VoxDev Development Economics

How many maize seeds should farmers plant in each hole? Ask the farmers and they say two or three. Agronomists can show them more reliable seeds, where they only need one. 
But change the seed and everything else changes too; the fertiliser, the spacing, the whole system. This is why getting better technology into the hands of African farmers, and helping them to find ways to improve their profits, is so much harder than it looks.
Rachid Laajaj (Universidad de los Andes) and Karen Macours (Paris School of Economics) tell Tim Phillips about an experiment in Kenya in which farmers ran trial plots on their own land for three seasons, comparing input combinations side by side, and were followed for five seasons more.
Farmers adopted the new inputs and their profits fell. But they kept experimenting anyway, season after season, until the losses became gains. The most skilled farmers went first, made the most mistakes, and paid the highest price; their neighbours watched, copied, and adopted at a fraction of the cost.
Each failed attempt costs a farmer a season. Lower that cost, Laajaj and Macours argue, and you change what is possible for millions of farming households.
The research behind this episode:
Laajaj, Rachid, and Karen Macours. 2026. "The Complexity of Multidimensional Learning in Agriculture." Econometrica 94 (2): 465-503. 
To cite this episode:
Phillips, Tim, Rachid Laajaj, and Karen Macours. 2026. "Why farmers struggle to adopt new agricultural technology" VoxDev Talks (podcast). 

About the guests

Rachid Laajaj is Associate Professor of Economics at Universidad de los Andes in Bogota, with research spanning technology adoption in agriculture, corruption, and human capital, studied from a micro-development perspective with particular attention to the role of information. He received his PhD in Agricultural and Applied Economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Karen Macours is a professor at the Paris School of Economics, a senior researcher at INRAE, and a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in the Development Economics programme. Her research spans agricultural productivity, rural poverty, social programmes, and early childhood development. She chairs the Standing Panel on Impact Assessment of the CGIAR and is co-editor of the Journal of Development Economics.
Research and concepts cited in this episode

The trials. In 48 randomly selected villages in Kenya, ten farmers per village were invited to run a three-season agronomic trial on a small parcel of their own land, guided by an agronomist. Each trial plot was divided into six subplots; five tested different combinations of modern inputs and one served as a control. The trials occupied a tiny share of each farm, so the direct economic effect was negligible; the point was the opportunity to learn. A further 48 villages served as controls, giving a sample of 960 farmers followed across six seasons of data collection.
Integrated Soil Fertility Management (ISFM). The input combinations tested in the trials followed ISFM principles; a sustainable intensification approach that combines improved seed with mineral fertiliser and organic inputs, adapted to local conditions. Its logic is precisely the multidimensionality the paper studies; the components work through their combination, not in isolation.
The International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) provided the agronomists who guided farmers through the trials. The paper builds on joint work with IITA.
The target-input model. The workhorse theory of learning in agriculture, in which farmers learn the optimal quantity of a single input through experience; it dates to work by Foster and Rosenzweig in 1995 and underlies much of the literature on social learning, including Conley and Udry's study of pineapple farmers in Ghana. Laajaj and Macours extend it to many interdependent inputs, where adopting one requires re-optimising the others; what Laajaj calls the curse of multidimensionality.
Measuring farmer skills. The origin of this project; Laajaj and Macours spent years developing measures of farmers' cognitive, non-cognitive, and technical skills, work that circulated as CEPR Discussion Paper 13271, "Measuring Skills in Developing Countries" (gated). Asking farmers agronomic questions revealed that many had no single right answer; the answer depended on everything else the farmer was doing.
Employment in agriculture. Macours notes in the episode that agriculture accounts for half of employment in sub-Saharan Africa, rising to as much as two-thirds when the wider agro-food sector is included.
Conservation agriculture. A prominent example of a knowledge-intensive sustainable practice; it combines minimal tillage, crop rotation, and the retention of crop residues, so a farmer must learn several new practices at once and find a combination that works.
More VoxDev Talks episodes

African agriculture's underappreciated supply side. Hope Michelson on the other half of the adoption puzzle; the markets and firms that supply seeds, fertilisers, and pesticides to smallholders.
Strengthening climate resilience in agriculture. Tavneet Suri on how small-scale farmers respond to extreme weather, and the seed varieties that protect crops against floods and droughts.
Combining improved seed varieties and index insurance to address drought losses. Paswel Marenya on a trial in Mozambique and Tanzania that paired drought-resistant seeds with insurance.
Related reading on VoxDev

Agricultural Technology in Africa, the VoxDevLit surveying the evidence on what drives, and blocks, technology adoption by African farmers.
Improving agricultural extension and information services in the developing world, drawing lessons from nearly fifty randomised evaluations of constraints on smallholder productivity.
Encouraging agricultural technology adoption through autonomy: evidence from Mexico, on how giving farmers ownership of the adoption process makes new practices stick.
Harnessing the benefits of digital agriculture for smallholder farmers in East Africa, on text-message-based extension programmes evaluated in Kenya and Rwanda.

