The AI Power Podcast

Jensen Huang is targeted by a Chinese spy, China adopts AI export controls, and AI’s impact on the midterms

Episode description

Adam Goodwin and Gregory Allen examine a shocking New York Times story that Jensen Huang was targeted by Chinese intelligence via the CEO of a partner company, and break down the litany of red flags surrounding diversion efforts to get Nvidia chips into China over the last few years. Then, Adam and Greg break down China’s new AI export controls regime, how it bears a striking resemblance to the Biden era Diffusion Rule, and what strategic objectives Beijing is pursuing by employing this playbook. Lastly, Greg recounts the PHP vulnerability and a Black October that saw record numbers of vulnerabilities found, and the episode finishes with an assessment of how voters feel about AI and its buildout heading into the midterms. 

Chapters:
00:00 – 18:49: Jensen Huang is targeted by a Chinese spy, Nvidia insists chip diversion isn’t happening despite examples to the contrary
18:49 -35:37: China’s new AI export controls assert authority over the flow of Chinese AI tech
35:37 - 54:24: Black October saw a seminal moment in AI cybersecurity risk, the PHP software vulnerability, and lessons from Anthropic’s bug bounty program
54:24 - 1:02:15: The impact of AI on voters’ opinions going into the midterms

Mackenzie Hawkins’ Bloomberg piece from 2025 mentioned by Greg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-12-22/nvidia-partner-megaspeed-draws-china-chip-smuggling-concerns-in-us
ChinaTalk’s breakdown of Chinese AI export controls: https://www.chinatalk.media/p/mofcoms-new-ai-rules

Saif Khan, founding director of the Center for Technology and Statecraft (CTS), and Nick Brown, CTS co-founder and senior fellow, join Gregory C. Allen to unpack their landmark 100+ page report, DUV Immersion Lithography: The Foundation of the US AI Advantage: Closing Gaps in Export Controls to China. Their central finding is that EUV gets the headlines, but the older immersion DUV machines are what China actually uses to make AI chips. China’s stockpile has grown from roughly 50–100 immersion tools in October 2022 to around 340 today. It imported about 90 a year in 2024 and 2025, close to two-thirds of ASML’s global immersion market.
They explain why ASML’s NXT:1980, which can be legally exported to China, is the machine to watch. They also cover how etch and deposition controls are masking the full power of China’s lithography stockpile, and why Chinese indigenization announcements, including the new 28nm prototype, don’t change the strategic picture before the 2030s. Then they lay out their scenario models. Even in an extreme case, China’s current stockpile can’t match US AI chip production through 2035, but continued imports could close the gap or even tip it. Finally, Saif and Nick make the case for a countrywide ban on immersion DUV, the levers the US could pull without new legislation, and what the MATCH Act in the Senate NDAA could mean for the fight.
Read the report at techstatecraft.org/duv.
Chapters
00:00 – 05:35: Meet the Center for Technology and Statecraft and the people behind the report
 05:35 – 08:22: What immersion DUV is, and why it matters more than EUV for China’s AI chips
 08:22 – 12:56: From Cold War controls to ASML’s near-monopoly: how lithography export controls evolved
 12:56 – 17:29: The counterfactual: where would Huawei and SMIC be without EUV controls?
 17:29 – 22:45: Three tiers of DUV, the NXT:1980 loophole, and why countrywide beats case-by-case licensing
 22:45 – 25:18: What if the US had banned all immersion DUV in 2022? From 50+ machines to ~340
 25:18 – 30:02: Why China hasn’t yet unlocked the full power of its lithography stockpile
 30:02 – 37:26: Can China build its own? Prototype, commercialization, scale-up, and the 2030s
 37:26 – 45:40: The scenario models: when stockpile alone isn’t enough, and when imports tip the balance
 45:40 – 50:13: Flops per gigawatt, 90 machines a year, and 100,000 Huawei chips per tool
 50:13 – 55:11: Monday morning at BIS: allied controls, light sources, FDPR, de minimis, and the MATCH Act
 55:11 – 55:27: Where to find the report

Jack Conlin and Gregory Allen examine how a new AI incident led to a shift in AI safety policy from the White House’s Super Intelligence Task Force, and CAISSI gets more direct access to the White House. 

