Supreme Court Oral Arguments

• [24-758] GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal

  The GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal Justia · Docket · oyez.org Petitioner: The GEO Group, Inc.Respondent: Alejandro Menocal. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Alejandro Menocal and other immigration detainees brought a class action lawsuit against The GEO Group, Inc. (GEO), a private company that operates the Aurora Immigration Processing Center (AIPC) in Colorado under contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). GEO maintained a mandatory Sanitation Policy requiring all detainees to clean common areas including walls, floors, bathrooms, and recreation yards. Detainees who refused these cleaning assignments faced escalating disciplinary actions, beginning with suspension of television and phone privileges and potentially resulting in solitary confinement for up to seventy-two hours. Menocal, detained from June to September 2014, witnessed fellow detainees placed in isolation for refusing to clean, and multiple detainees testified to being threatened with or actually placed in solitary confinement for noncompliance. Additionally, AIPC operated a Voluntary Work Program where detainees could work up to eight hours daily in various jobs such as food preparation, barbering, and laundry services for compensation of $1.00 per day. Menocal filed suit in October 2014, alleging forced labor under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act for the mandatory cleaning program and unjust enrichment under Colorado common law for the $1.00 daily wage in the Voluntary Work Program. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado certified two classes in 2017, which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in 2018. Following discovery, GEO moved for summary judgment claiming derivative sovereign immunity under Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co. The district court denied GEO's motion in October 2022, finding that ICE neither directed nor required GEO to compel detainee labor or limit compensation to $1.00 per day. GEO appealed this denial to the Tenth Circuit, which dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Question Is an order denying a government contractor’s claim of derivative sovereign immunity immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine?

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• [23-1197] Landor v. LA DOC

  Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections Justia · Docket · oyez.org Petitioner: Damon Landor.Respondent: Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Damon Landor, a devout Rastafarian, vowed as part of his faith never to cut his hair—a religious commitment known as the Nazarite Vow. Incarcerated in 2020, Landor was first held at the St. Tammany Parish Detention Center and later at LaSalle Correctional Center, both of which allowed him to maintain his hairstyle in accordance with his religious beliefs. After approximately five months and with three weeks left in his sentence, Landor was transferred to Raymond Laborde Correctional Center. Upon arrival, Landor proactively explained his religious practices and presented documentation of previous accommodations, including a copy of a federal court decision supporting similar claims. An intake guard disregarded his documentation, summoned the warden, and upon Landor’s inability to produce immediate additional proof of his beliefs, guards forcibly handcuffed Landor and shaved his head. Following his release, Landor sued the Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, its Secretary James LeBlanc, the correctional center, and Warden Marcus Myers, asserting claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his federal constitutional rights, as well as state law claims. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana dismissed Landor’s individual-capacity RLUIPA claims for money damages, holding such relief unavailable under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, relying on its prior decision in Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, and rejecting Landor’s arguments that subsequent Supreme Court authority or other legal developments altered that result. Question May an individual sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)?

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• [24-1287] Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, President of U.S.

  Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 5, 2025. Petitioner: Learning Resources, Inc., et al.Respondent: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the federal parties) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the private parties) Benjamin Gutman (for the state parties) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Learning Resources, Inc. and hand2mind, Inc. are family-owned businesses that design and distribute educational products for children. Although their product development and some assembly occur domestically, most of their manufacturing is outsourced to international partners, including China. Beginning in early 2025, a series of executive orders from President Donald J. Trump, invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), imposed unprecedented tariffs on imports, including goods from China. These included a 20% “trafficking” tariff and additional “reciprocal” tariffs that pushed rates on Chinese goods to over 145%. Petitioners’ imports were directly affected, and complying with the new tariffs would increase their import-related costs from $2.3 million in 2024 to over $100 million in 2025, putting their businesses at existential risk. The petitioners filed suit on April 22, 2025, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the legality of the IEEPA tariffs. The district court granted a preliminary injunction on May 29, 2025, holding that IEEPA does not authorize the president to impose tariffs and finding that the tariffs posed an existential threat to the petitioners. However, that ruling was stayed just days later, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit docketed the case. Meanwhile, the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled similarly in related cases but its decision was also stayed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Question Does the International Emergency Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (“IEEPA”), authorize the president to impose tariffs?

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• [24-724] Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist

  Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 4, 2025. Petitioner: The Hain Celestial Group, Inc., et al.Respondent: Sarah Palmquist, Individually and as Next Friend of E.P., a Minor. Advocates: Sarah E. Harrington (for the Petitioners) Russell S. Post (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Grant and Sarah Palmquist’s son Ethan developed normally until about 30 months of age, when he experienced sudden and severe developmental regression, including cognitive, behavioral, and physical impairments. He was later diagnosed with a range of conditions—some physical, like seizures and hypotonia, and others mental, like autism and neurocognitive disorders. Tests also revealed high levels of toxic heavy metals in Ethan’s system, which some physicians attributed to heavy-metal poisoning. The Palmquists linked his symptoms to his nearly exclusive consumption of Earth’s Best Organic baby food—manufactured by Hain Celestial Group, Inc. and sold by Whole Foods Market, Inc.—from infancy through toddlerhood. In 2021, a U.S. House Oversight Committee report revealed that Hain’s baby foods contained high levels of arsenic, lead, cadmium, and mercury and that Hain had not tested final products for such contaminants until 2019. In 2021, the Palmquists sued Hain and Whole Foods in Texas state court, raising various state-law claims. Hain removed the case to federal court, alleging that Whole Foods had been improperly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The district court agreed, dismissed Whole Foods, and denied the Palmquists’ motion to remand. It later granted judgment as a matter of law for Hain during trial. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the Palmquists had adequately stated claims against Whole Foods, defeating diversity jurisdiction. It vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to return it to state court. Question Must a federal court’s final judgment be set aside if the case did not have complete diversity when it was removed from state court, and can a plaintiff block diversity jurisdiction by updating the complaint after removal to include a valid claim against a nondiverse defendant?

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• [24-808] Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton

  Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 4, 2025. Petitioner: Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc.Respondent: Jeanne Ann Burton. Advocates: Daniel Ginzburg (for the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In November 2014, Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, a Nashville-based auto-parts corporation, entered bankruptcy proceedings in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. In 2015, Vista-Pro—later represented by its Chapter 7 trustee—filed an adversary proceeding against Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc., a New York corporation, to recover about $50,000 in unpaid invoices. Vista-Pro mailed the summons and complaint to Coney Island’s Brooklyn address addressed only to the corporate entity, not to any officer, agent, or individual as required for proper service under the rules governing service on corporations. Coney Island did not respond to the complaint, leading the bankruptcy court in May 2015 to enter a default judgment against it. Following reconversion of the case to a Chapter 7 proceeding, the trustee repeatedly attempted to collect the judgment. Coney Island received notice of the judgment at least as early as April 2016 when its CEO was sent a demand letter. Years later, after the trustee sought to enforce the judgment by freezing Coney Island’s bank assets in New York, Coney Island sought to vacate the default judgment, arguing that it was void due to improper service and lack of personal jurisdiction. The bankruptcy court and later the district court denied Coney Island’s motion to vacate the judgment as untimely. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that under its precedents interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1), motions to vacate void judgments must be filed within a reasonable time. Question Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) impose any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction?

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