Wars get the headlines. A civil war can wreck a country's economy and dominate its news for a decade. But if you assume war is the most costly form of violence a society faces, you would be wrong.
In this week's VoxDev Talk, James Fearon (Stanford) joins Tim Phillips to argue that the violence happening quietly inside homes and on ordinary streets does far more damage than war and terrorism combined.
Drawing on his new book Worse Than War (PUP), written with Anke Hoeffler, Fearon estimates that interpersonal violence, meaning homicide, intimate partner violence and severe physical abuse of children, kills and injures more people than war, and costs society more too. Large-scale collective violence hits very few countries in any year. Almost every country carries rates of homicide and assault that exceed the global average for war.
Fearon's argument is not that war does not matter. It is that the interpersonal violence is less dramatic and often hidden from view. There is evidence on what works to reduce it, but we aren't giving the problem the attention it needs.
The book behind this episode:
Hoeffler, Anke, and James D. Fearon. 2026. Worse than War: The Global Costs of Violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
To cite this episode:
Phillips, Tim, and James Fearon. 2026. "Interpersonal violence costs the world more than" VoxDev Talk (podcast). 

About James Fearon

James Fearon is the Theodore and Frances Geballe Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences and professor of political science at Stanford University, and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. His research spans civil and interstate war, ethnic conflict, the international spread of democracy, the evaluation of foreign aid and institution building, and the costs of collective and interpersonal violence. He was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 2012 and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2002.
The book is co-authored with Anke Hoeffler, professor of development research at the University of Konstanz and co-author of Breaking the Conflict Trap, whose work on the economics of civil war includes the influential conflict-trap research with Paul Collier.
Research and concepts discussed in this episode

Interpersonal versus collective violence. The book distinguishes collective violence, perpetrated by organised groups such as states, rebel organisations, terrorists, or criminal gangs, from interpersonal violence, committed by individuals. Interpersonal violence is broken down into homicide, intimate partner violence, and severe physical abuse of children. The central finding is that the average annual cost of interpersonal violence is far larger than that of interstate and civil war, somewhere between five and 20 times larger, with a best estimate of about eight times.
Prevalence, not intensity. The reason interpersonal violence costs more in aggregate is that it is far more widespread. Very few countries experience large-scale collective violence in any given year, but almost all countries carry annual death and injury rates from homicide, intimate partner violence, and child abuse that exceed global average war death and injury rates. For 2000 to 2019, the authors estimate a global annual average of not quite 1.5 deaths per 100,000 people from war and terrorism, against about 7 per 100,000 for homicide.
Intimate partner violence. The authors estimate global annual averages of about 3,300 and 1,600 per 100,000 people for intimate partner physical and sexual assault respectively, which is roughly twice those rates for women specifically.
Severe physical abuse of children. Measured conservatively, capturing beatings far more serious than a mild spanking, the estimates imply that 15% of children aged 14 or younger are subjected to monthly beatings that would be classed as assaults if the victims were adults.
Economic costs versus well-being costs. Civil war can cause severe economic devastation in the worst-affected countries, mainly through reduced growth, and at the global level the strictly economic costs of collective violence may exceed those of interpersonal violence. But economic loss is only one cost. Drawing on methods that use what people pay to avoid risks of death or injury, the authors estimate well-being losses that are far greater for interpersonal violence, because it kills and injures so many more people each year. The authors note that the difficulty of estimating the economic cost of interpersonal violence means their figures probably understate it relative to collective violence.
Why interpersonal violence stays invisible. National media and political debate focus far more on collective violence, partly because it is dramatic and episodic while interpersonal violence is persistent and, happening inside households, often practically invisible. Sustained public and policy attention on the scale of interpersonal violence is itself a step towards reducing its costs.
It is not just "culture". Against the view that little can be done because interpersonal violence is cultural, the authors point to a broad range of programmes and policies with evidence behind them. For homicide and intimate partner violence, measures that reduce alcohol access and consumption. For intimate partner violence and child abuse, adolescent dating programmes and parenting programmes. Across all forms, police reform to improve accountability and training, and more police in countries with low ratios of police to homicides.
Reducing collective violence. There is reasonable evidence that UN peacekeeping operations are a relatively inexpensive way to lower violence in civil war countries and to reduce the chance of war resuming after a peace agreement. The authors note that rising conflict among the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, and sharpening regional rivalries among larger states in conflict-affected areas, have sharply reduced the prospects for new peacekeeping operations for now.