Greg and Jack discuss the landmark shift in AI policy that takes safety more seriously, but still fails to address the growing risk of Chinese models. Then, Anthropic reports it has stopped distillation from 90-99% of attempts, cutting off a core avenue that feeds Chinese AI development. Will this milestone prove to be durable, and how will it affect US AI leadership and strategy?

Chapters:
00:00 – 10:10: Anthropic agents cause White House shift to tougher de facto AI regulation and oversight
10:10 – 14:06: CAISSI gets a name change and now reports to the White House
14:06 – 22:38: Focusing on US model safety without addressing Chinese models is inconsistent and jeopardizes American AI leadership
22:38 – 32:06: Anthropic has stopped 90-99% of adversarial distillation, will it lead to a durable US advantage?

Andrew Freedman, Co-Founder and CEO of Fathom, returns a year after his last conversation with Gregory C. Allen to explain how independent verification organizations (IVOs) went from Fathom's niche AI policy idea to governing law in two states. They start with Fathom’s published polling on U.S. public opinion on AI and how things have changed since the OpenAI Hugging Face incident. They cover:
California’s SB 813
Governor Newsom’s executive order, which pulls the IVO deadline forward to May 2027 and ties IVOs to SB 53
Connecticut’s five-IVO pilot
Why the bipartisan FRONTIER Act has a surprisingly high chance of being Congress' big AI bill next year.
 Chapters
Andrew Freedman returns: what Fathom is and why it isn’t a PAC (00:00 - 02:43)
The April 2026 poll: vetting, China, and who Americans trust (02:43 - 11:06)
Focus groups, named CEOs, and the “Armageddon” expert (11:06 - 15:21)
What an IVO is: Underwriters Laboratories and the Age of Edison (15:21 - 22:43)
How IVOs work, and why voluntary is turning mandatory (22:43 - 26:27)
IVOs alongside CAISI and the UK AISI; duty of care and tort law (26:27 - 31:44)
Who gets to be an IVO, and who audits the auditors (31:44 - 38:29)
SB 813, Newsom’s executive order, SB 53, and Connecticut’s pilot (38:29 - 47:31)
Would IVOs have stopped the Hugging Face incident? (47:31 - 52:30)
Bessent, Sacks, and the liability fight (52:30 - 56:59)
The FRONTIER Act’s odds and the 60th Senate vote (56:59 - 1:01:28)

Gregory Allen and Adam Goodwin break down recent AI policy updates out of the White House – the appointment of Jay Clayton as the new AI czar, and the assembly of a new “Super Intelligence Task Force.” They discuss how the task force’s makeup and the administration’s policy evolution has shifted, but is still hesitant to embrace the kinds of AI safety frontier labs are calling for. Then, Greg and Adam look at a recent FTC investigation of leading U.S. AI labs, as well as action from multiple state attorneys general, to break down how AI liability is perceived and proposals for how to use liability to encourage AI safety efforts. Then, unknown cyber attackers used an open-source agent to break into South Korean banks, smuggled Nvidia chips continue to flow into China, and the D.C. Circuit Court upholds Anthropic’s supply chain risk designation. 

Chapters:

00:00 – 12:28: White House unveils a new AI czar and the Super Intelligence Force
12:28 – 17:36: Re-evaluating the administration’s view of, and role for, AI safety
17:36 – 34:14: Debates about AI liability and responsibility for AI incidents, and how different levels of government are thinking about it
34:14 – 42:11: An AI agent breaks into South Korea’s biggest banks
42:11 – 54:58: Nvidia chip smuggling continues to supply China advanced AI chips, and implications for the U.S.
54:58 – 1:02:41: D.C. court upholds Anthropic’s supply chain risk designation, and why both parties lost the case