Talking About Organizations Podcast

In Part 2 of our episode on Gieryn’s 1983 article “Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from non-Science,” we review the main points in the context of contemporary tensions over society’s growing distrust of scientists and rejection of science. What factors may be contributing to this trend after so many decades where scientists have been considered noble individual or science considered an inherently good thing? What might be necessary to stem or reverse such trends?

We continue our series of discussions on the sociology of science and cover a seminal article that is commonly found as required reading in doctoral programs -- Thomas Gieryn’s 1983 article “Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from non-Science” from the American Sociological Review. This commentary draws from three different historical case studies to explore where the boundary is between what is or should be considered science or the autonomy granted to scientists and what is considered other forms of intellectual pursuit. In Part 1, we explore the cases that involve competition between the world of science and those of religion and engineering, of true science vs. pseudo-science, and of scientific openness and collaboration vs. national security and commensurate need for secrecy.

Coming soon! Our next episode features a 1983 article from Thomas Gieryn that discusses how the “boundary work” of scientists and others science contributes to a broader understanding of where science is separated from non-science or pseudo-science and scientists navigate the gap between their individual autonomy and the constraints placed on them by others such as government leaders. Through historical cases, Gieryn explores the contested spaces surrounding science and why the boundary will likely never be clear.

In Part 2 of our episode on Charles Perrow’s book Normal Accidents, we carry the framework forward into the 21st century to consider newer technological systems (especially in information technology) and the Y2K problem that was looming when the updated edition of the book was published in 1999. Is there any hope for mitigating the potential for new forms of high-risk accidents, or are we just stuck with having to deal with the occasional mass disaster?

This month we are discussing Charles Perrow’s book Normal Accidents that addresses the risks associated with complex, tightly coupled high-risk technological systems. Through analyses of numerous accidents and incidents involving nuclear power plants, petrochemical plants, aerospace and maritime systems, and others, Perrow derived a framework that showed how high-risk systems are prone to accidents if they are highly complex and the components are tightly coupled. He also argued that efforts to improve safety such as more meters and indicators can have the opposite effect of complicating the operator’s ability to control a catastrophic situation.