How do courts work when they work well? You would expect them to be impartial, neutral, and consistent. In much of the Global South that is a tall order. 
So when courts fall short of it, are they failing?
Development institutions ask states to build strong courts on the North American and Western European model. Good governance follows, they argue. This model treats poorer, less democratic systems as deviations from a norm rather than as institutions doing different work.
Fiona Shen-Bayh (University of Maryland) joins Tim Phillips to review the evidence on what courts in the Global South actually do, and who they help. Where the state is weak, customary elders, NGOs, even rebel groups step in to adjudicate, and people often trust these forums more than the state's own courts. 
Taliban courts in Afghanistan upheld due process during civil war. Dictators sometimes build genuinely independent courts, because property rights attract investment and citizens' lawsuits tell the centre what local officials are doing.
The research behind this episode:
Rios-Figueroa, Julio, and Fiona Shen-Bayh. 2025. "Courts in the Global South." Annual Review of Political Science 28. 
To cite this episode:
Phillips, Tim, and Fiona Shen-Bayh. 2026. "Courts in the Global South." VoxDev Talks (podcast). 

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About the guest

Fiona Shen-Bayh is Assistant Professor of Government and Politics, with a joint appointment at the College of Information Studies, at the University of Maryland. Her research spans authoritarian regimes, judicial politics, and the use of legal and judicial institutions as instruments of power, often drawing on digitised archives and text-as-data methods. Her book Undue Process: Persecution and Punishment in Autocratic Courts (Cambridge University Press) won the APSA-IPSA Theodore J. Lowi First Book Award, the Giovanni Sartori Book Award, and the Juan Linz Best Book Prize.
The paper is co-authored with Julio Rios-Figueroa, Professor in the Department of Law at the Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM), whose work spans comparative judicial politics, the rule of law, and empirical legal studies, with a focus on Latin America.
Research cited in this episode

The triad logic of conflict resolution. Drawn from Martin Shapiro's Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (1981). A court is effective when two parties appeal to a third to settle their dispute, and three conditions hold: the parties believe the third party is impartial; the third party is neutral, not predisposed to favour either side; and the rationale for the decision is consistent with existing norms, the idea of precedent. The review deliberately relaxes the assumption that courts are effective only when all three conditions are met.
The rule of law revival. The wave of good-governance programmes promoted by the United States and Western European governments and NGOs after the fall of the Soviet Union, presenting strong courts as a remedy for corruption, instability, and tyranny in the Global South.
The fallacy of legalism. The belief that creating law through statute, legislation, or precedent is enough to bring about social change. The phrase, from Sandra Joireman's work on property rights in Africa, names a habit of thought rooted in the Western experience, where the state has historically enforced property rights and contracts. In much of the Global South the absence of the state does not mean the absence of rules and order.
Stateness. The extent to which a state exercises authority across its territory: its monopoly on violence in the classic Weberian sense, but also the creation of law and the administration of public affairs. Where stateness is low, non-state actors fill the judicial vacuum.
Taliban and Islamic State courts. Recent fieldwork-based research finds that Sharia courts run by the Taliban in Afghanistan upheld notable degrees of due process and impartiality, offering predictability during civil war, and that the coercion associated with the Taliban featured in only a minority of the cases their courts heard.
Courts in authoritarian regimes. A growing literature shows what courts do for dictators: establish credible property rights that attract foreign capital; monitor administrative conflict, as in China, where citizens' grievances against the state feed information upward to the centre; and, at other times, repress opponents or legitimise the regime by delivering popular moral outcomes even against the letter of the law.
Political competition and judicial independence. Electoral competition can sustain independent courts in healthy democracies, partly because divided governments struggle to coordinate against unfavourable rulings. Under instability or an expected change of regime, the relationship can reverse: incumbents pack courts to entrench their interests before leaving, and judges may rule strategically to align with whoever they expect to hold power next, a pattern visible across Latin America.
Access to justice and legal mobilisation. Social transformation through courts depends on people developing a "legal conscience", an understanding of the law and how to use it, and on support structures outside the judiciary: civil society organisations, bar associations, prosecutors, lawyers, and human rights groups that help citizens bring and sustain claims.
Courts and democratic backsliding. Courts hold neither the purse nor the sword, which makes them easy targets for hostile rhetoric, legislative threats, pressure to resign, and court-packing. Courts that are neither impartial nor neutral can still stabilise a democracy while rival parties remain uncertain of each other's intentions, provided both still accept competitive elections. Once a party, especially an incumbent, abandons that commitment, there is little a court can do alone.
Digitised judicial data. The digitisation and free publication of court records across the Global South has opened large-scale, fine-grained study of everyday jurisprudence, useful to scholars and to the judges, lawyers, and litigants who can now see how the law works in their own context.

