proper vehicle for his claims.

Question

Can a federal prisoner use a habeas corpus petition to challenge the government's calculation of First Step Act time credits in order to seek an earlier transfer to a halfway house or home confinement?

Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, Georgia

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 2, 2026.

Petitioner: Jasmine Younge.
Respondent: Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, Georgia .


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In April 2019, Fulton County District Attorney Paul Howard — an elected official — hired Dr. Jasmine Younge as Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Policy and Programs at a salary of $120,282. Younge ranked third in the office's chain of command, reported exclusively to Howard, supervised more than thirty employees, and worked so closely with Howard that he described her as a "key member" and his "go-to person for almost everything." About two months into her tenure, Younge told Howard she was pregnant.

After that announcement, Howard stopped meeting with Younge, excluded her from meetings, treated her dismissively, and reassigned some of her duties — then fired her two weeks later. Younge sued the Fulton County District Attorney's Office for pregnancy discrimination under Title VII. In its answer, the DA's Office raised several affirmative defenses but did not plead the Title VII personal-staff exemption — which excludes from Title VII's coverage persons chosen to serve on an elected official's "personal staff." The DA's Office did not recognize the exemption as relevant until it began preparing its summary judgment motion, after discovery had already closed.

The district court allowed the DA's Office to raise the personal-staff exemption for the first time at summary judgment, finding no prejudice to Younge from the late assertion, and granted summary judgment to the DA's Office on that basis; Younge then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed.

Question

May a defendant raise an affirmative defense it never pleaded in its answer as the sole basis for a summary judgment motion — without seeking to amend its answer — and does it matter that the court's scheduling order deadline would have barred any such amendment?

Oral argument for Salazar v. Paramount Global, argued on October 14, 2026.
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Beaird v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Oct 13, 2026.

Petitioner: Kendrick Jarrell Beaird.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates: Kevin Joel Page (for the Petitioner)

Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent, supporting vacatur)

Anthony J. Dick (Court-appointed amicus curiae)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Kendrick Jarrell Beaird pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. During sentencing, the district court applied a penalty enhancement under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines because Beaird possessed a “large capacity magazine.” While the text of the Guidelines does not define that term, the accompanying official Commentary specifies that any magazine capable of holding more than 15 rounds triggers the increased penalty.

Beaird possessed a magazine that held 17 rounds. He argued that the district court erred by relying on the Commentary to define a term missing from the actual Guidelines. This challenge focuses on the level of deference courts must grant to supplemental Commentary, especially when that Commentary expands the scope of sentencing enhancements beyond the written text of the Guidelines.

The district court sentenced Beaird to 72 months in prison and three years of supervised release. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding that prior circuit precedent foreclosed Beaird’s challenge to the court’s reliance on the Guidelines commentary.

Question

Does Stinson v. United States still correctly state the rule for deference that courts must give the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?

Department of the Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Oct 7, 2026.

Petitioner: Department of the Air Force.
Respondent: Prutehi Guahan.

Advocates: Sopan Joshi (for the Petitioners)

Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The U.S. Air Force operates Andersen Air Force Base at the northern tip of Guam, adjacent to Tarague Beach—a coastal area that sits above Guam's sole-source drinking-water aquifer and serves as habitat for endangered sea turtles. Since 1982, the Air Force has disposed of hazardous waste munitions at Tarague Beach through open burning and open detonation (OB/OD) operations, a method that involves igniting or exploding ordnance in open air. Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Air Force must obtain a permit every three years from the Guam Environmental Protection Agency (Guam EPA), which has administered RCRA on the island since 1986. The Air Force has renewed that permit on a triennial cycle without interruption.

When its most recent permit approached expiration in September 2021, the Air Force submitted a renewal application to Guam EPA in May 2021—without first preparing any environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The application described planned OB/OD operations for 2021 through 2024 and proposed restarting open burning, which had been inactive since at least the early 2000s. The Air Force conducted no environmental impact statement, no environmental assessment, and offered no public comment opportunity before committing to that plan. Guam EPA accepted the application, held a public comment period, and issued a preliminary notice neither approving nor denying the application while it reviewed public comments. Meanwhile, under RCRA's automatic-extension provision, the Air Force continued OB/OD operations under its 2018 permit while the renewal remained pending.

Prutehi Litekyan filed suit in the District Court of Guam in January 2022, alleging that the Air Force violated NEPA by submitting its RCRA permit renewal application without conducting the required environmental review; the district court granted the Air Force's motion to dismiss on three grounds—lack of standing, absence of final agency action, and failure to state a claim—and Prutehi Litekyan timely appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed all three holdings.

Question

1. When the federal government submits a permit application to continue disposing of hazardous waste, does that submission count as a final, reviewable government decision under federal law?

2. Before submitting that permit application, must the federal government first conduct the broad environmental review that federal law generally requires—even though the hazardous waste permitting process already includes its own, more limited environmental review?