The usual way to measure women's power in politics is to count the seats they hold in parliament. But most women who take part in politics never stand for office. They vote, attend meetings, petition, protest, or try to get the water supply fixed. 
In this week's VoxDev Talk, Soledad Artiz Prillaman of Stanford talks to Tim Phillips about her new review of the research into non-elite women's participation in politics, written with Peace Medie (University of Bristol).
They are not elite women with less money, she argues. They want different things and face different constraints. Social norms can prevent them from achieving the change they want. But in the Global South there is evidence that non-elite women are using collective action to gain access to politics, and using that access to renegotiate the norms that hold them back, rather than waiting for those norms to shift first.
The research behind this episode:
Medie, Peace A., and Soledad Artiz Prillaman. 2026. "Nonelite Women's Participation in Politics." Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 29.
To cite this episode:
Phillips, Tim, and Soledad Artiz Prillaman. 2026. "Nonelite Women's Participation in Politics." VoxDev Talks (podcast). 

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About the guest

Soledad Artiz Prillaman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and faculty director of the Inclusive Democracy and Development Lab. Her research spans comparative political economy, development, and gender, with a focus on South Asia and on how and when women gain access to politics, both as citizens and as representatives. She is the author of The Patriarchal Political Order: The Making and Unraveling of the Gendered Participation Gap in India (Cambridge University Press, 2023).
The paper is co-authored with Peace A. Medie, Associate Professor in the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at the University of Bristol. Her work covers gender, security, and politics in Africa, including the campaigns to end violence against women.
Research cited in this episode

Elite and nonelite women. The paper defines eliteness by access to political power, not by office held or income alone. Elites include elected representatives, but also academics and business executives whose position gives them access to power. Nonelites are those who lack that access. The distinction matters because policy aimed at getting more women into elite positions only helps everyone else if elite and nonelite women want the same things, and the evidence that they do is thin.
The income puzzle. At the individual level, income is generally uncorrelated with women's turnout; at the national level, GDP predicts nonelite women's participation only in some places. Women in paid work do participate more, but the driver appears to be the networks and information that come with a job, not the wage.
Vote agency. Showing up to vote is not the same as voting freely. Asked whether they would vote for their own preferred party or the one a male gatekeeper preferred, at least half of women in some South Asian settings say they would defer. Work by Sara Khan shows that the women with the least agency are those whose preferences differ most from the men who hold power over them.
Varieties of patriarchy. All societies are patriarchal, but patriarchy operates differently across them. In parts of South Asia it takes the form of explicit, socially sanctioned control over where women go and how they vote. In the United States and Europe it shows up earlier, as socialisation, producing large gender gaps in stated political interest. Same underlying force, different mechanics, different policy conclusions.
Quotas. More than 100 countries have adopted some form of electoral gender quota, making it the most widespread women's empowerment policy in the world. The evidence on whether quotas help nonelite women is mixed; they raise some women's participation in some places, but in others the effect is null or negative. In India, Prillaman notes campaign material for quota seats that pairs the woman candidate's name with a man's photograph.
Collective action. Networks outside the home, through women's groups, microcredit groups, churches, unions or friendship circles, raise women's participation by widening their information and giving them cover against backlash. Prillaman argues that in the Global South women are increasingly using collective action to gain access to politics, and using that access to renegotiate norms, rather than waiting for norms to change first.
More from VoxDev

Where are the Indian female politicians?, an interview with Lakshmi Iyer on why a woman winning office in India does not lead to more women standing next time.
Related reading on VoxDev

Grassroots party activism by women promotes equal political participation, in which Tanushree Goyal finds that women politicians in Delhi recruit women activists, narrowing gender gaps in political knowledge and participation.
Women's microcredit groups empower women politically, in which Prillaman shows that microcredit groups raise women's political participation in India by building their networks, not their bank balances.

This episode follows a wide-ranging panel convened at Stanford's King Center on Global Development, featuring Gyude Moore, as well as Gates Foundation CEO Mark Suzman, former USAID Administrator and Ambassador Mark Green, and Chair and Founder of the Liquidity and Sustainability Facility Vera Songwe - The future of global development: Approaches and partnerships for a new reality.
Bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa will fall by between 16% and 28% this year, according to the IMF. In past downturns, multilateral and humanitarian funding tended to fill the gap when bilateral aid dropped. This time those channels are shrinking too.
Gyude Moore, who ran the Liberian President's Delivery Unit under Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, thinks the contraction is structural rather than a passing effect of the Trump administration, and that recipient countries should stop expecting the old arrangement to return. He wants economic growth put at the centre of development rather than treated as one programme among several. Instead of letting donors decide which programmes are run, he says, countries should run a growth diagnostic: a way of identifying the two or three constraints doing most to hold an economy back. Governments can then reorganise their budgets around removing those constraints, and use the diagnostic to decide which offers of aid to take and which to turn down. Moore calls this “sovereignty through analytics”. Aid was meant to be temporary, he argues, and the job now is to quickly reach the point of not needing it.
To cite this episode:
Phillips, Tim, and W. Gyude Moore. 2026. "The end of aid dependency.” VoxDev Talks (podcast). 

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About the guest

W. Gyude Moore is a distinguished fellow at the Energy for Growth Hub and a non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development. He was Liberia's minister of public works from December 2014 to January 2018, and before that deputy chief of staff to President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and head of the President's Delivery Unit, which oversaw more than $1 billion of road, power and port projects in a country rebuilding after civil war. He also lectures at the University of Chicago's Harris School of Public Policy. His work covers African infrastructure, energy, industrial policy and development finance.
Cited in this episode

The scale of the cuts. The IMF's October 2025 Regional Economic Outlook for sub-Saharan Africa, using OECD figures, projects bilateral aid to the region falling by 16% to 28% in 2025, with more cuts likely. Moore says the cuts to multilateral and humanitarian funding run higher again, and that the most aid-dependent countries have been hit hardest, through weaker health, education and nutrition systems.
Growth diagnostics. A way of finding the constraints that matter most: the one or two that, once removed, allow others to ease. Moore likens it to a doctor running tests before prescribing. The method is associated with the Growth Lab at Harvard. He suggests governments hire an independent party to run the analysis, so the findings cannot be dismissed as political.
The Millennium Challenge Corporation. A US agency that runs what it calls a constraints analysis, then funds the removal of the constraint it finds. Moore offers it as an existing model for diagnostic-led aid, while noting that it has critics.
Sovereignty through analytics. Moore's phrase for using a credible diagnostic to set the terms with donors. A government can say what it is trying to do, ask for help where it needs it, and decline what does not fit. He points to Ghana, Zambia and Zimbabwe rejecting or walking away from US health agreements under the America First Global Health Strategy as evidence that recipient governments now have that leverage and are willing to use it.
The Development Alliance. Liberia's attempt, around 2014 and 2015, to bring every donor and NGO into one room to map who was doing what, spot duplication and find the sectors nobody was covering. Moore's assessment: useful, but voluntary, not written into law, and not built around a single diagnostic. His conclusion is that such a framework should be put on a legal footing.
Five-year plans. Moore, who teaches in China each autumn, points to the discipline that fixed planning periods impose, and argues that legislation can do a similar job of holding a development strategy steady across changes of government.
Delivery units. Small teams set up to push complex projects through where the wider bureaucracy cannot. Moore ran one in the Liberian presidency and calls them islands of competence; he offers them as a way around weak implementation.
The European politics of aid. Moore's reason for thinking the window may close. Nativist parties are gaining ground across Europe, from the AfD to Reform UK to the PVV in the Netherlands, and an ageing population will pull more public money homeward. Countries that do not adjust, he warns, may find the external funding gone.